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17.06.2007

FAO - Farm animal diversity under threat

The rapid spread of large-scale industrial livestock production focussed on a narrow range of breeds is the biggest threat to the world’s farm animal diversity, according to a report presented today to the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. Surging global demand for meat, milk and eggs has led to heavy reliance on high-output animals intensively bred to supply uniform products, according to The State of the World’s Animal Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. The problem is compounded by the ease with which genetic material can now be moved around the world, says the report, which draws on information from 169 countries. “In the next 40 years, the world’s population will rise from today’s 6.2 billion to 9 billion, with all the growth occurring in the developing countries,” said FAO Assistant Director-General Alexander Müller in his address to the Commission. “We need to increase the resilience of our food supply, by maintaining and deploying the widest possible portfolio of genetic resources, which are vital and irreplaceable. ”“Global warming is an additional threat to all genetic resources, increasing the pressure on biodiversity,” Müller adds. “Yet we need these genetic resources for the adaptation of agriculture to climate change. ” Time is running out “One livestock breed a month has become extinct over the past seven years, and time is running out for one-fifth of the world’s breeds of cattle, goats, pigs, horses and poultry,” says Müller. “This report, the first-ever global overview of livestock biodiversity and of the capacity within countries to manage their animal genetic resources, is a wake-up call to the world. ”And this may only be a partial picture of the genetic erosion taking place, according to the report, as breed inventories are inadequate in many parts of the world. Moreover, among many of the most widely used high-output breeds of cattle, within-breed genetic diversity is being undermined by the use of a few highly popular sires for breeding. “Effective management of animal genetic diversity is essential to global food security, sustainable development and the livelihoods of millions of people,” says Irene Hoffmann, Chief of FAO's Animal Production Service. “While sometimes less productive, many breeds at risk of extinction have unique characteristics, such as disease resistance or tolerance to climatic extremes, which future generations may need to draw on to cope with challenges such as climate change, emerging animal diseases and rising demand for specific livestock products,” Hoffmann adds. Some breeds are more equal Well-adapted livestock have been an essential element of agricultural production systems for more than 10 000 years, especially important in harsh environments where crop farming is difficult or impossible. Since the mid-twentieth century, a few high-performance breeds, usually of European descent – including Holstein-Friesian (by far the most widespread breed, reported in at least 128 countries and in all regions of the world) and Jersey cattle; Large White, Duroc and Landrace pigs; Saanen goats; and Rhode Island Red and Leghorn chickens – have spread throughout the world, often crowding out traditional breeds. This progressive narrowing of genetic diversity is largely complete in Europe and North America and is now occurring in many developing countries, which have so far retained a large number of their indigenous breeds. Hotspot of breed diversity loss The developing world will be the hotspot of breed diversity loss in the twenty-first century, according to the report. In Vietnam, for example, the percentage of indigenous sows declined from 72 percent of the total population in 1994 to only 26 percent in 2002. Of its 14 local breeds, five breeds are vulnerable, two in a critical state and three are facing extinction. In Kenya, introduction of the Dorper sheep has caused the almost complete disappearance of pure-bred Red Maasai sheep. Conservation programmes lacking The crowding out of local breeds is set to accelerate in many developing countries, unless special provisions are made for their sustainable use and conservation by providing livestock keepers with adequate support, the report warns. Effective management of animal genetic diversity requires resources – including well-trained personnel and adequate technical facilities – which many developing countries lack. According to the report, 48 percent of the world’s countries report no national in vivo conservation programmes, and 63 percent report that they have no in vitro programmes, that is, the conservation of embryos, semen or other genetic material, with the potential to reconstitute live animals at a later date. Similarly, in many countries, structured breeding programmes are absent or ineffective. “Support for developing countries and countries with economies in transition to characterize, conserve and utilize their livestock breeds will be necessary,” says Clive Stannard of the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. “Frameworks for wide access to animal genetic resources, and for equitable sharing of the benefits derived from them, need to be put in place, both at national and international levels.” Source - FAO

06.06.2007

USA - Fraud in the House of Insurers

Crop Insurance Fraud: The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Risk Management Agency, which administers the crop insurance program, uses satellite imaging technology to monitor farm acreage that is involved in a farmer's crop insurance claim. The images have been used in courts to determine crop insurance fraud. Since 2001, less than 100 cases that used satellite images have been prosecuted. However, teamed with data mining, the agency has put about 1,500 farms on watch for suspected fraud. Its spot check list, developed through the use of the images, has saved taxpayers $71-$110 million a year in fraudulent crop insurance claims since 2001. Insurers' Antifraud Measures: Insurance companies are not law enforcement agencies. They can only identify suspicious claims, withhold payment where fraud is suspected and to justify their actions by collecting the necessary evidence to use in a court. The success of the battle against insurance fraud therefore depends on two elements: the resources devoted by the insurance industry itself to detecting fraud and the level of priority assigned by legislators, regulators, law enforcement agencies and society as a whole to eradicating it. Special Investigation Units (SIUs): Many insurance companies have established special investigation units (SIUs) to help identify and investigate suspicious claims; some insurance companies outsource their units to other insurers. In 1999, 40 percent of property/casualty insurers had SIUs, according to the Coalition Against Insurance Fraud. By 2001, that proportion had more than doubled. These units range from a small team, whose primary role is to train claim representatives to deal with the more routine kinds of fraud cases, to teams of trained investigators, including former law enforcement officers, attorneys, accountants and claim experts to thoroughly investigate fraudulent activities. More complex cases, involving large scale criminal operations or individuals that repeatedly stage accidents, may be turned over to the National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB). This insurance industry-sponsored organization has special expertise in preparing fraud cases for trial and serves as a liaison between the insurance industry and law enforcement agencies. In addition, it publicizes the arrest and conviction of the perpetrators of insurance fraud to help deter future criminal activities. Insurance company surveys confirm that SIUs dramatically impact the bottom line of many insurance companies. In the mid-1990s insurers said that for every dollar they invested in antifraud efforts, including SIUs, they got up to $27 back, but these returns have become harder to achieve as the more apparent fraud schemes have been uncovered and more effort is necessary to ferret out the sophisticated fraud that remains. A 2000 study by Conning Research & Consulting suggests that results vary widely. Using the ratio of "claims exposure reduction" to the expense of running SIUs, the study found ratios ranging from a low of 3 to 1 to a high of 27 to 1, depending on the year and line of insurance. Although some insurers are cutting back on fraud investigation by outsourcing investigations and dissolving their fraud units, advances in software technology, especially programs that sift though the millions of claims that large health insurers process annually, are proving effective in fighting fraud. These "data mining" programs can uncover repetitions and anomalies and analyze links to fraudulent activities or entities. (See below.) New Technology: The consolidation of insurance industry claims databases has put a valuable new tool in the hands of investigators. ISO's system, known as ClaimSearch, utilizes a data-mining program. ClaimSearch is the world's largest comprehensive database of claims information. The NICB has developed a program called Predictive Knowledge, which collects and analyzes information that can be disseminated to insurers and law enforcement agencies to detect, investigate and prevent insurance fraud. In addition, the NICB, in partnership with iMapData Inc., has a progarm called CATfraud, which identifies potentially fraudulent catastrophe/weather-related insurance claims. The latest technology offers valuable tools that can help insurers fight fraud before it occurs. Software can verify the accuracy of information provided by prospective policyholders on application forms. These systems are relatively new but may be able to eliminate potentially fraudulent claims at the point of underwriting instead of after a claim. Once a claim is made, insurers can use a number of different software tools, ranging from voice stress analysis and "red flag" identifiers to datamining and database searching. Software is also available to compare claims to baselines or thresholds developed from examining many similar claims. Analysts are able to determine if the claim they are handling is an exception to the norm. Fraud Academy: A national fraud academy - a joint initiative of the Property Casualty Association of America, the FBI, NICB and the International Association of Special Investigating Units - was designed to fight insurance claims fraud by educating and training fraud investigators. It offers online classes under the leadership of the NICB. Privacy: An emerging issue for insurers using data sharing services is their impact on privacy. Financial institutions, including insurers, must respect the privacy of their customers and protect their personal information, a practice that may deter efforts to combat fraud. The federal financial services deregulation legislation, the Gramm/Leach/Bliley Act of 1999, raises this issue. RICO: Insurers may also file civil lawsuits under the federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which requires proving a preponderance of evidence rather than the stricter rules of evidence required in criminal actions and allows for triple damages. Since 1997, some of the largest insurers in the country, especially auto insurers, have been filing and winning lawsuits against individuals and organized rings that perpetrate insurance fraud. State Legislation: While insurance fraud, like other types of fraud, is illegal in all states, some laws are more effective in fighting it than others. It is easier to prosecute cases of insurance fraud in states where it is identified as a specific crime in the penal code and where what constitutes insurance fraud is defined, along with the penalties that can be imposed. Where insurance fraud is not specifically mentioned, it falls under general fraud provisions such as fraud by deception. The level of seriousness attached to the crime also varies by state. Some states classify insurance fraud or certain types of insurance fraud as a felony, others as a misdemeanor, a lower level of crime. Some classify insurance fraud as a felony when more than a certain dollar amount is involved. Privacy laws protect the rights of policyholders and claimants against the release of information considered confidential. However, to successfully bring a case to trial, insurers must be able to provide information to prosecutors on individuals suspected of fraud. Immunity laws that allow insurance companies to report information without fear of criminal or civil prosecution now exist in all states, but not all laws cover insurance fraud specifically, or allow information to be reported to law enforcement agencies as well as to state departments of insurance. Many are limited in other ways, providing protection against libel suits or violation of unfair claims practices acts only in auto insurance fraud, for example, or arson investigations. Some experts believe that immunity laws should be extended to also include good faith exchanges of certain kinds of claim-related information among insurance companies. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners has developed model bills for immunity as well as insurance fraud laws to encourage states to address the problem of insurance fraud and to assist them in formulating appropriate legislation. Most states have set up their own fraud bureaus, often with insurance industry funding. Many have law enforcement powers. In some states, laws require insurers to establish SIUs and to file antifraud plans with the insurance department. The NICB has set up a standardized computer program to eliminate duplicate reporting and to speed up the electronic transmission process. Source - http://allafrica.com

30.05.2007

Developing nations protect farm interests more than industrialized ag countries

Everybody does it; some just do it more than others — supporting, or subsidizing, a nation’s agricultural production and infrastructure is as common among nations as the people’s need to eat and clothe themselves. But the apparently widely-accepted notion that developed nations take advantage of developing ones through higher subsidies is, in modern parlance, messed up. A recently published report from the Cotton Economics Research Institute (CERI) in the Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics at Texas Tech University, Lubbock, takes on that notion and compares crop subsidies and tariffs of 21 developed and developing countries. The study was initiated by the recently-organized Southwest Council of Agribusiness. It shows that “all countries, both industrialized and developing, support their agriculture sectors, but use vastly divergent policy tools and combinations of tools. Most use guaranteed minimum prices and import tariffs to protect domestic producers.” The report also indicates that developing countries use a plethora of tools often not considered in measuring the amount or rates of subsidies. These include input subsidies, such as reimbursement for seed, fertilizer, equipment and labor. Producers in some developing countries also get tax incentives or low interest loans. “Developing countries’ tariff protection is substantially higher than that of industrialized countries,” the report notes. Developing countries also are more likely to employ sanitary and phytosanitary measures to limit imports. Nations have compelling reasons to protect agriculture, including a desire to achieve: self-sufficiency in food production, food safety, and sustainability of natural resources. The report says most countries, developing or industrialized, “use some form of guaranteed minimum price to producers and use import tariff-rate-quotas to protect domestic industries.” Protection may be a loan rate, as in the United States, intervention price in the European Union, minimum support price in India and Pakistan or a minimum floor price in China. Findings reveal that the minimum support price for cotton in the United States is lower than that of other cotton-producing countries. Findings also indicate that industrialized countries have, in recent years, moved away from price supports to broader farm income support options and direct income payments to stabilize agriculture. Countercyclical payments serve that function in the United States. The European Union also is moving toward decoupled instead of commodity support payments. Studies indicate, based on per unit prices, extent of support may be higher in developed countries. “But major developing countries supplement price support programs with sizable amounts of input subsidies to protect their agriculture sectors. “For example, India provides annual subsidies of $12 billion for food storage and distribution, fertilizer, water, and electricity. China provided its producers subsidized seed and machinery purchases, technology adoption and investments in rural infrastructure of $43 billion in 2006, up from $18 billion in 2004 and $15 billion in 2003. “Brazil, a rising force in the world agricultural market, is proposing $26.1 billion in various forms of credit assistance and agricultural production insurance.” The research found that developing and developed countries use import tariffs to protect their agriculture sectors. “But an interesting point, supported by World Bank estimates, is that average bound/applied tariffs for agriculture are higher in major developing countries than in developed countries. In 2004, the average applied tariff rates were 8.2 percent for the United States and 9.5 percent for the European Union. For major developing countries like India and China, the average applied tariff rates for agriculture were 30 percent and 15 percent in the same year,” the report says. “The differences are even more pronounced when one compares average bound tariff rates for agriculture between major developed and developing countries.” Studies also show that major developed countries allow more agriculture products to come in duty free than do major developing countries. The United States and the European Union allow more than 25 percent of agricultural products in duty free. That percentage for most developing countries is less than 3 percent. A less apparent but significant advantage developing counties have over industrialized agricultural nations comes through lower standards for environmental and workplace regulations. Programs that restrict pesticide management in the United States, for instance, add to production costs. So do mandated environmental initiatives to protect soil, water and air. Minimum wage standards required in the United States and other developed countries do not apply in developing nations. Neither do stringent U.S. regulations that maintain worker safety, freedom from forced labor and basic union rights for workers. “In effect, low standards in these areas may be considered a form of subsidy in that they represent costs that producers in developing countries do not have to bear. The presence and enforcement of environmental and worker standards increases the cost of production … in developed countries.” Countries analyzed in the comparison are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Vietnam and West African Countries. The CERI researcher team includes Don Ethridge, Director; Samarendu Mohanty, Associate Director; Suwen Pan, Mark Welch, and Mahamadou Fadiga, Research Scientists; Margarita Velandia-Parra, Research Assistant; and Samantha Yates, Publication Specialist. Ron Smith, Farm Press, USA Source - http://southwestfarmpress.com

29.05.2007

Canada - Net farm income falls again in 2006

Numbers released by Statistics Canada on Monday show that realized net income for Canadian farmers fell for the second consecutive year in 2006 to its lowest level since 2003. Rising interest, wage and fuel costs, together with falling hog receipts and program payments, more than offset increases in revenue from crops and cattle. Realized net income (the difference between a farmer's cash receipts and operating expenses minus depreciation, plus income in kind) declined from 2005 to $1.1 billion. This figure was also below the previous five-year average between 2001 and 2005. Provincially, only Saskatchewan and New Brunswick recorded a gain in realized net income last year. Total farm cash revenue from livestock and crop receipts as well as program payments edged up 0.6% to $37.0 billion, the third consecutive annual increase. Meanwhile, higher interest rates as well as higher energy and labour costs drove farm operating expenses up 3.3% to $31.5 billion. Realized net income can vary widely from one farm to another because of factors such as commodities produced, prices, weather, economies of scale and management. This and other aggregate measures of farm income are calculated on a provincial basis employing the same concepts used in measuring the performance of the overall Canadian economy. They are a measure of farm business income, not farm household income. For details on farm cash receipts in the first quarter of 2007, see today's "Farm cash receipts" release. Financial data collected from surveys and other sources at the individual farm business level, which help to explain differences in performance of various types and sizes of farms, are not yet available for 2006. In recent years, for example, data from Statistics Canada's Whole Farm Database have shown that net operating income of farms with revenues of $250,000 and over have been trending upwards while those of smaller farms have not, even though many of these smaller operations still have positive net farm incomes. Higher crop revenues boost market cash receipts: Market cash receipts, the revenues from the sale of crops and livestock, increased 1.8% to $32.4 billion in 2006. Crop receipts jumped 7.4% to $14.5 billion as prices recovered from recent lows. Stronger crop revenue helped offset declines in livestock receipts and program payments. Hog prices continued to languish, pushing livestock receipts down 2.4% in 2006. The recovery in crop revenues was helped by increases in both deliveries and prices. Deliveries of canola and wheat soared in 2006, as farmers made use of the record or near-record stocks gleaned from the harvests of 2005 and 2006. Prices gained strength during 2006 as the biofuel industry expanded and adverse growing conditions were experienced by some of the major grain-exporting countries. Late in the year, prices also benefited from the improved harvest conditions in 2006 that resulted in higher quality crops to market. Canola revenues surged 34.8% to $2.5 billion in the wake of a 28.7% jump in marketings. Producers of wheat (excluding durum) also saw their receipts climb by 16.2%. Both stronger prices and marketings supported this growth. Potato receipts also contributed to the gain in crop revenues. They rose 15.3% to $899 million as prices jumped 20.0%. In the livestock sector, hog producers saw their receipts plunge 13.0% to $3.4 billion. The decline left revenues 8.7% below the previous five-year average. Prices were the main factor, averaging 12.7% below those of 2005. Increased cattle and calf receipts moderated the drop in livestock revenues, climbing 2.1% to $6.5 billion. Cattle exports regained their strength following the reopening of the American border to live cattle under 30 months of age on July 18, 2005. The 1.0 million cattle and calves exported in 2006, while almost doubling the figure from 2005, remained 40.7% below the pre-bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) peak in 2002. Reduced US demand for Canadian cattle, partly due to drought-stricken US ranchers shipping cattle early to feedlots, together with a strong Canadian dollar, discouraged Canadian exports. The supply-managed sector saw its receipts fall a marginal 0.9%, the first decline since 2002. A 4.3% drop in chicken receipts was more than enough to counteract small increases in egg and turkey receipts. Dairy receipts were essentially unchanged from 2005. Program payments fall from record levels: After three consecutive years of increases, program payments declined 7.1% from the record level of 2005 to $4.6 billion. Despite the drop, the amount in 2006 was 4.7% above the previous five-year average. Certain programs linked to cash flow problems and difficulties in the cattle sector were terminated in 2006, including the Farm Income Payment Program and BSE-related programs. However, new programs helped to prevent a precipitous fall in payments. These included the Grains and Oilseeds Payment Program and the Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization (CAIS) Inventory Transition Initiatives, as well as other CAIS enhancements. Crop insurance payments also played a role, declining 21.1% as a result of better growing conditions in 2006. Producers hit by increased interest charges, labour costs and fuel prices: Farm operating expenses reached $31.5 billion, up 3.3% from 2005, the highest annual gain since 2001. Increases in interest rates, fuel prices and labour costs contributed to the increase. However, the 2006 increase was marginally below the average gain in expenses during the previous 10-year period (1996 to 2005). Interest expenses shot up 16.3%, the largest increase since 1981. Prime business rates jumped by over 30%, while one-year mortgage rates rose by more than 20% from their recent lows of the past couple of years. Farm debt continued to rise, increasing 4.6% in 2006, slightly below the average increase of 5.1% over the previous five-year period. Although fuel price increases did moderate in 2006, price rises in diesel and gasoline were the major contributors to a 5.8% climb in machinery fuel costs. Labour costs continued their ascent, rising 3.1% in 2006. Farm operators struggled to find workers in an increasingly tight labour market. Manitoba producers experienced a 7.0% rise in operating expenses, the largest percentage increase in Canada. Added to factors already mentioned was an increase in crop expenses linked to a return to more normal levels of seeded acres. In 2005, seeded acres of field crops had declined by 10.1% as a result of excessive moisture that prevented planting in much of southeastern Manitoba. Total net income falls as farm inventories decline: Total net income fell 80.7% in 2006 to $479 million. This was 82.4% below the previous five-year average. Total net income adjusts realized net income for changes in farmer-owned inventories of crops and livestock. Declining on-farm stocks of livestock were a major contributor to the negative value of inventory change in 2006. Cattle inventories fell 3.5% in the wake of renewed live cattle exports to the United States, while hog inventories declined 2.7%. As well, the conversion of on-farm stocks of canola into market deliveries and lower stocks of feed grains were not fully offset by increased stocks of wheat (excluding durum), potatoes and soybeans. – Daily Business Buzz EXTRA: Q1 2007 farm cash receipts rise Market receipts for Canadian farmers rose 13.0% in the first three months of 2007, up from 2006, when the first-quarter level was one of the lowest in a decade. The gain was mainly due to higher grain and oilseed prices as global supplies tightened and the biofuel industry continued to expand. Farmers received $8.5 billion in market receipts, a record for a first quarter. (Market receipts are revenues from the sale of crops and livestock.) This total was 9.8% above the previous five-year average between 2002 and 2006. On a year-over-year basis, market receipts have increased for the fourth consecutive quarter after being relatively flat in 2005. Crop receipts reached $3.8 billion between January and March, 28.8% above the same period last year and 17.1% above the previous five-year average. In 2006, first-quarter crop receipts had fallen to their lowest level in a decade. Livestock receipts increased 2.7% from the first quarter of 2006 to $4.7 billion. This total was 4.4% higher than the previous five-year average. An improvement in hog prices from their recent lows was the main factor behind the rise in livestock receipts. Farmers received $1.4 billion in program payments during the first quarter, down 12.8% from the first quarter of 2006, as crop conditions improved and several programs wound down. Despite this decrease, program payments remained 3.9% above the previous five-year average. Total farm cash receipts, which comprise crop and livestock revenues plus program payments, increased 8.6% to $9.9 billion and were 8.9% above the previous five-year average for a first quarter. Provincially, total farm cash receipts rose in eight provinces. Increases ranged from 0.9% in Manitoba to 15.1% in Alberta. Receipts decreased 13.1% in Prince Edward Island and 8.2% in New Brunswick, as potato receipts dropped in both provinces. Farm cash receipts provide a measure of gross revenue for farm businesses. They do not account for expenses such as wages, fuel and feed costs incurred by farmers. Cash receipts can vary widely from farm to farm because of several factors, including commodities, price and weather. For the most recent information about net farm income in 2006, consult today's "Net farm income" release. Crop receipts leap forward as grain and oilseed prices regain ground: Production issues faced by some of the major grain exporting countries in 2006, coupled with an increase in global biofuel production, contributed to reduce the abundance of world grain supplies and improve grain and oilseed prices. This advance follows a period of very low prices received by farmers at a time when input costs were rising. Corn receipts increased to $271 million, fuelled by a 38.4% rise in price and a 14.8% gain in marketings. Higher demand for corn for biofuel production in the United States had a positive impact on prices, which spilled over to other crops. Revenues from wheat (excluding durum) rose 73.9% to $633 million, as a result of three factors: a 34.3% rise in prices, increased deliveries and higher Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) payments. Barley receipts rose 65.6% to $154 million, due to a combination of increased prices and CWB payments. Prices and CWB payments also pushed durum receipts up 53.8% to $123 million. However, deliveries of both these grain crops were down, largely due to lower production in 2006 as producers chose to seed other crops and yields declined. Canola receipts hit a record first-quarter high of $697 million. In contrast to the same period last year, this increase was driven by a 43.6% price gain, as deliveries fell 15.0% from the first-quarter record of 2.4 million tonnes in 2006. Canola production in 2006 was down slightly from the 2005 record, but remained well above the previous five-year average. Soybean revenues also reached a first-quarter record of $248 million, mainly as a result of record deliveries. Soybean prices increased 11.8% over 2006, which had been a 14-year low for a first quarter. As prices for grains and oilseeds improved, producers deferred more receipts from crops sold in 2006 for liquidation in 2007. Liquidations of grain and oilseed receipts were up 28.5% to $473 million in the first quarter of 2007. Improving hog prices support livestock receipts: Cash receipts for hog producers increased 8.0% in the first quarter of 2007 to $909 million. Prices rose 9.3% above the first-quarter 2006 level, although they remained below their five-year average. Marketings fell slightly as a drop in hogs sold domestically was not offset by higher exports. Domestic processing remains the largest market for Canadian hogs, accounting for nearly 80% of hog receipts. However, exports of weanlings into the US continue to be a growing market. Prices for hogs sold were up for both domestic processing and exports. Despite lower prices, cash receipts for cattle and calves edged up 0.7% to $1.7 billion as a result of higher marketings. First-quarter receipts in 2007 were still lower than in the three years prior to the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) situation, when they ranged from $1.8 to $1.9 billion. Revenues from international exports of cattle rose 9.8% to $429 million, as the number of animals exported continued to increase after the border was reopened to live cattle under the age of 30 months. Receipts from slaughter cattle were also up 2.3%, mainly because of higher marketings. From January to March 2007, 2.1% more cattle were shipped for slaughter. Decreases in the cattle sector were attributable to interprovincial export markets, where receipts fell 19.2% from the first quarter of 2006. Average feeder cattle and calf prices were down 10.2% and 16.4% respectively, as feed prices soared. The number of animals marketed was also down. Receipts from supply-managed commodities increased 2.2% in the first quarter after a slight decline in 2006. Despite a reduction in marketings, receipts were up for poultry and dairy products as prices improved. Revenues from egg sales decreased slightly, as a result of lower prices for eggs for consumption. Program payments are down but remain above the previous five-year average: Farmers received $1.4 billion in program payments during the first quarter, down from the same period in 2006, but still nearly double the amount distributed in the years prior to the BSE situation. Crop insurance payments, to which producers contribute via premiums, declined 53.2% to $117 million, due to improved growing conditions in 2006. The Grains and Oilseeds Payment Program, a one-time program for producers of grains, oilseeds, or special crops, delivered over $4 million in payments in the first quarter of 2007. This was down significantly from $400 million in the corresponding quarter of 2006, when the majority of payments were made under this program. The Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization (CAIS) program and CAIS-related payments of $718 million increased 43.3% and helped cushion the overall decline in program payments. The Nova Scotia Business Journal

03.04.2007

India - Agricultural sector faces crisis

There is a consensus about the crisis which the Agricultural sector is facing in India. The contribution to GDP has been falling and it is under 20% of the GDP now. The sector provides employment to about 60% of the population. Most of the farmers under this sector fall under the ‘informal sector’ where there is a dearth of reliable statistics. This can be one of the causes for the low share of agriculture in the GDP. From the figures of employment and ‘contribution to GDP’, we can conclude that there is the presence of a high degree of disguised unemployment. Agriculture in the Budget The proposals to revive the agricultural sector are: Farm credit raised to Rs 1,75,000 crore, providing relief to additional 50 lakh farmers. At 7 percent interest rate farmers receive short-term credit from NABARD, with Rs 3,00,000 upper limit on principal amount. The outlay for Accelerated Irrigation Benefit Programme (AIBP) has been raised by 58.22 per cent to Rs 7,120 crore for 2006-07 from Rs 4,500 crore during 2005-06. Banking sector to credit-link an additional 3,85,000 Self-Help Groups (SHGs) in 2006-07. NABARD to open a separate line of credit for financing farm production and investment activities. The corpus of Rural Infrastructure Development Fund (RIDF) in 12 tranches to be increased to Rs 10,000 crore. The programme for repair, renovation and restoration of water bodies to be implemented through pilot projects in 23 districts in 13 states. The estimated cost of the programme stands at Rs 4,481 crore. [Via Surfindia] The current budget has addressed the farm credit, pulses, plantation sector, irrigation, rainfed area development, restoring water bodies, ground water recharge, training of farmers, fertilizer subsidies, agricultural insurance, social security etc. [Budget 2007-08] Are these enough to significantly affect the agricultural sector? Moreover since India claims to growing at over 8% in GDP, are these allocations sufficient? An important constituent of the strategy to revive agricultural performance in the country must be to increase the level of public investment in agriculture research and development and rural infrastructure. Increase in public investment in agriculture in turn requires significant rationalisation and restructuring of government subsidies on food and agricultural inputs, including power, canal irrigation and fertilisers. Greater public investment in agriculture research and extension and rural infrastructure would stimulate private investment in agriculture and agro-processing. A policy of higher investments without commensurate reforms in the institutions endowed with the charge of managing the resources created is, however, unlikely to succeed. Participatory management and selective privatisation can contribute greatly to improving the delivery of major inputs to agriculture. [Sharma and Gulati 2005] Reasons for the crisis Only 2 reasons are being highlighted as all the other reasons are associated to there too or spring form these two. So broadly speaking, the crisis is due to Pressure on land: Population has outstripped land supply. Faster growth of population goes with slower rise in per capita output. [Vaidyanathan 1988] The rate of growth of population is more in the rural areas than in the urban areas. Population growth can be said to be indirectly proportional to education. Where there are more family planning programmes and adequate education, which lays emphasis on both the male and female child, the tendency to have more children is less. Moreover, with the rapid expansion of SEZ’s, the pressure on agricultural land is further aggravated. Structural deficiencies: Indian agriculture is characterized by inefficient distribution, marketing and financial institutions. As more of the agriculture falls under the ambit of the informal sector, there is a dearth of efficient institutions. The loans are hard to come by as they lack the necessary assets to keep as collateral. Moreover, with the current rates of inflation, the prices of inputs will rise, further adding to the farmers’ distress. The distribution systems fail as the agricultural produce most often does not reach the targeted population. US and Indian Agriculture Rich nations preach free trade but practice protectionism against poor nations, especially in agriculture. For example, the United States severely limits sugar imports from Latin America to benefit American sugar beet growers, even inhibiting imports of Brazilian cane-based ethanol, which is far cheaper and more energy efficient than domestic ethanol. [Noll 2006] The subsidies that the developed nations offer their farmers’ vis-à-vis to what the developing countries can offer is very large. The developing nations find it difficult to withstand this competition in the world markets. If the subsidies are not reduced by the US and the EU, it will be the developing nations who will have to bear the brunt. [Thomas 2006] Globalization and Indian Agriculture Once again, there are some individual cases where globalization has led to deprivation and suicide. About 800 km away from Mumbai is the cotton-growing region of Vidarbha, perched on the Deccan Plateau. Hundreds of cotton farmers here have killed themselves in recent years. The reasons are complex and varied. Among the reasons is this one: farmers here cannot compete with cheap cotton imported from the United States, whose farmers are lavished with huge subsidies by a government that preaches the virtues of competitive markets to the rest of the world. Their deaths can be linked to imperfect globalization. More generally, though, reform and globalization have led to faster growth and sharp drops in poverty levels. [Knowledge Wharton 2007] The article talks about individual cases which resulted from imperfect competition. I wonder if anything in this world can work in a perfect way! And in Vidarbha, it is not individuals who are dying but ‘groups of individuals’. Yes, globalization has led to faster growth but ‘sharp drops’ in poverty levels is hard to agree, though the statistics does say so. Conclusion On the whole, the condition of Indian Agriculture is bleak. If the current allocations of the budget will help the agricultural sector will be seen in the next few years. The sector is pressurised by the domestic as well as the international economy. Agriculture finds it hard to compete in international markets with other products which are highly subsidised. More of funds need to be devoted to research in agriculture which should aim at improving agricultural production and productivity. The size of agricultural markets needs to be increased. This can be facilitated by the extension and improvement of transport. [Vaidyanathan 1988] Agriculture is a sector which cannot be neglected as majority of the Indians depend on it for their livelihood. Targeted policies which bring about favourable outcomes are necessary. Of late, the rhetoric is about the booming GDP and bulling bourses; that significant issues like ‘agriculture’ are not getting adequate attention. Source - Alex M Thomas

09.02.2007

Presentation - Agricultural insurance statistics and informational support

Roman Shynkarenko The presentation RS -statistics-eng was prepared for the meeting of the agricultural committee of the League of Insurance Organizations of Ukraine. The meeting took place on February 6, 2007. The presentation provides an overview of statistics available in different countries and takes a closer view at problems of Ukrainian agricultural insurance sector. The presentation will be interesting to the insurance specialists from the countries that currently develop agricultural insurance systems. The presentation provides an overview of the statistics available in the USA, Italy, Canada, Russia, Kazakhstan and other countries. The document also contains a brieа analysis of the problems with informational support of the agricultural insurance in CIS countries.

06.02.2007

Livestock and Aquaculture Insurance in Developing Countries, a Brief Overview

R.A.J. Roberts, FAO, Rome, November 2005 The purpose of this publication is to meet the demand for a brief, accessible introduction to the role of insurance as a risk management mechanism in livestock and aquaculture enterprises. With the focus of the publication being on enterprises in developing countries, most attention is given to livestock (especially cattle, sheep, goats, poultry) kept for food and/or fibre, and transport/motive power, rather than bloodstock used for sporting and recreational purposes. You can download the full version of the publication with tables and annexes - PDF file (530 kB) Livestock farmers and fish farmers in developing countries face many uncertainties and risks in the pursuit of reproductive and growth operations. Diseases, adverse weather, theft, predation, fire and other perils can cause sickness, loss of stock or of performance, or death. Losses to farmers can be substantial. The losses can similarly affect those entities in the economy, namely processors and marketers, who depend for their livelihoods on a supply of livestock, livestock products, fish and other products of aquaculture operations. The losses can also affect financiers and other investors who are dependent on the profitability of the farming operations with which they are associated. Consumers too may well face increased costs as a result of losses to livestock and aquaculture enterprises, and can also be affected by an interruption to supplies of needed foodstuffs, especially if perils are such that sources of supply are cut for more than a short time, for example, through business failures among the producers. Again, outbreaks of transboundary animal diseases (TADs) can result in serious losses to entire national economies. In recent years, outbreaks of diseases such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and foot and mouth disease (FMD) have been expensive for the countries affected. At the time of writing (November 2005), the effects of Avian ‘flu are beginning to be felt, with the destruction of poultry flocks in some regions of some countries being mandated as a necessary control measure. The purpose of this publication is to meet the demand for a brief, accessible introduction to the role of insurance as a risk management mechanism in livestock and aquaculture enterprises. With the focus of the book being on enterprises in developing countries, most attention is given to livestock (especially cattle, sheep, goats, poultry) kept for food and/or fibre, and transport/motive power, rather than bloodstock used for sporting and recreational purposes. This book does not purport to be a guide on to how to design an insurance product for these types of farming. Rather it aims at setting the scene, and exploring with the reader some of the complexities involved in this financial mechanism for risk sharing. In doing so, it starts by stressing the importance of risk management practices other than insurance. Before taking this broader perspective, it is worth stressing that insurance does not increase a farmer’s income; rather it helps manage risks to this income. “Risk management practices” embrace a wide range of mechanisms, which are the foundation of sound farm management. These include policy issues e.g. site licensing, regulations relating to such matters as quarantine and compulsory veterinary procedures. They also include on-farm physical measures such as attention to structural maintenance of fences, cages, racks and housing, as well as daily monitoring for disease conditions, and both preventive and curative veterinary procedures. Risk management can also involve financially-based mechanisms such as share-farming, farming partnerships and Islamic-type borrowing where the lender shares the potential profit and the potential loss. Another form of risk management is the forward sale of output and other types of contractual farming arrangements, especially where an element of risk-sharing is involved. All of these will be briefly described in order to identify the potential role for insurance. This role, in brief, is confined to those situations where there is no other suitable risk management technique, or where insurance products can be designed to be advantageously cost-effective. The guide will then cover the more usual areas of insurance, such as: the roles of public and private sectors; the overall design of policies, including the basis for valuation; marketing policies; methods of collecting premiums and paying indemnities; loss adjustment; insurance product monitoring and modification. It is worth noting that livestock, and especially aquaculture insurance, has received less attention than crop insurance in development efforts in the last few decades. This publication is intended as a contribution to redressing the current imbalance. It discusses the applicability of insurance to managing those risks which are beyond the immediate control of the farm manager, and which result in animal and fish mortality. The book is a companion volume to the 2005 FAO publication, Roberts, R.A.J. Insurance of Crops in Developing Countries. As with the companion volume, a newly revised glossary of terms commonly used in connection with the insurance of agriculture and aquaculture is included. Whereas the focus of the publication is on developing country situations and circumstances, developed country examples are often used to illustrate particular points. The demand for livestock products in developing regions has risen greatly over the last two decades, a trend that is likely to continue, since this is a generally observed phenomenon, across virtually all nations and cultures, as incomes increase. The combined value of livestock production and aquaculture, totalling nearly $1100 billion, is almost double that of crop production, at $550 billion per annum. In volume terms, data indicate that the global production of meat in 2002 was 216m tonnes, with an annual growth rate of 1.8 percent (developed countries growth rate 0.6 percent; developing countries growth rate 2.8 percent). Milk production totalled 512m tonnes in 1993, and the corresponding figure for 2002 is estimated as being 600m tonnes, based on an annual growth rate in production, in developing countries, of 3.7 percent. Indeed, one developing country, India, is now the world’s biggest producer of milk. Against this, the annual consumption of fish for the same year was 100m tonnes (excluding 33m tonnes for non-human food uses, e.g. as an ingredient in chicken feed). Within this total, the share of aquaculture had risen massively from 3.9 percent in 1970 to 29.9 percent in 2002. The limitations on production from capture fisheries, due to over-fishing in many parts of the world’s lakes, rivers, seas and oceans, are well known. Coupled with this is the continued development of techniques to farm successfully more and more fish species. For these reasons, the share of aquaculture is expected to continue to rise. An additional demand factor is that fish is an important dietary item in one major developing region (Asia) where incomes are rising very substantially. This will drive the global trend still further. Associated with these production and consumption increases is a substantial demand and opportunity for investment capital. For example, FAO estimates that the investment associated with the huge expansion in global aquaculture production over the last 30 years is of the order of US$60 billion. While accepting that an estimate of this sort must be subject to a certain degree of error, the figure is sufficient to indicate the order of magnitude of the investment flowing into aqua-cultural production. It will also be evident that massive production increases over a short period of time, in the case of aquaculture, may mean that the growth of knowledge and experience in the industry does not automatically keep up, with deficiencies in both the planning and the execution of projects. This adds a new and serious dimension to the issue of risk, and the need to manage this risk, as will be discussed below. Insurance is just one item in the toolbox of risk management techniques to address the perils faced in these two industries. Although the range of perils faced by livestock and aquaculture enterprises is similar, it is rather different from the range faced by crop farmers. Because of the differences, insurance product design and insurance operations for livestock and aquaculture are similarly distinct from those applying to cropping enterprises. The Discussion Focus Risks facing livestock and aquaculture producers can be divided into market related risks, and non-market related risks. Since this publication has risk management through insurance as its focus, the insurable types of risks predominate in the discussion, and these are largely non-market related. However, the distinction is not complete, as some insurance products incorporate an element of coverage of price and/or revenue risk in the insurance product design. The focus of the discussion will therefore be on identifying where and how insurance is worth consideration as a risk-management technique. Given this focus, the discussion of various perils and of risk management other than insurance is intended to be illustrative rather than comprehensive. Market Related Risks These risks relate directly to transactions in the economy. They include: availability of inputs, the prices of inputs, the price of farm products, the availability of markets for farm outputs, the gross margins of agricultural enterprises, and the revenue derived from farming operations. With regard to prices, it is particularly the short-term volatility in prices, for both inputs and outputs, which is of most concern to the average farmer, as he is rarely in a position to make quick changes to his farm enterprise mix or to his farming system. Of significance to a discussion of risk with livestock and aquaculture is the possibility of market access for products being denied when there is evidence of a serious disease or contamination situation, leading to a health risk. This can apply both to domestic and to export markets. Clearly, for a correct application of marketing bans there has to be confidence that the information on which they are based is accurate, and that the conclusions drawn are not biased for reasons of personal gain or for the creation of a trade barrier for political reasons. International agreements are important here, with the specialist organization OIE (World Organization for Animal Health) responsible for maintaining a classification of those animal diseases that are notifiable by national authorities. The most serious category of these, Class A diseases, includes the major highly infectious diseases, such as FMD and BSE. Incidences of these diseases can lead to export bans between countries, and to bans on movements within countries. The reader will quickly appreciate that these measures imply both costs and loss of income. Indeed, one of the major and long-lasting causes of loss following the outbreak of a serious livestock disease is the effect on exports. These may be blocked by importing countries, which are free of the disease in question, for what could become a lengthy period. In such a case, exports will only be possible to countries where the disease is endemic, and such exports are likely to realise a much lower price. Exports and movements of livestock and livestock products following disease outbreaks are not subject to arbitrary decisions but are prescribed by international agreements – to which authorities, financiers, insurers and those in the trade can refer for guidance. Another type of price risk is that caused by over supply. Salmon harvest volumes from aquaculture farms have risen rapidly in recent years. This has led to what might be described as a slump in prices. For example, in early 1998 salmon prices in a major import market, Japan, were some 30 percent lower than the levels ruling just one year earlier. Non-market Related Risks These risks relate to a variety of events, some involving human intervention, directly or indirectly. The risks include: climate events, geological events, pollution, predation, theft, disease. A more detailed breakdown of these risks reveals the following individual, non-market perils for livestock and aquaculture farmers: Group 1 Health factors These risks are associated with diseases/epidemics4 (local, national, transboundary) with the risk of consequences including: - Mortality, - Diminished production through disease, - Ban on sale of animals or animal products due to quarantine or health rulings, - Government slaughter order, - Increased on-farm costs occasioned by quarantine, curative or preventive measures. Group 2 Climate and seismic events ■       Drought, ■       Flood, ■       Windstorm, ■       Freeze, ■       Lightning, ■       Earthquake, ■       Tsunami. Group 3 Accidents ■       Fire, ■       Accident, ■       Poisoning, ■       Explosion. Group 4 Infrastructure & environmental problems ■       Machinery/electrical breakdown and power outages, ■       Malicious damage, riot, strike, ■       Pollution of water supply or water environment, Group 5 Management issues - Infertility, loss of normal biological function, - Cannibalism / overcrowding losses, - Malnutrition due to unexpected feed deficiencies, - Mysterious disappearance, rustling, theft, predation, escape. Group 6 Consequential losses ■   Consequential loss and legal liability due to livestock losses and/or food safetyconsiderations. A listing of risks for aquaculture farmers would include many of those listed above, to which can be added the following, which are clearly spread across the Groups classified above: •      Predation by birds, seals, sharks •      Presence in massive numbers of harmful organisms, e.g. jellyfish, algae (see below) ■       Water quality problems ■       oxygen depletion ■       pollution ■       algal toxins - from harmful algal blooms •    Risks to structures (tanks, cages, sluices) from collision, seismic or storm events, e.g. tsunami) All of the above apply principally to individual farmers. Some perils can also have significant consequences for national economies, for example, outbreaks of a contagious disease. Indeed the risks associated with transboundary diseases have grown as human travel and trade (including livestock movements) across borders has increased rapidly in recent decades. This has placed considerable burdens, scientific, organizational and financial, on countries as they attempt to protect their national livestock and fish stocks against exotic disease threats. MANAGEMENT OF RISKS Policy-based risk management Site licensing Site licensing for certain types of production is required in certain jurisdictions. Often this is due to an attempt by the authorities to minimise pollution or nuisance to the general population – intensive livestock production is usually not wanted in or near to towns. However, there are also occasions when planning, subsequent zoning and site licensing has a risk management purpose. This applies especially to aquaculture, where the risk of storm damage is greater in exposed areas, while conversely the risk of losses from phenomena such algal blooms is greater in very sheltered areas, due to diminished natural water exchange. Another source of loss in aquaculture is pollution of waters in which freshwater or marine farming takes place. Clearly, sites particularly at risk are those that are susceptible to outflow of sewage or industrial waste. This is all too common in many countries, due to excessive rain overloading storm water systems, leading in turn to contamination and outflow of the contaminated water to the sea and, sometimes, to aquaculture sites. Attention to appropriate design factors related to sewage and storm water infrastructure is clearly needed here, but given the fact that these sorts of improvements can take many years to effect, the onus to protect aquaculture enterprises falls on those selecting the sites for such enterprises. This means both fish farmers, and site licensing authorities. A further cause of pollution and harm to farmed marine species is exposure to oil from accidental spills and from chemicals such as TBT (tributyl tin) and TPT (triphenyl tin). TBT has been commonly used as an antifouling surface treatment for the hulls of boats and ships. Although the use of TBT has been banned in some countries for certain types of craft for some years now, a global ban will only come into force in 2008 (and only then if the International Maritime Organization of the U.N. treaty on this is ratified by all countries). TPT, used in agriculture as a fungicide, has also been found in waters close to intensive agriculture. For example, in the Netherlands, “Variations in OT (organo-tin) concentrations in zebra mussels were studied at two locations near potato crops that were sprayed with triphenyltin (TPT) in order to estimate the integration period over which body concentrations reflect the environmental quality…………. The TPT was found in very high concentrations in mussels near sources of this fungicide.” (Stab et al 1995). With chemicals such as these two examples, the authorities have a dual responsibility. First to minimize their use; second, to permit aquaculture operations only on sites remote from those stretches of water where toxic substances are found in concentrations that are harmful to farmed marine species. The possibility of aquaculture losses from oil spills, from oil tanker collisions and groundings, focuses attention on the increased risk presented when aquaculture is permitted close to on-shore oil terminals and near shipping lanes. Quarantine requirements Quarantine requirements are an attempt to help manage the risk of the introduction of exotic diseases or organisms that may be detrimental to the health, and/or production of existing species, in a given country. Recent examples of incidents involving these diseases, now termed “transboundary diseases", include, in recent years, foot and mouth and BSE disease outbreaks in the U.K. More than 100 years ago, the disease rinderpest, fatal to cattle, was thought to have spread from Egypt into Uganda, and from there into the rest of East and Southern Africa. The disease affects and is carried by wild game, especially antelopes. This is believed to have facilitated the rapid spread of the disease. Rinderpest still prompts quarantine efforts in some countries, and although Africa was thought to be free from it in the mid-1990s, a later outbreak indicated the difficulty of controlling this type of disease. This difficulty is almost certainly related to the fact that feral animals are very common in this continent (see next section). As island nations, Australia and New Zealand are among the most effectively isolated countries in which agriculture is a major part of the economy. Yet even in these naturally protected islands, the border inspection personnel are a major force, and consequently bio security is an important cost item for the public sector. Compulsory veterinary procedures These also address livestock and fish health, but relate to disease conditions already present in the country, and for which veterinary control measures and practices are known and required by the authorities in the interest of the individual farmer, the national industry as a whole, and as a food safety measure. While compulsory veterinary procedures can be enforced for domestic animals, widespread vaccination of wild animals is practically impossible, even though suitable vaccines are available. This seriously complicates the task of controlling transboundary animal diseases such as rinderpest, which (see above) affects wild game as well as cattle. This means that in the case of some livestock diseases, game animals can constitute both a reservoir of disease organisms, and a means for their spread. The implications for cattle farmers in regions such as Eastern and Southern Africa, where game is abundant, are obvious. On-farm risk management On-farm risk management is a major, ongoing task for both livestock and aquaculture producers. Most of the non-market perils allocated to Groups in Chapter 2 above are addressed in the first instance through on-farm procedures. Indeed, the risks associated with most perils of a certain magnitude are more readily managed by the farmer as part of his normal farming operations than by external interventions. Each major group of similar perils is now discussed, with the intention of identifying the limits of on-farm risk management. Group 1 Health factors These risks are associated with diseases/epidemics (local, national, transboundary) with the risk of consequences including: •      Mortality, •      Diminished production through disease (morbidity), •      Ban on sale of animals or animal products due to quarantine or health rulings, •      Government slaughter order, •      Increased on-farm costs occasioned by quarantine, curative or preventive measures. Normal management of livestock and aquaculture farming involves close attention to health factors. These start with adherence to official recommendations for preventive veterinary procedures (e.g. inoculations, isolation and supplementary feed additives). Farmers’ actions range from the ongoing monitoring of the health of livestock, fish and shellfish, to attention to siting and structural issues of buildings, cages and tanks. Care taken in the siting and construction of livestock handling facilities, as in the siting of aquaculture ponds and cages, helps protect the structures and their living contents against damage from flood, windstorm, strong currents, land subsidence, pollution etc. It also assists in protection against the actions of human thieves and animal predators. Apart from the monitoring of health, as already mentioned, management procedures directly geared to the livestock per se include attention to stocking rates in pastures, to the density of poultry, fish and crustaceans in housing, ponds, tanks, racks and cages, and to quality factors in the respective immediate environments. Group 2 Climate and seismic events In terms of its global impact, drought is probably the most serious peril faced by livestock producers. Impacting as it does on nutritional adequacy, it can also be associated with death or loss of production/performance from direct causes other than lack of precipitation. When animals weakened as a result of a drought, then face another environmental challenge, they may well be affected to a greater extent than would be the case in a normal year9. Normal farm management practices address drought by ensuring reserve food supplies (hay, silage etc.) are either stored ahead of time, or can be purchased and brought into the region. But this is often difficult in developing countries, due to the lack of financial resources, and difficulties over supply from areas accessible from an economic as well as from other points of view. Above all, drought may be systemic and impact an entire region. Other climate perils, flood, windstorm, freeze and lightning, all call for basic on-farm management of risks (though protection of livestock from lightning in rangeland farming is not feasible). Beyond the basic and economically sensible precautions, including siting issues (where there is freedom of choice) losses with these perils may call for other approaches, e.g. financial arrangements. The same can be said for risks to aquaculture structures (tanks, cages, racks, sluices) from storm events. These are addressed firstly by appropriate design, construction and maintenance, then by other approaches, i.e. financial measures. The same attitude can be taken with the management of the risk of earthquakes and tsunamis, with a financial approach likely to be the most feasible. Group 3 Accidents Clearly basic farm management practices will also address the risks in this category, which include: fire, accidental injury or death, poisoning and explosion. Beyond what can be addressed on the farm, financial risk management approaches could be considered, with insurance being an obvious contender for specific risks under certain circumstances. Group 4 Infrastructure and environmental problems Clearly, the extent to which on-farm management can address Group 4 risks depends on the degree of control the farmer has over the risk items. Machinery and electrical breakdown can be rendered less likely by appropriate maintenance, but cannot be prevented altogether. Power outages are beyond the farmer’s control, though increasingly farmers of particularly energy-dependent enterprises (e.g. fish hatcheries) are investing in standby generators. Indeed, some insurance policies make this a requirement for cover to be valid. Malicious damage, riots and strikes are beyond a farmer’s control, with the resulting losses rather difficult to manage, especially as these risks are often excluded from standard insurance policies. Pollution losses are a particularly potent risk for aquaculture farmers. Water quality is the issue here, including: oxygen depletion, pollution from chemical and biological sources, algal toxins produced during algal blooms. In each case, there is much that can be done on the farm to reduce the risk of loss from these causes, especially daily monitoring of fish health so as to have early warning of a new danger, so that measures can be taken, where it is possible to do so. Sometimes a peril does not become evident until after structures have been installed and stocked. This is especially the case when a relatively new type of farming is introduced to a particular location. In the photo below (Lake Manajau, West Sumatra, Indonesia) the fish cages illustrated originally held tilapia and a species of carp. Observation of fish mortality and general health revealed that whereas the tilapia were thriving, carp were dying in large numbers, Chemical analysis of the water indicated that there was an underwater discharge of toxic gas (hydrogen sulphide), probably of volcanic origin, to which the carp were particularly susceptible. This underlines two important factors relating to risk management in aquaculture: The first of these factors is that commercially-oriented aquaculture is still a relatively new enterprise for many of the operators (and indeed countries) involved. This means that much is still to be learned as to the range of perils that face the industry (especially as new species are added to the list of those being farmed), and the means by which these perils may be addressed. The second is that aquaculture takes place in an environment that in many respects is hidden. Not all countries have the facilities to inspect all sites thoroughly, and this applies especially to developing nations. For this reason, unexpected perils of an environmental nature, such as that in Lake Manajau, can provide an unwelcome surprise to investors and farmers. The example underlines the need for careful site examination at an early stage in any aquacultural production project. Group 5 Management issues By definition, these risks are controlled by management action. They include: infertility, loss of normal biological function, cannibalism and overcrowding / stress losses, together with most losses from theft, rustling, predation and escape. Dealing with these risks is another part of the responsibility of the farm manager. Largely beyond on-farm control are losses from malnutrition due to unexpected feed deficiencies, problems due to contamination of feed and some losses due to rustling, theft, predation and escape (where management has taken all normal precautions, yet stock losses still occur. Mysterious disappearance is a term used in insurance when there is no obvious cause for the loss of animals or fish. More discussion on these types of losses will be given in the chapter on the use of insurance for risk management. However, it is worth noting here that in Southern Africa losses of cattle due to theft were noted in a recent ICAR/FAO conference in Tunisia as the main reason for seeking secure identification systems. Group 6 Consequential losses More advanced and commercialized farms face significant claims if supply contracts are not met, or if the quality of products being supplied by livestock farmers does not meet standards of safety. These losses are again a matter for good management in the first instance, with financial mechanisms sometimes called upon as a safety net. Financially-based risk management mechanisms Introduction Financially-based risk management mechanisms include: shared ownership, Islamic banking, marketing arrangements, insurance. These all involve mechanisms that permit some of the financial burden of losses in livestock and aquaculture operations to be shared with an entity or individual outside of the farm itself. There is a gradation in the four examples discussed below, with an increasing direct connection between a loss of a given batch of livestock or aquatic organisms, and the sharing mechanism employed to assist in managing the risk. A further important point is that the mechanisms briefly described are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, there may be many situations and individual examples where some or even all of the mechanisms could operate together in harmony, providing mutual support. Shared ownership/farming partnerships/production cooperatives Here the risk sharing is obvious, since it is implicit in the ownership structure of the farm. Share or partnership arrangements are normally entered into as a means to raising a greater quantum of capital than would otherwise be the case. Incorporation as a company formalizes the share arrangement, though this is not as yet common in developing countries. Production cooperatives are another form of shared ownership of production enterprises. Cooperatives have traditionally (and this is often formalised in cooperative legislation) held reserves, built up by setting aside, each year, a percentage of the operating surplus. Clearly financial reserves can form an important first layer of funding to assist in overcoming losses. Yet another type of share farming involves a supplier of young stock (livestock or fish smolt) retaining ownership of the stock throughout the growing-on period. The farmer contracts to deliver the grown livestock or fish at a pre-determined weight to the owner. Clearly, the risk of mortality or loss of performance is shared in this type of arrangement Share farming and partnership arrangements can mean more capital is invested in the enterprise than an individual might have at his or her disposal. From a risk management point of view, this can mean permitting access to technology that in itself may bring risk management benefits. For example, it might provide access to more water, for livestock and even for irrigation of fodder crops. For fish-cage farmers, access to more capital can mean the ability to install and anchor cages that can be more adequately protected against perils such as storms and predators. Similarly, when losses occur despite measures such as these, they can be shared across the owners of the enterprise and/or the organisms being farmed, spreading the resulting financial burden. Islamic banking Islamic banking products, especially musharaka loans, or partnership financing, offer a potent method for farmers to share farming risks with their financiers. (Musharaka basically means ‘partnership’. “It involves you placing your capital with another person and both sharing the risk and reward. The difference between Musharaka arrangements and normal banking is that you can set any kind of profit sharing ratio, but losses must be proportionate to the amount invested.” (Ref. www.islamic-bank.com ) In essence, musharaka financing arrangements mean that any losses are borne in proportion to the investment of each partner/financier. This contrasts with normal bank lending where the risk falls primarily on the farmer/entrepreneur, with the bank calling on the borrower and/or the security pledged in order to recoup the investment in the loan. The advantage to the borrower as regards risk management is that the lender is often in a more powerful position to obtain information that will assist in reducing any given risk. Given the direct stake of the bank in the financial health of the enterprise, there is a strong incentive for the lender to use its influence and connections to assist the farmer in minimizing on-farm losses. Marketing arrangements Inter-linked transactions, of which formal contract farming is perhaps the best-known example, provide the opportunity for an element of sharing the cost of losses. Contracted forward sale of animals or fish during the growing period means automatically that the risk of loss is either assumed totally by the owner of the livestock or fish at the time of loss, or that there is a loss sharing mechanism. The details of the contract will specify the relative shares to be assumed by the farmer and the buyer in the event of loss from a given peril. An example from Bangladesh describes how a contracting processor and buyer of broilers not only organizes credit for participating farmers, but also operates a risk fund – called a contributory security fund - in order to assist in protecting against production and price risks. Similarly, a large Jamaican broiler enterprise, which is also a major aquaculture operator, provides tilapia smolt to pond-owning out growers, with an agreement to buy market-sized tilapia at an agreed price. Some of the farmed shrimp in Indonesia, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are grown in share-farming arrangements, where the ownership of the ponds is held by the contracting company, with the proceeds of sale of market-sized shrimp being shared between pond-owner and farm operator. (Based on a personal communication from Dr. John Bostock, Univ. of Stirling, Scotland. July 2005.) A further example comes from Northern Vietnam, where fingerlings are obtained from hatcheries on credit, with payment expected after the fish have been harvested. If the fingerlings die, the wealthier hatchery operator will often waive the due payment. Insurance – introduction One or two references have already been made to insurance as a risk management mechanism in livestock and aquaculture farming. The present chapter has outlined other types of risk management, before introducing the topic of insurance. The phasing in the discussion is deliberate. It serves to underline that there are many mechanisms for risk management that should be explored to the full before recourse is made to insurance. In the chapter that follows, some examples are given where livestock and/or aquaculture insurance is in force in developing countries. Some, though not all, of the related insurance products have been associated with veterinary care programmes. Chapter 5, Insurance Approaches: Steps in the Development Process, covers some of the main points that should be appreciated by those seeking to initiate a process for making livestock and aquaculture insurance products available in developing countries. In certain parts of this chapter, a distinction is made between livestock and aquaculture insurance products respectively. Despite the similarities in the risks faced by the two types of farming, the obvious differences in the environments mean that there are very real differences in the details of insurance approaches to risk management. INSURANCE IN PRACTICE This chapter serves to outline a few examples of experience in developing countries with livestock and aquaculture insurance. Livestock insurance in India Public sector livestock insurance: The central government of India has been much involved over the years with a broad range of insurance services in the country. From 1972 until 2000, the state-owned General Insurance Corporation (GIC) was the only body permitted to transact insurance business, and it did so through its then subsidiary companies, namely: National Insurance Company Ltd., New India Assurance Company Ltd., Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. and United India Insurance Company Ltd. In 2000, the insurance market was liberalized, permitting the private sector to develop and sell insurance products. Nevertheless, the four named state-owned companies still transact a significant share of all insurance business, and are predominant in the fields of livestock and aquaculture risk. The latest available information on livestock insurance is summarized in Table 3 below. Table 3: Livestock insurance in India (Public sector) Year Number of Policies (million) Premium R s. crores14 Indemnities Rs. crores Loss ratio 1995/96 15.3 113.39 74.05 0.65 1996/97 14.7 122.54 74.83 0.61 1997/98 6.3 143.45 80.11 0.56 1998/99 7.9 152.02 126.08 0.83 1999/00 9.8 137.14 114.28 0.83 2000/01 7.9 145.53 127.97 0.88 Source: Adapted from Government of India website Typically, livestock insurance products offered by the state-owned insurers are confined to mortality cover. The sum payable on the death of the animal is either the sum insured, or the market value, whichever is the lesser amount. A number of exclusions apply, most of these being designed to ensure that adequate preventive veterinary practices are followed. Annex IV provides further information on the conditions applying to these policies. The focus is on the insurance of individual animals, except in the case of poultry, where a certain minimum flock size is required, for understandable practical reasons. A feature of the Indian livestock insurance products is that they tend to target dairy production units, especially those raising crossbred and other high-yielding cattle and buffaloes. This is situation is logical, since dairy farmers milking herds of this type of livestock are likely to be more commercially-oriented than are the more traditional producers, and may therefore be expected to have a greater demand for insurance products. However, there is another example, from India, where insurers are linking with microfinance institutions in order to reach down to a smaller-scale type of client. This programme is the BASIX livestock insurance product, described below. Private sector livestock insurance (example, BASIX) BASIX is an Indian livelihood promotion institution, established in 1996, working (as in 2005) with over 190,000 poor households in 44 districts and eight states. It addresses the promotion of rural livelihoods by the provision of financial services: savings, loans and insurance. As with those supplying banking services in rural areas, insurance providers face high administrative costs when dealing with small-scale clients. BASIX addresses the administrative cost problem for its financial services by linking itself, where possible, to Self Help Groups (SHGs) organized at village level. The SHGs provide a cost-saving interface between BASIX and individual clients. Livestock insurance operations involve a partnership between BASIX and a private sector insurer, Royal Sundaram General Insurance Company. The partnership is designed to combine the insurance expertise of a major underwriter with the proven ability of a microfinance specialist, BASIX, to reach rural clientele. Both partners contribute their specific expertise in the process of product design, and in the administration of the programme. The policies are ‘group’ in the sense that the insurer issues one policy for “the livestock belonging to the customers of BASIX”. In this sense, it is a group policy, though BASIX maintains records of individual ownership of insured livestock. Cattle, sheep and goats are included. The table below indicates the scale of current operations, which are a fraction of the business reported in the earlier table, which addressed public sector livestock insurance in India. Nevertheless, the BASIX and Royal Sundaram partnership is clearly reaching a clientele group that would be unlikely to attract the attention of the major providers of insurance services. A strategy of careful attention to cost containment has been a key factor in permitting this livestock insurance product to operate sustainably. Part of this strategy has been to harness computerization for recording transactions, including premium collection and payment of claims. Table 4: Livestock insurance – Indian private sector (BASIX)Year                                              Policies sold                                   Premium Rs. Lakhs To March 2004                              4430                                                16.23 To March 2005                              5040                                               16.37 Source: BASIX website Aquaculture insurance in Iran General Aquaculture insurance, as is case for crop and livestock insurance, is offered by a state-owned entity, the Agricultural Products Insurance Fund (APIF). The APIF is a subsidiary of the Bank Keshavarzi, the government-owned agricultural bank. This is a large organization, with some 2,000 branches nationwide. The APIF started operations in 1985. Aquaculture products were first offered in 1996. The APIF has 580 employees, about 500 of whom are outposted in the field. Product design is done in-house by APIF staff. Many of these officials have technical qualifications in agronomy, veterinary medicine, animal husbandry, plant husbandry. For aquaculture there are at least two officials who have university-level qualifications that are directed related to their responsibilities within APIF The marketing of insurance products is carried out directly by APIF field staff. Because of the close relationship between the APIF and the Bank Keshavarzi, borrowers from the bank are encouraged to manage some of their risks by using insurance. On notification of a loss event, loss assessment is carried out in-house by APIF staff, with a high level of supervision from headquarters. The public sector plays an active role in insurance operations, not only through ownership of the insurance company but also through the fact that it provides reinsurance for this company. In addition, it subsidizes premiums, to some extent. Insurance coverage and results Species insured: Trout, prawns (shrimp), carp Perils covered:   Temperature variability (biggest cause of losses) Oxygen depletion Flood Hail Earthquake White spot disease in shrimp Exclusions - Disease – except for white spot. Table 5: Iran - Aquaculture insurance Year Number of contracts I n s u r e d area (ha) Premiums paid ($’000 equiv. Jan 2005 rate) 2000 421 2803 366 2001 422 3 141 387 2002 715 5 182 623 2003 1002 4654* 7 3 6 2004 1186 3200* 6 3 2 *Despite the number of insured clients rising steadily, the insured area dropped in 2003 and 2004 due to closure for a period of a number of shrimp enterprises, due in turn to quarantine requirements following outbreaks of white spot disease. Table 6: Iran – Aquaculture insurance loss ratios Year                                                                             Ratio* 2000                                                                                                                                                             0.19 2001                                                                                                                                                             0.43 2002                                                                                                                                                             1.13 2003                                                                                                                                                             0.90 2004                                                                                                                                                             1.09 *The Loss Ratios (L/R) quoted here are not pure figures, based on unsubsidized premium and indemnity totals. This is because the government operates a premium subsidy scheme that is apparently variable. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the overall true L/R is of the order of 2.0, which implies a significant level of subsidy to the insurance programme. Brief notes on livestock and aquaculture insurance experience The individual country notes that follow serve to indicate the somewhat patchy experience of a number of developing (and newly-developed) countries when insurance products have been offered as a risk management mechanism for livestock and aquaculture enterprises. Argentina: Despite the availability of a number of crop insurance products, it believed that no livestock or aquaculture insurance is currently available. Bangladesh: The public sector insurer, the General Insurance Corporation, has offered insurance products on a pilot basis for high technology shrimp farms. Perils covered included: flood, tidal waves, storm surges, cyclones. The pilot has had very limited success, and in its initial form has proved to be financially non-viable. This is due to a high level of claims, coupled with poor demand for the product because of the exclusion of disease as an insurable peril. Brazil: Just one company offers livestock insurance. The demand is mainly for cover for horses and cattle. No aquaculture insurance is currently available, though proposals are now (October 2005) being finalised for shrimp insurance. Chile: This country is one of the world’s biggest marine salmon and sea trout fish farming producers. Its aquaculture insurance industry is highly developed with two main insurers. All major international reinsurers are supporting these companies. The typical Chilean Aqua Policy is a very comprehensive named-peril policy for loss of both fish stock and installations. Ecuador: One livestock insurer, since 1997, has offered insurance covering cattle (dairy & beef) and horses. There is no aquaculture insurance at present. It is believed that a pilot aquaculture programme was severely affected by storm and disease claims, and was terminated after one year. Republic of Korea: A pilot insurance programme directed to oyster cultivators has proved to be a failure, due to a high level of claims, and the resulting non-sustainable loss ratio for the insurer. Mexico: This country has the most developed livestock insurance market in Latin America. Individual animal mortality cover is available for cattle, sheep, goats and pigs. In addition, since the beginning of 2006, whole herd covers with high deductibles for epidemic diseases can be purchased – see Section 5.4 for more details on this new development. The Government provides premium subsidies, but these are now geared towards catastrophe epidemic disease covers, rather than to policies based on individual mortality. Agroasemex Mexico also has more than 10 years experience with aquaculture insurance, which is mainly for shrimps. Panama: The local state insurer offers very limited livestock insurance Vietnam: A pilot insurance programme for aquaculture enterprises in 15 Mekong River delta provinces was offered by a local subsidiary of the large French insurer, Groupama. After two years, the scheme was discontinued, with a loss ratio of nearly 2. INSURANCE APPROACHES: STEPS IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS Decision and action steps Considerable attention has been given in the foregoing chapters to introducing the wide range of risk management mechanisms that operate in livestock farming and aquaculture. This approach is deliberate. Although this publication is primarily concerned with the use of insurance approaches to risk management, even the most fervent proponents of agricultural insurance would readily concede the necessity of accurately identifying the role, if any, of insurance in any given type of farming. One key point needs to be underlined at the start. This is that insurance does not and cannot obliterate risk. It spreads risk. There are two dimensions to this spread. The first dimension is the spread across an industry or an economy, extended in the case of international reinsurance to the international sphere. The second dimension of spread is through time. Most insurance programmes operate on both dimensions. The important fact to note is that insurance does not directly increase the income from the livestock or aquaculture enterprise. It merely helps manage risks to this income. An insurance indemnity becomes payable in the event of a claim under a policy. The policy must be in force, with premium paid, by the time of the loss event. Most policies incorporate an element of risk sharing, by means of a deductible. This amount is the percentage of the loss that is borne entirely by the insured. Premiums must cover several areas of cost. The components commonly used by insurers to calculate premiums are explained in Annex II. Any decision-making process on insurance involves many stages. These stages, and certainly the priorities, will differ, depending on which type of body is doing the investigation. This may be a government ministry, a farmers’ organization, an insurer, a bank or a group of marketing/processing agencies. In any case, some of the more important issues and steps are: a.         Demand assessment – ensuring that any initiatives are in response to real riskmanagement needs b.         Identification of the key insured parties; where is the risk carried, and is there a place forautomatic as opposed to voluntary insurance cover? Are farmers willing to pay forinsurance? c.         Which is the most important factor for the farmer to insure? Is it mortality and perhapsin some cases, loss of performance? Alternatively, is it rather the risk to the grossmargin generated by the livestock enterprise? d.         Determination of the perils that the insurance contract can cover e.         Decision on types of enterprise to be covered – a key factor in insurance design f.          Analysis of insurance options, administrative models and loss assessment procedures,together with determination of associated costs g.         Rating – determining the pure premium required, plus administrative and lossadjustment overheads to derive the initial premium level to be charged. Note: this stepneeds reliable historical data on incidences of perils and resulting losses. h.        Identifying possible complementary roles for the government and for the private sector In any given situation the results of investigating these issues will determine whether or not insurance is the most efficient and effective mechanism to manage a particular area of risk. The results will also indicate the type of insurance product that is optimum for a given situation. Further information on insurance administration is given in Chapter 8. The sections below set out some of the arguments, and illustrate, with examples, how some insurance solutions have been developed. Given the over-riding importance of one particular climate peril for livestock, particular attention is given to the potential of rainfall index approaches in managing the risk of losses from drought (see Section 5.5 below). Demand assessment This must come before any substantial investment is made by any of the parties – government, insurance companies or organizations representing potential insured farmers. The assessment is not easy, as insurance buyers want to have an indication of the likely premium cost before expressing an interest in buying the insurance product. However it is impossible to give more than a very vague estimate of the likely cost of the insurance before there has been a detailed investigation of the incidence and effect of perils on livestock and aquaculture farmers, and an assessment of operating costs, Closely linked to this is the need for any insurance programme to respond to real needs. As stated in the introduction, the buying and selling of livestock and aquaculture insurance products is a business, and both buyer and seller must want to participate. Real opportunities to benefit from the transactions must be met for this condition to be satisfied. While some risks, such as drought, are ongoing, new risks emerge as production practices are altered. This alteration may be due to the availability of new technology, or as a result of changes in market demand or, as is increasingly the case, to respond to other types of pressure such as environmental or animal activist groups objecting to certain livestock management practices, such as the mulesing of Merino sheep. Abandonment of an established practice will lead to a search for other risk management techniques. Sometimes, in some situations, the range of options will include insurance. In the face of these needs, the services of an experienced agricultural or aquaculture insurance team are required when insurance is under consideration. Such a specialist team would be able: a.          to examine the risk structure of certain key enterprises, b.          to identify the extent to which the involved parties are vulnerable to these risks, c.          to draft an outline of an insurance programme, with indicative costs and benefits, andresponsibilities; it would also include details of further investigative, publicity andlobbying work required before insurance business could commence. This team would consult closely with several sectors in the economy, and follow up in detail the issues that are described below. Nature of the insured parties – automatic or voluntary cover? Farmer/producers are one obvious party to insurance. Those who depend on a supply of livestock, livestock products, fish or other aquaculture products for their business are another. The latter group includes processors and product buyers. These firms often stand to lose financially if products are not available from their local primary producer In the event of a loss on the farm, the buyer or processor may face increased acquisition costs in order to meet ongoing contractual or other market obligations. They therefore have an insurable interest in the livestock and fish. One of the factors, which can lead to an increased demand for insurance, is the growth of contract farming arrangements. When insurance can economically address some of the production risk involved, risk that affects both growers and contractors, then there may be a case for making insurance automatic. This is the same as making it compulsory, but “automatic” is a better description of the process when insurance becomes just one of a range of services being provided, as a package, to contracted growers. Another form of linkage of insurance to other services involves credit, when insurance is sometimes a condition imposed and arranged by the lender. Beyond these types of linked compulsion, the catastrophic FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2001 (already mentioned above) sparked a debate in both the U.K. and the EU as to whether livestock farmers should be obliged to buy epidemic disease cover so that taxpayers would not be obliged to pay for future losses. Such losses include compensation to farmers for animal mortality, loss of production and clean-up costs. At the time of writing, the outcome of this debate is not known. The key risks for livestock and aquaculture farmers have been set out in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 above. Some of these are such that they might be managed with the assistance of insurance. Others would not. Chapter 6, below, selects some of these risks and discusses them from an insurance point of view. Firstly, however, it is necessary to look briefly at the basis for possible insurance. In other words, in the insurance contract, what is the basis for an indemnity payment to be made, is it mortality, or is it based on financial criteria, in turn dependent on the gross margin results achieved in the enterprise. This distinction is now explored in Section 5.4 below. Approaches to livestock & aquaculture insurance In conventional livestock/aquaculture insurance policies, a claim leading to payment of an indemnity can be made in the event of an insured peril leading to stock mortality, with the loss measured on the basis of an agreed value for the stock. This is still by far the most common form of livestock and aquaculture insurance. Moreover, it is likely to be the most readily form of insurance cover, for most developing country situations, for the foreseeable future. An alternative approach is when an insured peril impacts on the profit of the specific enterprise being insured, i.e. the gross margin. This impact may be due to mortality of numbers of stock – or it could be due to loss of production due to adverse climatic factors, to a ban on marketing stock or stock products, to the outbreak of an infectious disease or pollution of the environment (particularly applicable to aquaculture enterprises). Again, it could be due to a marked increase in on-farm costs, following an insured event - even without the actual death of the insured stock. When the contractual basis between the insured and the insurer focuses on the expected gross margin of an enterprise, any significant shortfall in the gross margin is then the basis for the determination of an indemnity payment, provided it is caused by a peril recognised under the insurance policy. This approach is far from being in common use as yet, the only mature example known to the writer being a policy popular in recent years with German dairy farmers. In Mexico too the benefits of concentrating on the financial outcome of the enterprise have recently been recognised. Detailed product development work has been completed in this country, and a commercial launch of insurance products expected in the near future. Clearly, with its focus on the expected financial outcome of an enterprise, the new type of policy addresses the key factor in commercial farming. Despite this logical advantage, there will be difficulties in introducing gross margin products in most developing countries. These difficulties exist on both the supply side (the insurer) and on the demand side (potential insured farmer). For the farmer, the circumstances that would make a gross margin trigger attractive include those where there is significant investment involved, and where there is limited personal risk-bearing capacity, usually due in turn to high levels of borrowed funds for the enterprise. These circumstances certainly exist, but are by no means the rule in most developing countries. For the insurer there must be confidence that the necessary records are available and reliable, so that a loss can be quantified. In developing countries, there will be limited situations where this condition can be met, though more and more farmers, including fish farmers, are known to be keeping records. By contrast, insurance contracts where mortality as the basis for a claim are less demanding in terms of records, but still require a reliable system for the positive identification of the insured stock. Perils covered in traditional mortality insurance include: •      Flood, windstorm •      Pollution, poisoning, land subsidence •      Machinery/electrical breakdown •      Fire, lightning, explosion •      Malicious damage, riot, strike Common exclusions in the traditional policy were: •      Consequential loss & legal liability •      Epidemic diseases and Government slaughter order •      Cannibalism/ malnutrition •      Overcrowding The challenge now for the insurance industry is to design products that would have wide applicability for many developing country farming types and systems, and would cover: •      Epidemic disease with or without a Government slaughter order •      Ban on selling animals or animal products •      Drop of production as a result of an insured peril As mentioned above, Mexico has recently taken up this challenge. Here, government and private, commercial insurers are currently exploring options for livestock insurance against catastrophe epidemic disease. Insurance products are needed which combine coverage of direct mortality losses to the livestock enterprise and the consequential losses or business interruption costs arising out of the insured event. Traditionally, Mexican insurers have offered individual animal accident and mortality livestock insurance for cattle, pigs, sheep and goats. This type of cover has been available since the mid 1990’s, and has been supported by government subsidies of about 30 percent on the insurance premiums paid by livestock producers. With premium rates for individual animal insurance of 5 to 7.5 percent, or higher, according to the coverage provided, the subsidies have been important in making the product affordable for small livestock producers. Indeed, the cover has proved very popular among farmers. Consequently, insurance penetration levels have been high, particularly for dairy cattle and pigs enterprises. In 2005 the Mexican government decided to withdraw its subsidy support for individual animal cover and instead to switch the subsidies to catastrophe livestock epidemic disease insurance products. At the time of writing the author has not seen the final details of the new Mexican catastrophe livestock insurance products, but they are understand to include the following features: •      The policies are herd (flock) based, with a first loss deductible designed to eliminate normal mortality levels and low-level frequency losses, which do not impact heavily on the financial viability of the livestock enterprises. •      The policies include protection against traditional accident and mortality on the one hand, and losses arising from catastrophe (OIE Class A) epidemic diseases and unavoidable slaughter on the other. •       For dairy cattle, the intention of the policies is to provide business interruption cover against lost milk production when a high mortality event takes place. For dairy farms that are directly affected by the disease event, the policies would pay out for the loss of the cow plus loss of income from milk sales for any cows that have died and/or have been culled. For non-affected herds in the controlled zone, where milk sales are banned, the cover would indemnify the producer for loss of income from milk sales. The policies would also indemnify milk producers in situations where a natural peril, such as flood, prevents the producer from delivering his milk to the market. •    By restricting coverage to catastrophe events only, there is the potential to offer this insurance at rates of 1 to 2 percent, or less, though the actual rates are not known for certain at the time of writing. Index approaches to insurance The concept: In a conventional or classic livestock or aquaculture insurance policy, evidence of damage (i.e. mortality of stock on the farm, or in the water) is needed before an indemnity is paid. However, verifying that such damage has occurred is expensive, and making an accurate measurement of the loss on each individual insured farm is even more costly. An index (also sometimes known as ‘coupon’) policy operates differently. With an index policy a measurement is derived from factors connected to the damaging event but not directly dependent on individual loss assessment of the insured stock. Weather index insurance The measurement that is most commonly considered in constructing an index for insurance relates to meteorological events which are expected to be damaging, and which can therefore be used as the trigger for indemnity payments. These damaging weather events might be: a.         a certain minimum temperature for a minimum period of time. b.         a certain amount of rainfall measured in a certain time period – this can be used forexcess rain and also for lack of rain (drought) cover; an alternative approach toestablishing the degree of drought experienced, and the area affected, is the NormalizedDifference Vegetative Index ( See NDVI in Glossary). This relies on an analysis ofsatellite imagery, rather than the use of rain gauges on the ground. c.         attainment of a certain wind speed – for hurricane insurance. The classic insurance policy is replaced with a simple coupon. Instead of the usual policy wording, which would give the indemnity payable for livestock mortality for losses from specific causes, the coupon merely gives a monetary sum that becomes payable on certification that the named weather event, of specified severity, has occurred. The face value of the coupon may be standard, to be triggered once the weather event has taken place for the geographical area covered. Alternatively, it could be graduated, with the value of the coupon then being proportional to the severity of the event. Clearly, this type of trigger operates over an area, encompassing many insured farms. Again, a trigger such as this cannot be used for certain perils, such as hail, where the adverse event normally impacts on a very limited area of land. On the other hand, it is suited to weather perils that impact over a wide area, for example drought. Since there is no direct connection between a farming operation and the coupon, even those without farming enterprises at risk could theoretically purchase risk cover of this type. This is not a disadvantage. On the contrary, there are many persons besides farmers who stand to suffer financial losses from adverse weather events. Fishermen, tourist operators, outdoor vendors are among the many categories making up the potential clientele for index insurance products. Index-based agricultural insurance is a very new product. It has only started recently in a small way in a few parts of the developed world and it is still too early to be able to report much experience over a satisfactory time series. Examples to date include index insurance against drought on pastureland in the provinces of Alberta and Ontario, in Canada, and a similar cover in operation in India, through the BASIX microfinance network, designed to provide a level of protection for smallholder farmers. Other examples are noted in the section below entitled, ‘Index insurance: the way of the future?’ In Spain, a novel approach is being taken with livestock insurance. The risk being addressed is a shortage of pasture feed, itself largely a function of rainfall. Agroseguro, a consortium of insurers (the operations of which are heavily subsidized) has constructed an index that is designed to trigger an indemnity when the quantity, density and quality of pasture fodder falls below a certain critical index figure. The analyses used to derive the index (termed the NDVI – Normalised Difference Vegetative Index) are based on satellite imagery from NOAA. It is not yet known how successful this approach has been, but one can note that it has the potential to provide information at low cost compare with on-the-ground rainfall measurements. Moreover, data from satellite imagery are not as susceptible to tampering, as is the case with data produced by standard rain gauges. Non-weather index insurance There is a theoretical possibility that indices derived from events other than weather could be used as triggers for insurance products. The example below, from Mongolia, describes one such possibility, where one of the indices being considered is a zonal livestock mortality rate. Mongolia - Livestock insurance concept, using an index approach Mongolian agriculture is largely based around raising livestock, with the national herd, nearly all of which is now privately owned, being nearly 30 million head, predominantly sheep and goats, with significant numbers of cattle, yak, horses and camels. Income from herding accounts for nearly one-third of the country’s GDP. The main climate hazard faced by herders is when a harsh winter follows a period of poor spring and summer pasture growth. The resulting dzud causes severe livestock losses. Inadequate nutrition in the previous spring and summer means that animals go into the winter in poor condition. In addition, poor summer growth means that the pasture is short or inadequate where stock is kept in the winter - the winter camps. Heavy snow covers pasture to the extent that animals have very little access to nutrients in the camps. As a result of these factors, dzud conditions lead to high livestock mortality levels. Indeed, in recent years, three successive dzud winters saw the national herd contracting from 33.6 million head in the 1999 census, to 23.9 million head three years later. Traditional, individual insurance approaches to assist in the management of the losses caused by dzuds have been considered, but have been quickly judged unsuited and impractical, given the scattered communities, high administrative costs and the opportunities for moral hazard problems. Moral hazard in these conditions would be extremely costly to monitor, let alone control. Accordingly, the Mongolian authorities and the World Bank recently conducted a study to see whether an index of mortality could be used as a basis for paying indemnities – on an area (local district or sum) basis. Facilitating this is the fact that there is a well-established practice of conducting an annual livestock census in Mongolia. Therefore, the determination of an index of livestock mortality should possible and could doubtless be done at minimum cost. The feasibility study indicated that the concept has merit, and may well be taken as a step towards meeting the strict conditions that would be required by insurers and reinsurers before they would accept the risk. By way of commentary on the proposed use of a mortality index, one could note that it is not completely detached from management factors. Conceivably, careless management practices by a number of herders within the sum, and subsequent higher than necessary mortality of livestock, could influence the index. However, herders who engage in such careless management would need to collaborate in order to influence the index. A greater potential problem to the use of a mortality index is the credibility of census statistics. Local authorities (who manage the annual livestock census) could influence the reporting process and thus introduce a systematic bias that would inflate the payments made for livestock losses in their area. In order to overcome the problem, an examination is now underway of the feasibility of using other indices, indices that would be beyond the control of the herders and the local authorities. While the obvious candidate is a weather index, as used elsewhere in the world, this is not feasible in Mongolia, as the dzud and its losses involve many complex factors and relationships that go beyond weather per se. More likely to show promise is an index using data derived from satellite imagery, coupled to sample observations on the ground that indicate nutritional levels in livestock. Index insurance: the way of the future? Despite the paucity of experience with index insurance, there is a high level of interest in both development and insurance circles in this risk management mechanism for developing countries. This interest is prompted by the belief that index insurance products offer an apparently practical solution to many of the barriers to classic agricultural (crop, livestock) insurance for small-scale, dispersed farmers in less developed areas of the world. These barriers include: a.         adverse selection – only those farmers more at risk will buy cover; b.         moral hazard – the insured farmer may not do everything possible to avoid or minimise aloss; c.         transactions costs – the huge costs of marketing individual insurance policies, coupledwith the administrative costs involved in calculating and collecting individual premiumsand paying claims; d.         loss assessment expenses – if loss assessment is done on an individual farm enterprisebasis the costs can be very large in comparison to the premium paid, and may not befeasible in many small farm situations; as noted in Chapter 8, index insurance avoidsnearly all the steps involved in the process of loss adjustment. These four factors are all major constraints to conventional insurance. In an attempt to counter them, index insurance products have been or are being tried in a number of countries. At this stage, the focus is on crop risk with weather indices as the triggers. The list of countries involved includes: Canada, Ethiopia, Guatemala, India, Malawi, Peru, Spain, Ukraine, Uruguay. In summary, and on present evidence, index approaches appear to be the most promising field for new insurance products for many types of primary industry in developing countries – especially for certain perils affecting livestock and cropping. At the present stage of development, it is not clear how index insurance products could be designed for aquaculture, though this may well be merely a matter of time. Certainly, given the growing importance of aquaculture, there is every reason to believe that efforts will be made to harness the benefits of index approaches in order to facilitate insurance participation in some of the perils faced by this industry. Some of the special features of index insurance are discussed in the following chapter, in the section dealing with drought. This peril poses particular challenges for traditional insurance products, which has led to much attention now. RISKS THAT MAY BE MANAGED, AT LEAST PARTIALLY, BY USING INSURANCE Disease losses Diseases may cause actual death, or diminished production. They may also mean increased on-farm costs, occasioned by the required quarantine, curative or preventive measures. For example, the regular drenching (oral dosing) of sheep against parasitic worms in the alimentary tract is a significant cost item for many sheep herders. Again, the presence of a disease may prompt a government ban on the sale of animals or animal products, or even a government slaughter order within a zone of possible infection. Transboundary animal diseases can affect livestock in all countries, but are particularly important where the borders between countries are land boundaries, and where the movement of both domesticated and feral animals is difficult to control. Fish diseases can similarly spread readily from the waters of one country to those of another. Having noted these costs resulting from disease, how relevant is insurance as a means for assisting in the management of disease risk? On the supply side, coverage of disease risks is not easy for insurers and reinsurers, since most diseases are partially or totally preventable/curable through sound animal husbandry, livestock sanitation and vaccination programs. In addition, many diseases do not cause death, but rather loss of use or performance. Turning now to demand, there is little doubt that farmers of widely differing scales of operation are heavily dependent on their livestock staying alive and productive. Thus, the demand for management of disease risks touches both the small farmer, with one or two draught or milk animals, as well as the large-scale beef feedlot operator, who is carrying a heavy debt burden on his current stock. There is no doubt that the first layer of disease management must be appropriate on-farm livestock and aquaculture husbandry. Insurance, where it operates, is generally accompanied by requirements that prescribed veterinary care procedures, including vaccinations, are followed. For example, some cattle insurance contracts specify a number of required vaccinations, for which documentary proof is demanded by the insurer in the event of mortality of an insured animal. The two types of products – a veterinary care plan and insurance – are mutually supportive. Moreover, marketing to the same clientele costs less in administrative costs than would be the case if the products were to be sold separately. The risk of exotic disease outbreaks, particularly at an epidemic level, call into question the ability of the insurance industry to design and market suitable policies to meet this type of risk. The problem here is that the exposures are potentially so high, that the only way most insurers and reinsurers could be persuaded to participate would be through caps on their exposure. Such caps could be possibly be accompanied by government partnership arrangements, with the public sector undertaking to cover losses above the cap established in insurance contracts. Despite the apparent attraction of this type of arrangement, the ability of most developing countries to undertake this sort of commitment would be very limited. Despite the difficulties posed by epidemic diseases, several traditional livestock insurance programs in Europe do cover livestock epidemic diseases, including for example insurance products offered in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia. In short, insurance cannot substitute for sound management of the risk of diseases. Indeed, this task is a significant area of modern farm and aquaculture management, with very substantial losses resulting from failures in this area. Moreover, the growing importance of international trade in agricultural commodities impacts on the pest and disease issue in developing country farming in several ways: a.         Food safety and quality regulations mean that any evidence of pest or disease in a consignment may disqualify meat, other livestock products or fish from entry to the country of destination; b.         Similarly, pesticide and drug residues are subject to very tight limits under the standards for international trade; c.         Competition in the market is fierce, and even if produce is allowed to enter, a recent history of disease problems in the producing country may mean the produce is unlikely to find a buyer at a remunerative price. Insurance implications can similarly be summarised in a brief list: a.   It is sometimes possible for farmers to obtain cover against diseases where there is no generally accepted on-farm livestock or aquaculture husbandry practice. b.   Because many disease conditions only lead to mortality when there is a nutritional deficiency, or similar failure of management, insurers require certain minimum standards of livestock husbandry, and may state in the insurance contract that indemnities will not be paid if there is evidence that these standards have not been met. c.   In an attempt to reduce the adverse environmental impact of some well-established routines for pest and disease control (e.g. certain chlorinated hydrocarbons used to control ectoparasites), alternative, benign regimes are continually being developed. Insurance may be utilised in the future in order to provide temporary risk assurance to farmers who are persuaded to use the new routines, but who are uncertain as to their efficacy. Climate perils Drought Drought is by far the most important peril for livestock farmers in developing countries. A quote from an IFPRI publication is relevant here: “Drought management interventions need to be designed so that they assist farmers and herders to better manage risk and improve their productivity and incomes, but without distorting incentives in inappropriate ways. The experience with feed-subsidy programs in the West Asia and North Africa region and with restocking projects in Sub-Saharan Africa have had mixed results.   While they have helped protect incomes and food security in drought years, they have also had negative impacts on the way resources are managed. Better alternatives could be area-based rainfall insurance, particularly if offered by the private sector, and the development of more accurate and accessible drought-forecasting information.” It is worth noting that the writer of this opinion specifically mentions herders, alongside farmers, as being potential beneficiaries of improved drought management interventions. Indeed, the devastating impact of drought on livestock herds is well known. Drought is also the natural weather event that causes most problems for insurers. The reasons for this are many. Firstly, insurers feel most confidence when an adverse event has a clearly defined time of impact, coupled with a clearly defined geographical area that is affected. The classic example is hail, which may do its damage in a matter of a few minutes, or even seconds, and will typically impact an area confined to a few hundred square metres up to a few square kilometres. Hail damage is clearly attributable to the adverse weather event, and is readily verified as such, provided that a field inspection is undertaken. By contrast drought has a vague beginning, its effects linger for a very long time, and can extend over more than one season. Moreover, it typically impacts a very wide land area. Livestock production losses caused by drought can be aggravated by the incidence of other problems, e.g. severe winter conditions following a summer and spring during which feed was in short supply, due to lack of rain. From a purely underwriting point of view drought poses great difficulties for a standard livestock insurer. Firstly, because drought affects a large number of farmers in the same season – perhaps the whole of a country – the losses can be very large. This systemic or catastrophe exposure means there are problems in mobilising sufficient insurance capacity to cover the sum insured that is at risk, even with recourse to substantial reinsurance. Secondly, droughts in recent years, at least in many parts of Africa, have tended to extend over more than one year. This experience means that it is extremely hard for insurance companies to obtain reinsurance for insurance portfolios that carry drought risk. Thirdly, the magnitude of the risk in most developing countries means that actuarially calculated premiums would be very high – too high perhaps to attract all but the most at-risk livestock farmers. No insurer wants to build a portfolio based entirely on such clientele. For these reasons, insurers are very wary of covering drought as an inclusion in standard agricultural insurance policies. This is particularly the case in those parts of the developing world where drought is the major weather constraint to livestock production. These include: Southern and Eastern Africa, Sahelian Africa, Horn of Africa, North Africa/Near East, Eastern Europe, Central and East Asia, South Asia, Central and South America. These are also regions in which livestock play an important role in farming generally, and in small-scale farming in particular. The list illustrates the key role that drought plays in the lives of much of the developing world’s rural population. Given the almost insurmountable problems involved in including drought in standard mortality policies for developing countries, attention in recent years has turned to examining whether index (coupon) policies could provide a useful degree of loss control in the event of a serious shortfall in precipitation. For drought, the index used would most likely be precipitation over a given period and within a pre-determined zone. However, other indices may also be applicable in particular circumstances. Initial developmental work in this field is promising. As mentioned above, the NDVI index is already in use, in Spain. This index, or similar remote-sensing applications, could well bring low cost benefits to certain developing countries where livestock farming is based on pasture, and where drought is an occasional peril. Again, the Mongolian example, described by Skees and Enkh-Amgalan, and noted in Chapter 5 above, suggested that a livestock mortality index insurance product could overcome the high costs of the more conventional insurance programmes. The policy would be triggered by a mortality index above a certain threshold. An annual livestock census would provide the necessary baseline and “after loss data”. As an area or zonal programme, all livestock farmers in a given zone would receive the same level of indemnity, as this would be fixed on a zonal basis. This standardization means of course that there is every incentive for individual farmers to minimise their losses – i.e. nil moral hazard, as could be the case with insurance products where losses are adjusted individually. More generally, a weather (e.g. rainfall) index insurance product involves using a meteorological measurement as the trigger for indemnity payments. In practice, the most likely trigger format would be a series of indemnity steps, each step corresponding to a given level of rainfall deficit. The assumption is that farmers could select a level of indemnity suited to individual circumstances. Thus the indemnity payable would increase as the rainfall shortfall increased from a defined “drought trigger” amount. At the time of writing (2005), index policies covering drought or other climate risks cannot be described as being a standard, tested product ready for introduction in developing countries. Rather they are in the nature of a promising new insurance technique, attracting much interest among farmers’ organizations, policy-makers, insurers and other risk management professionals, with the likelihood of more pilot programmes being implemented, in developing countries, in the near future. Windstorm Windstorm insurance for developing country livestock and aquaculture enterprises relates chiefly to losses resulting from damage to structures such as livestock housing for intensive rearing enterprises, and to those aquaculture structures that can suffer damage from excessive winds and the resulting storm surges. Clearly siting considerations, together with construction quality, are factors that will affect vulnerability to windstorm losses. Before accepting windstorm as an insured peril, insurers would take these sorts of management practices into account. They make certain that it is only exceptional events that will trigger the insurance. Windstorm is associated with catastrophic losses to life and property, as well as to crops. Hurricane Andrew, one of the most destructive storms ever recorded, hit Florida and Louisiana on 25 August 1992, while more recently, and perhaps more disastrously, Hurricane Katrina hit the Louisiana and Mississippi coasts at the end of August 2005. Storms of this magnitude, and lesser, but still serious weather events of this nature, are believed to be increasing in frequency. This may be due to the incremental energy levels in the world’s weather systems, as a result of global warming. Because of the increasing frequency of damaging weather events, it is expected that in the short term this will result in a significant rise in premium rates for conventional insurance. In the longer term, the challenges posed will doubtless give an impetus to a trend that is already apparent, that is, the search by risk management professionals and others for new ways by which losses arising from severe climate events can be managed. One such development has been catastrophe bonds. These provide a mechanism whereby investors can earn an attractive return on such bonds, but stand to lose some or all of the capital invested in the bonds, in the event of a catastrophe. Freeze Freeze is not a peril generally associated with livestock or fish deaths in developing countries. However, it does affect fish farmers in northern latitudes, for example in Norway and Finland, and along the eastern coast of Canada, especially when particularly violent storms accompany the normal freezing over of the top layer of water. In these circumstances, ice is broken up and is stirred down through the zone where the fish are found, super-cooling the water, and causing high fish mortality. Another example relates to carp broodstock in pond culture in Eastern Europe. High mortality levels of these carp have been experienced during extreme winters. This risk is often insured in the countries where this risk needs to be managed. The other type of enterprise affected by freeze is livestock raising in northeast Asia, for example in Mongolia, here the dzud, can cause a very significant number of deaths among sheep, goats, cattle, camels and horses. The exploration of a means for insuring against this peril using an index approach is described above in Chapter 5. Flood Flood damage may be due to excessive rainfall on-site, but it can also be caused by excessive precipitation elsewhere, and the subsequent rise of river and lake levels, to cause flooding of farmland, overflowing (and pollution) of aquaculture ponds and dams, and heavy losses of livestock and fish. It may also be caused by structural failure of dams or levies, but this is usually a secondary consequence of an extreme climate event, so flood as a peril is listed under Climate in this discussion. Flood is sometimes one of the results of severe oceanic storms. Examples are the frequent tropical cyclones experienced in the Bay of Bengal. These usually cause flooding of low-lying farmland along the affected coastal zone. Records indicate that although the fundamental peril is windstorm, the actual losses on farms – to livestock as well as to aquaculture enterprises, have been due to flood damage resulting in turn from wind-induced high sea levels, which are known as storm surges. At the time of writing (September 2005), much attention is being given to the flooding in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama in the southern United States as a result of Hurricane Katrina. In this case, excessive precipitation was accompanied by wind-induced storm surges that broke the levies protecting, among other areas, the city of New Orleans. Another extreme example of an ocean-related flood is the seismic sea wave, or tsunami. As its name suggests, this oceanic wave is the result of a seismic event, usually an underground earthquake, or volcanic incident affecting a relatively small part of the ocean in a massive way. The resulting wave travels at a speed of several hundred kilometres per hour, over vast distances. As the wave meets a rising seabed, it grows massively in height, leading to serious flooding of the land adjacent to the sea front. Aquaculture enterprises are particularly at risk, as they are very frequently located along or close to the seashore. Damage can be to the growing fish and to livestock; it can also affect fish cages and ponds, mollusc racks, on-shore fish farms, which are often sited on shorelines and livestock housing (in intensive rearing systems). As a result of an undersea earthquake off the Aceh Province of Indonesia on 26 December 2004, and a subsequent tsunami, significant damage was done to coastal regions of many countries. For example, in Aceh itself, more than half of some 44,000 ha of fishponds were destroyed, along with their stock. Ponds were filled with debris and silt that was often found to be toxic. The resulting clean-up and rehabilitation of facilities is proving to be a costly exercise. The insurance technology for flood risk is not overly complex, so in many circumstances this risk is insurable. Exceptions would be for enterprises that are situated where the risk is regarded as high, for example, flood plains that by definition are exposed to a very high risk of inundation. Premiums charged to manage the risk of flood in such areas would be prohibitively expensive, although in some developed countries the public sector has subsidized insurers in order that farmers in the area are covered against losses from this peril.  Other perils Seismic and volcanic events Although seismic events are relatively common, those causing significant damage are rare, as are seismic sea waves, or tsunamis. Livestock housing and aquaculture structures can be destroyed, leading to deaths, or deaths may occur as a result of accompanying inundation and/or pollution. Insurance protection against these events is usually possible, at least from an underwriting point of view. For the farmer, these types of events bring the expectation that disaster relief will be forthcoming from public funds. This will reduce the demand for insurance, even if insurance products are available in the market. Fire Fire is one of the oldest perils to be covered in property insurance. It is also a major peril for many livestock enterprises, particularly those involving housing, such as broiler and egg production units. Bush and pasture fires can also result in livestock losses. Again, insurance protection is usually possible – often as part of a multi-risk policy. Fires are caused by human action (and carelessness) and also by lightning strikes during electrical storms. Whatever the cause, there are control measures to reduce any losses. These may be through early detection and the subsequent means to take action. This implies the use of smoke detectors and alarms, together with adequate access to fire extinguishers and/or the more basic means of putting out fires, such as water and sand buckets. Insurance policies will normally state the expectations under the policy of the means to control fire losses. Again, this is an example of insurance being just a part of a cluster of measures used to control risk. Theft and predation Mysterious disappearance, rustling, theft, predation, escape are of growing concern in certain parts of the world. For example, and as already noted above, theft of livestock in Southern Africa is the major incentive for herders to use stock identification systems. Insurance policies often exclude theft and ‘mysterious disappearance’ from cover, due to the difficulty of proving that stock was present immediately prior to the disappearance. Even when this type of loss is covered, the policies are likely to specify high deductibles, thus forcing herders to rely principally on their own careful management to minimize losses of this type. Fish farms, especially those in which fish are held in sea cages, are at risk from predation by sea birds, and also from seals and predator fish such as sharks. Cage design can assist in controlling predation of this sort, but only at a considerable cost in terms of the use of stronger materials. This risk has been covered by insurers in some developed countries, but losses have been considerable. There is little evidence that insurance for this type of risk will be readily available in most developing countries, in the foreseeable future. In inland, pond culture systems, animal predators can be responsible for significant losses. For example, monitor lizards are a particularly important source of predation losses of farmed fish in some African countries, for example, in Uganda. Water quality Water quality problems are of particular concern to aquaculture. In their natural environment, fish deal with threats to their survival by simply swimming away. When caged, or in ponds, this is not an option. Three main types of peril affect water quality: •      Oxygen depletion – can be due to high water temperatures, or to decomposing organic matter, or to the presence of high concentrations of algae. The condition is also known as ‘summerkill’ ; •      Pollution – may be organic or inorganic; it is worth noting that pollutants are not only the substances commonly classed as such; even fresh (non-saline) water can be a pollutant that causes harm to certain sensitive seawater species ; floods may also lead to pollution losses; •      Algal blooms – often caused by a series of unusual weather events, giving rise to rapid multiplication of algae. Farmed fish, in cages, are unable to move to clear water, and can die through oxygen depletion in the water, from toxins produced by the algae or from other effects of the presence of algae, such as the clogging of the gills of the fish, with the result that oxygen transfer across the gill membranes is inhibited. In the main, this risk is best addressed by farm management practices, starting with careful siting of fish cages, care with water recharge in pond systems, avoidance of over-stocking and even selection of species being farmed. However, some of the underlying causes of these problems may themselves be insurable.   Storms can induce summerkill in pond systems, by stirring up oxygen-deficient water from the bottom layer of ponds. Ponds, sea or lake cages, or shellfish may all be subject to pollution resulting from flooding of nearby land. Accidents Many insurance policies for livestock and aquaculture will cover losses from accidental poisoning, explosion, and other incidents resulting in infrastructure and environmental problems, and also machinery/electrical breakdown and power outages. Similarly, damage to structures (tanks, cages, sluices) from collisions on land or water will generally be included as insurable risks. Losses from malicious damage, riot and strikes are sometimes covered in insurance policies, but insurers often list these risks as exclusions. Consequential losses As farming becomes more commercial, with contractual arrangements for supply to processors and exporters more common, so too can losses consequent upon a failure to supply farm products become an issue. Similarly, as food safety measures include such mechanisms as tracing produce back to points of origin, issues of responsibility for the freedom from harmful substances or pathogenic organisms can impact upon food producers. It is envisaged that consequential loss and legal liability due to such livestock losses and/or food safety considerations will have increasing financial consequences for producers, and may be a growing area for insurance protection in developing countries. In Europe, consequential losses due to measures such as trade bans on livestock and livestock products, may be compensated through private insurance schemes (e.g. The Netherlands, Germany, UK), or through public-private partnerships (e.g. Denmark, Finland, Spain). Management issues These are usually rated as exclusions in livestock insurance policies. Examples include: infertility; loss of normal biological function; cannibalism and overcrowding losses; malnutrition (though the last named may be insurable when due to unexpected feed deficiencies, beyond the immediate control of the farm manager). HOW DOES INSURANCE RELATE TO VARIOUS TYPES OF ENTERPRISE? Benefit/cost issues It is often stated that virtually any enterprise can be insured, against virtually any peril. However, primary industries such as livestock and aquaculture production pose stiff challenges to this general principle. Moreover, at the time of writing, with squeezed profit margins on the production of many livestock and aquaculture commodities, a paradoxical situation arises. The tight margins highlight the need for improved levels of risk management, including insurance, but also reduce the ability of farmers to buy the desired level of protection. In the discussion below, the focus will be on identifying insurable areas of risk. These are determined by the nature of the livestock or aquaculture enterprise, and by the perils they commonly face. This means that some enterprise types and some perils are more suitable than are others for the use of insurance as part of a risk management strategy. In this discussion, ‘insurance’ relates to the various types of contract, which make up the more traditional type of cover, as opposed to index policies. With the latter, the nature of the enterprise is less of an issue than the means for deriving the index. Insurance of farming enterprises usually involves insurance of an expected future value, as a result of growth and/or reproduction This sets agricultural insurance apart from other property covers (e.g. motor vehicle, buildings, machinery) when the value (frequently maximum value) exists at the commencement of the insurance. One of the factors that can determine whether a particular enterprise/peril combination is suitable for insurance is the ease and economy by which losses can be satisfactorily assessed. This will be touched on below, with some of the more general loss assessment issues discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8, under the section, Loss Assessment. Intensive livestock enterprises These include operations such as broiler and egg production units, high input/high output dairying, intensive pig production units and cattle feedlot operations. Six features mark these types of enterprises as being potentially insurable at reasonable cost to the farmer: •      They all involve significant investment in fixed infrastructure, coupled to high recurrent costs. They are also likely to involve bank loans, with loan servicing as a major cost item. There is therefore considerable dependence on a regular cash flow from sales. •      Many intensive livestock enterprises have a defined production cycle, with identifiable ‘off take’ or marketing phases. This means that shortfalls in expected production can be identified at an early stage, and remedial action taken wherever possible to do so. Relevant examples include: dairying, broiler and egg production units. •      The nature of intensive enterprises means that accurate records of stock numbers are likely to be kept. •      Those managing the enterprise will have close contact with the livestock, meaning that animal health can be monitored carefully, and early action taken in order to control losses. •      The managers are likely to have a good level of education and operate to a good standard of husbandry. This is likely to be accompanied by access to ongoing sources of up-to-date information on risk factors such as disease threats and imminent, extreme weather events. •      Most intensive enterprises have a defined marketing chain and virtually all of the production enters the commercial market, and requires processing. This means that there is control over quantities produced, year after year, together with an opportunity for establishing a strong database of producers and of details of production enterprises. The availability of information of this sort is vital to creating the climate of confidence necessary for efficient and economical insurance transactions. As a rule, the more commercial the nature of the enterprise, the greater will be the likelihood of identifying a cost-effective role for insurance in risk management. As a corollary, enterprises that fall outside of any of the factors listed above will be less likely to be able to utilise insurance as a risk management mechanism. This is due to their inability to pay the high premiums that would be charged as a result of the insurers’ perceptions of the risk involved. Traditional mixed farming systems It will be evident from the list in 7.2 above that traditional mixed farming systems that involve livestock do not lend themselves to conventional insurance approaches. This is because the enterprises are small and not highly monetized; moreover, the livestock and livestock products are consumed at home or are traded in an unrecorded local market, where tracing is all but impossible. This means that insurance assessments are similarly difficult for this type of livestock enterprise. Similarly, on the demand side, this is limited by the risk management implicit in a mixed farming system. However, for those mixed farms where livestock income becomes of increasing importance, with a move towards a more commercial type of operation, then insurance products may well be sought for certain risks. Again, where animal draught power is important in cropping operations, farmers have an added incentive to seek to insure some, at least, of their livestock. The loss of a key ox or buffalo can have a costly outcome for the farming operation as a whole, through its impact on the production and profit generated. Nevertheless, novel approaches will be necessary in order to overcome the problems (administrative cost, lack of good information linkages) of dealing with small-scale clients. In this respect, the second Indian example quoted in Chapter 4 shows how a partnership between microfinance and insurance providers can develop insurance products suited to small-scale farmers, many of whom are operating mixed farming systems. An alternative approach is to turn to weather indices as the basis for insurance. Extensive livestock ranching systems Turning again to the six factors facilitating insurance applications to the management of risk in livestock production farming, it is clear that few apply to extensive ranching systems for larger livestock such as cattle and deer. For this reason, this type of enterprise is ill suited to conventional, individual-animal insurance approaches. On the other hand, whole herd policies, giving protection against catastrophic herd losses, due to perils such as drought, are likely to enjoy a demand. Perhaps the most promising approach for insurance protection of this type is weather index cover (ref. Chapter 5, Section 5.5). The NDVI pasture index is currently in use in Spain, and a similar approach is used in Canada. Spain experienced, in 2005, the worst prolonged drought for more than 50 years, so the index was thoroughly tested under very difficult conditions. The result is reported to have been satisfactory. Aquaculture – sea/lake cage systems Perils that may kill fish in cage systems start with the water in which the cages are moored. Water can be the means of transmission of a variety of harmful organisms and substances. As already noted above, in their natural state fish can swim away from threats to their survival, whether such threats are in the form of algal blooms, pollutants, low levels of dissolved oxygen or predators. Caged fish do not enjoy this option. There are structural issues too with cage systems. Sea water sites that are optimum for fish health and wellbeing are those that are characterised by high levels of water exchange, which in the main means they should have some degree of exposure to winds, tides and currents. These factors are not conducive to the ease and safety of moorings, and to the structural integrity of the cages. Cage systems of aquaculture involve frequent feeding of the fish, and therefore a high level of human oversight of the operation. As such, the health of the stock can be monitored and remedial action taken when a problem is identified. Moreover, cage systems are generally well-documented, since cages are stocked with fingerlings, and the numbers of these are known. These two factors, the presence of records, and the monitoring of fish health, are both positive as far as an insurer is concerned. However, because the cage rearing of fish is still a new type of farming, with the magnitude of many of the risks being still unknown, insurance product availability is far from certain. This applies especially to policies that cover diseases and parasitical infestations, though some experts believe that it should be possible to design policies to cover the risk of exotic diseases for which on-farm control measures have yet to be developed. Such policies, as and when available, are likely to carry a high level of deductible, say more than 20 percent of the total sum insured Insurance against storms and severe weather events is likely to be more readily obtained, though insurers impose stringent requirements in terms of the design adequacy and condition of moorings and cages. Aquaculture – pond systems The generally poor results of insurance products geared to pond cultivation in various Asian countries (ref. Chapter 4 above), especially of shrimp, serves to underline the challenges of this type of aquaculture. It is no surprise therefore that as a whole, and at the time of writing (2005) this class of aquaculture in Asia is believed to be virtually uninsured, despite the importance of this type of aquaculture in many parts of the region. In Latin America, it is understood that shrimp insurance has been available in Mexico for a number of years. Apart from the losses that insurers have experienced in the few experimental programmes to date, there are some fundamental reasons for the reluctance of insurers to assume part of the risk of this class of aquaculture. Firstly, records are seldom kept, or if kept, are not often thought to be reliable. Second, the farmers have a tendency to attempt to maximise profits by overstocking their ponds, even where much extension advice dwells on the dangers of disease and parasite build-up, and subsequent mortality, when the stocking rate is too high. Third, the level of education of many pond farmers is still very low, meaning that they are less exposed to sources of advice on better management, and threats such as disease outbreaks. On the positive side, and as with cage farmers, insurance against storm damage should eventually be possible, possibly through index approaches, with technology yet to be developed. Aquaculture – recirculation systems Recirculation systems of fish rearing depend for their success on close and careful control of water quality factors – pH, dissolved oxygen, temperature, presence of organic or inorganic toxins, etc. Along with this close level of control of water quality, the health of fish stocks is readily monitored as they can be seen easily in the tanks and raceways. These controls mean that the most situations that could lead to abnormal mortality can be quickly identified and remedial action taken. Given the dependence of recirculation systems on machinery and power, risks to these are likely to lead to a demand for appropriate insurance cover, since the nature of the installation means that high fish mortality can result from an interruption to water flow. From the point of view of the insurer, farmers operating recirculation systems are likely to have invested considerable sums in plant design and construction. They are also likely to have appropriate back-up mechanisms in place, for example, standby power-generation machinery. Records are likely to be sufficiently accurate and informative to give confidence to an insurance underwriter that the risk he is asked to assume is readily quantified and that moral hazard risk is minimized. INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION Loss assessment issues The ability to assess losses is a sine qua non for any standard insurance business. For this reason, this chapter, on insurance administration, starts with a brief consideration of loss assessment issues. This discussion focuses on conventional insurance. Index-based policies avoid the challenges posed by loss assessment. With livestock and aquaculture insurance, loss assessment procedures centre on the need to ascertain that mortality has occurred, and that the cause was an insured peril. Where the policy is not ‘all-risks’ but rather ‘named-perils’ then any loss assessment process should also be able to ascertain as to whether the loss was caused by an insured peril. If this is difficult or impossible, then even at the product design stage, it might be necessary to make a judgement that an insurance approach may not be appropriate. As in any insurance contract, it is vital that the process of loss assessment is made clear, so that in the event of a loss, the assessment process can start in a manner that has the prior agreement of both insurer and insured. The loss must then be measured, and the indemnity to be paid determined. The whole process of assessing the loss, determining the indemnity and paying it, is known as loss adjustment. The loss assessment process will take into account any financial benefit that can accrue if the dead stock is sold. For example, in Finland, salmon dying as a result of some types of physical damage (from birds, for example) can be sold as food for animals farmed for their fur pelts, e.g. minks. Cost containment The management of insurance, as a business, has several stages. These are: market identification, product development, setting indemnity and premium levels, marketing, risk selection and policy issuance, collecting premiums, accumulation control and handling claims. The over-riding aim in the design of administrative structures and procedures is to lay a foundation for minimising costs. Since the potential clientele comprises small and often widely dispersed growers, costs can easily escalate to the point of non-viability of the business, unless special care is taken. In this connection, the new index insurance products, mentioned earlier, offer much scope for drastically lowering the costs of administering a financial risk management mechanism. The various stages of standard insurance administration offer some scope for economies. The tasks involved in these stages are briefly described below, with mention of particular examples where efficient procedures have been developed in order to save costs. The extent of involvement of the public sector varies from country to country, but it always has a role, even if this is exercised in the main through setting supportive and regulatory policies. It may be particularly important in the early stages of developing new insurance products, and in situations where financial support is considered both desirable and possible. Market identification and product development This is a vital stage. Buying insurance involves increasing the up-front costs for a farmer. The advantages of buying cover must be clear, with careful positioning of any proposed insurance product. Firstly, this means recognising that insurance as such may not have a legitimate role in a particular industry for the major perils as seen by the owners. Secondly, where there is believed to be a role, it means that careful attention must be paid to benefit/cost considerations for both contracting parties – the insured and the insurer. These two conditions can best be met by identifying the real points of financial risk in an enterprise type, and examining whether a financial risk-sharing mechanism can be economically applied. In general, the more commercial the operation, the more likely is it that insurance could be designed to address certain of the risks involved. This applies, in particular, to the intended market for the produce of the insured farming enterprises. A formal, commercial market implies the ability to collect information on quantities of production from particular producers. Time series data of this type, since they are based on transactions involving payment, are likely to be highly accurate. A market outlet may also facilitate administrative economies in arranging the cover, or even in paying premiums. At this stage too it is important to identify the insurer. Is it to be a local general insurance company, perhaps one that has little direct connection with the clientele? This is the case with the BASIX insurance in India, where the insurer utilises the existing interface of the microfinance provider with the clientele, while using in-house insurance expertise for product design and underwriting. Alternatively, it can be handled by a special agency, as is the case in Iran, where much effort goes into building up the specialist knowledge required within the insurance company. It is not possible to give an opinion as to which of these alternatives is better. However, one can note that if an existing company were to take on livestock and/or aquaculture risks as an additional line of business, then it will start a number of advantages: a)        It will already have staff trained in insurance; b)        It will have, in place, the necessary systems to handle information concerning the sums insured, and claims; c)        It will have accounting systems in place; d)       It is likely to have existing business relationships with re-insurers; e)        It will have a capital base, one that may be sufficient for it to enter into a new area of business. f)         It will already have a government licence to transact insurance business. Realistically, neither livestock and nor aquaculture insurance in developing countries is likely to be any more attractive to existing insurers than is lending in these sectors to most commercial banks. As with the provision of financial services to these sectors, special attention will be needed to careful design, and identification of suitable innovative approaches. The impressive BASIX example in India (see Chapter 4) is a case in point. Product design, and the determination of the required administrative arrangements for these types of insurance as a new line of business, whether in an existing company, or in a new entity, calls for the best experience available. At the time of writing, the required expertise is most likely to be found within the reinsurance industry, and with specialized consultants/researchers. Costs are likely to be substantial, for product development is a highly skilled task, requiring a detailed knowledge of livestock farming / aquaculture, coupled with a sound appreciation of the principles and operational imperatives of insurance. As such, this can be an expensive stage in the process, but it is an investment with which international agencies can often assist. This assistance might be in the form of direct partnership in product design, or training existing insurance staff to handle the new challenges. In practice, it is likely to start with both approaches. What is important to note is that the design of insurance products, like the design of products for other financial services, is an ongoing task. Marketing Implicit in any moves to start livestock or aquaculture insurance is the assumption that there is a demand for the product. Whereas automatic or compulsory insurance has many advantages, it is not often possible to design or to get the necessary agreements with farmers for this type of policy. Marketing therefore is important. Several factors are important here: a)                  Close links with the representatives of farmers, and speedy response to new needs for insurance. b)                  Similar linkages with banks, product buyers and others with business connections with insured producers. c)                  Attention to appropriate publicity, including information packages designed for farmers. d)                 Scrupulous fairness in loss assessment and claims handling. e)                  Speedy payment of claims. f)                   Appropriate staff training. Setting indemnity and premium levels; valuation; deductibles In conventional insurance, the basic issue to be addressed is whether the insurance is meant to substitute for farm income in the event of a loss event, or whether the indemnity would merely cover the cost of inputs lost, because of mortality. The second option is certainly the easier and lower cost alternative, as the level of overall coverage would be significantly less. The second alternative is also the most commonly used in existing livestock and aquaculture insurance policies. This means that as a given enterprise goes through a cycle, costs increase (more food, more use of veterinary products, more labour) and thus the basis for valuation also increases. With index policies, the choice would be more flexible, since an insured individual could choose the level of coverage, purchasing the number of units that suits his or her needs. In any case, it is vital that an actuarial balance is struck between premium and indemnity levels, and that this balance be continually checked in order to ensure the financial sustainability of the programme, and its ability to meet commitments to insured producers. A key issue is the level of deductible (excess) that applies. The effect is twofold. Firstly, and more obviously it impacts directly on the premium level through an inverse relationship between the quantum of deductible and the pure premium required for a given level of insurance protection. Secondly, it also impacts through economies in loss assessment and adjustment costs. Having a significant deductible, since it implies self-insurance of the first part of any loss, means that minor losses will not prompt a claim, and therefore no loss assessment will take place. With both livestock and aquaculture policies it is necessary to distinguish between individual animal insurance (individual cage/rack/pond in the case of aquaculture) and policies that apply to a whole herd (whole location – group of cages/racks/ponds for aquaculture). In individual policies, the deductible (co-insurance) applies to the individual animal and might be typically 10 to 20 percent of the sum for which the animal is insured. Such cover is expensive, with rates for dairy cows being typically 5 to 7.5 percent of the sum insured, and 10 percent or more for pigs. Whole herd policies specify a deductible expressed as number of head lost, say two deaths out of 100 in a 100-cow herd. Whole herd policies avoid small losses, and enable insurers to offer cover more cheaply. Whole site deductibles for aquaculture similarly mean lower premiums than when deductibles apply to individual cages, racks or ponds. A major area of difficulty in setting indemnity and premium levels is the lack of data linking the incidence of adverse weather events, disease outbreaks or other insured perils, and actual losses. Experience has shown that historic newspaper reports are unreliable (they usually exaggerate the losses) and that reports kept by government ministries are similarly inaccurate, since in the absence of insurance there is little incentive, or need, for precision. In any case, insurance products in agriculture are seldom launched on the basis of all the data an actuary would wish to have in order to set premiums at the level required to meet expected indemnity liabilities. Experience must be gained during the early years of a programme. During this period, adjustments can be made to the indemnity and premium levels, and also to the percentage of deductible applied. Collecting premiums The main objective here is to keep costs as low as possible. Consequently, there is a strong incentive to build linkages with existing providers of services to the livestock and/or aquaculture sector. Perhaps the most obvious linkage is between the insurer and banks serving the same clientele. In this case, the premium for insurance protection could be included in the loan, as a cost item alongside other expenses for the growing cycle in question. These other expenses could be the costs of young stock (e.g. fingerlings in aquaculture), feed costs and veterinary expenses. Since the premiums in such cases are paid in bulk by the banks to the insurer, costs are minimized. Similarly, there is sometimes scope to build insurance into the transactions between certified hatcheries of fish fingerlings and fish farmers, or between suppliers of young poultry (e.g. day-old chicks) and broiler and egg producers. Such arrangements have the added benefit of facilitating technical assistance and sharing of technical expertise. Handling claims Again, cost containment is very much an objective in designing procedures for the notification of claims, for assessing the losses and for paying indemnities. Clearly, the big divide is between the older, traditional type of policy, in which losses need to be assessed on each individual enterprise, and the newer types of policies in which a wholesale approach is possible. As already noted, a further potent field for cost economies is through building linkages with entities already providing services to farmers. These include banks, input suppliers, processors and other buyers. It is worth repeating that index policies neatly avoid most of the steps involved in claims handling. This is a major reason for the index approach to have a greater potential for developing countries than that enjoyed by conventional insurance. Roles for government and the private sector As a business, insurance belongs in a business setting. However, the very nature of primary industry insurance operations for livestock and aquaculture risks means that there is bound to be strong governmental involvement. Most governments have a close interest in risk management for basic industries of this nature, both for productivity reasons, and for concern for the wellbeing of rural populations. This often means, in practice, that governments are active, not only in an overall policy and prudential regulatory sense, (and in some countries state-owned enterprises also directly transact insurance business) but can be more directly involved in other ways. This can start with capacity building geared for the special nature and demands of primary industry insurance operations. These other ways may include funding the initial investigation of the feasibility of introducing insurance products for risks in livestock and/or aquaculture enterprises. Another is ensuring that the necessary infrastructure for efficient insurance business is in place; an example of infrastructural needs is a network of accurate and reliable weather recording stations. In many cases, the assistance by the government it may also involve funding part of the initial operational costs, once an insurance product is launched. It may extend to providing a ‘start­up’ subsidy to the premium pool, and a layer of reinsurance for the first few years of operations. Spain has an interesting private-public sector partnership in offering insurance products for livestock and aquaculture enterprises, and for agriculture as a whole. The partnership revolves around Agroseguro, an entity that is, in effect, a pool of more than 40 insurers co-insuring agricultural risks. Products are based on an annual ‘insurance plan’ that is jointly developed by producers (the eventual buyers of insurance), the insurers, and Enesa, an agency of the Ministry of Agriculture. Enesa also provides premium subsidies. Finally, a Reinsurance Consortium is run by the Ministry of Economics, and this provides reinsurance for the products offered under the insurance plan. The Spanish example suits a developed country where agriculture still occupies a section of the population in which significant numbers are disadvantaged as compared with the population as a whole. However, the Spanish system is costly, with some Euro200 million in public funds applied as subsidy to the programme in 2003. Few developing countries could afford this level of support. The Spanish example attempts to harness the best of both private and public sectors. There are strong reasons for the business operations in insurance to be handled by a commercial concern (as in Spain, by Agroseguro and its pool participants). This is for reasons of efficiency, and convenience in terms of insurance operations complementing other commercially-run services to farming. As already noted, the public sector role is also important. However, the dual parentage of this area of insurance can lead to tensions. The most crucial areas of concern lie in the areas of premium setting and claims handling. In these areas, experience has shown that undue and inappropriate political influence on an insurer can be very damaging. Accordingly, much attention is given during the design of livestock and aquaculture insurance programmes to avoiding these tensions to the extent possible. Such avoidance is aimed at optimising the role of the public sector, while harnessing the drive and efficiency of the commercial insurance sector. Several steps are involved. One listing might suggest the following as important: a)                  Ensure that any existing company or new entity has a sound legal basis on which to offer insurance products, with the required level of business competence. b)                  Clarify the government’s objective in promoting insurance for livestock and aquaculture producers. Is it purely an additional risk management mechanism, or is it also an avenue of subsidy to these sectors? If the latter is the case, then the avenue for financial support has to be ring-fenced from day-to-day political interference. This is not easily done, yet it is essential if there is to be the required continuity of financial conditions in order to build efficiency and fairness into the system. c)                  Establish strong linkages, at an early stage, with international re-insurers. These companies can assist not only with technical advice, but can also be instrumental in ensuring the necessary adherence to correct application of premium setting procedures, and settlement of claims. Although the opportunity for profit may be some years away, such companies are often prepared to become involved in a new field of business, or work in a new geographical area. They operate with long-term time horizons, and this can work very much to the benefit of a nascent insurance product line – whether this is being offered by a new company or by a new section within an established company. d)                 The financial base for the insurer must be adequate. This must be sufficient to survive initial years in which conditions might be such that underwriting profits are sharply negative. On top of this loss, administrative expenses have to be met. In many developing countries there may have to be public sector participation in ensuring a sound financial base. e)                  Work closely with representatives of the production sectors. This will help ensure that the services and products meet real, felt needs, and that they enjoy a lively demand as a result. Again, the Spanish example quote above indicates how this is done, with producers collaborating with insurers and the Ministry of Agriculture in the production of the annual insurance plan.

11.01.2007

Challenges in Government Facilitated Crop Insurance

Jerry R. Skees and Barry J. Barnett Experience to date indicates that it is extremely difficult, without massive government subsidies, to insure farm level crop yields from losses caused by any number of natural perils. Those who seek effective, agricultural risk management tools, offered with little or no government subsidy, need to understand the underlying problems with farm level, multiple peril crop insurance. This chapter begins by discussing those problems. The following section presents an alternative form of insurance that makes payments based not on measures of individual farm yields, but rather on either area yields or some weather event like temperature or rainfall. This alternative form of insurance is often referred to as “index” insurance, since payments are triggered by realizations of a pre specified index measure rather than by realized farm yields. Index insurance holds significant promise for a number of reasons. In some situations, index insurance offers superior risk protection when compared to traditional multiple peril crop insurance that pays indemnities based on individual farm yields. Second, index insurance provides an effective policy alternative for governments seeking to protect the agricultural production sector from widespread, positively correlated, crop yield losses (e.g., drought). Finally, when index insurance is used to shift the risk of widespread crop losses to financial and reinsurance markets, the residual idiosyncratic risk often has characteristics that make it easier for local insurance markets to absorb. For full version of the paper with graphs and formulars please download Word file (170 kb) Requirements for Multiple Risk Crop Insurance Successful insurance programs require that the insurer have adequate information about the nature of the risks being insured. This has proven to be extremely difficult for farm‑level yield insurance. Farmers will always know more about their potential crop yields than any insurer. This asymmetric information is the major problem with insuring farm yields. If an insurer cannot properly classify risk, then it is impossible to provide sustainable insurance. Those who know they have been favourably classified will buy the insurance; those who have not been favourably classified will not buy. This phenomenon, known as “adverse selection,” initiates a cycle of losses (Goodwin and Smith; Ahsan, Ali, and Kurian; Skees and Reed; Quiggin, Karagiannis and Stanton). The insurer will typically respond with “across the board” premium rate increases. But this only exacerbates the problem, as only the most risky individuals will continue to purchase the insurance. The problem can only be corrected if the insurer can acquire better information to properly classify and assign premium rates to potential insureds. Insurers must also be able to monitor policyholder behaviour. Moral hazard occurs when insured individuals change their behaviour in a way that increases the potential likelihood or magnitude of a loss. In crop yield insurance, moral hazard occurs when, as a result of having purchased insurance, farmers reduce fertilizer or pesticide use or simply become more lax in their management. At the extreme, moral hazard becomes fraud where policyholders actually attempt to create a loss. Again, the problem is asymmetric information. Unless the insurer can adequately monitor these changes in behaviour and penalize policyholders accordingly, the resulting increase in losses will cause premium rates to increase to the point where it becomes too expensive for all but those engaged in these practices. Insurers must also be able to identify the cause of loss and assess the magnitude of loss without relying on information provided by the insured. For automobile or fire insurance the insurer can generally identify whether or not a covered loss event has occurred and the magnitude of any resulting loss. For multiple‑peril crop yield insurance this is not always the case. It is not always easy to tell whether a loss occurred due to some covered natural loss event or due to poor management. Nor is it easy to measure the magnitude of loss without relying on yield information provided by the farmer. Another requirement for traditional insurance products is that the loss events be independent, or at least not highly positively correlated. This characteristic allows the “law of large numbers” to generate a narrow confidence interval around the expected loss for insurer’s portfolio of insurance products. If risks are highly positively correlated (what some refer to as systemic risk) the law of large numbers is not relevant and the solvency of the insurer can be threatened by extremely large losses due to a single event. For multiple‑peril crop insurance, losses due to perils such as drought, freeze, or excess moisture, are typically highly positively correlated across exposure units. When considering these requirements, it is useful to compare multiple‑peril crop insurance with hail insurance. For well over 100 years, the private sector has sold crop hail insurance with no government involvement. Why has hail insurance succeeded without government involvement when multi‑peril crop insurance has not? There are at least four reasons: 1) farmers have no better information than the insurer regarding the likelihood of a hailstorm; 2) farmers cannot, by changing their behaviour, increase the likelihood of a hailstorm or the magnitude of damage from a hailstorm; 3) insurers can generally tell whether or not a loss was caused by hail and accurately estimate the damage without relying on information provided by the farmer; and, 4) hail risk is largely independent across exposure units. Actuarial Performance of the Crop Insurance Programs Performance of publicly supported multiple peril crop insurance has been poor when all costs are considered. If companies were private, the premiums collected would have to exceed the administrative cost and the indemnities paid out. Hazell quantifies the condition for sustainable insurance as follows:                           (A + I )/ P < 1          where       A = average administrative costs                           I = average indemnities paid                  P = average premiums paid Given this ratio, Hazell finds that in every case the value exceeds 2 (Table 1). This means that the support from government is at least 50%. However, there are cases where farmers are clearly paying only pennies on a dollar of the real cost of the crop insurance program. A ratio of 4 means that the farmer pays 25 cents for every 1 dollar of total costs. Skees (2001) reports a ratio of 4 for the current US crop insurance program and Mishra reports that India’s I/P ratio increased to 6.1 for the period 1985‑94. Table 1 has only one case where the loss ratio of indemnities over premiums approaches 1 –Japan. In this case, the administrative costs needed to achieve this lost ratio are quite unbelievable – over 4 and ½ times higher than the farmer premium. It seems a very high price to pay to obtain ‘actuarially sound’ crop insurance. The other strategy in reaching this goal is to make the premium subsidy high enough that there is no adverse selection – even the low risk farmers soon learn that crop insurance is a good buy. Once lower risk farmers are in the risk pool, the actuarial performance can improve if one is measuring the unsubsidized premium against the loss experience. Obviously this is a pure numbers game and reflects little about the true performance of the program. This is what the US has done in recent years (Skees 2001). Table 1. Financial Performance of Crop Insurance Programs in Seven Countries Country Period I/P A/P (A+I)/P Brazil 75‑81 4.29 0.28 4.57 Costa Rica 70‑89 2.26 0.54 2.80 India 85‑89 5.11 n.a. n.a. Japan 47‑77 1.48 1.17 2.60 85‑89 0.99 3.57 4.56 Mexico 80‑89 3.18 0.47 3.65 Philippines 81‑89 3.94 1.80 5.74 USA 80‑89 1.87 0.55 2.42 Source: Hazell. With such poor performance one must ask if it is even possible to run an individual multiple peril crop insurance program that is self‑sustaining. Consider the information required to deliver and monitor this program. The insurer must know the following for every individual insured unit: Insurance yield: Estimating the expected yield for an insurance unit is a daunting task. For the US federal crop insurance program, insurance yields are based on a simple average of the most recent 4‑10 years of realized yields on the insurance unit. Farmers can establish an initial insurance yield with as little as four years of yield records (there are significant penalties if farmers cannot provide at least four years of yield records). As the farmer builds toward 10 years of yield records, realized yield in a given year is incorporated into calculation of insurance yield in subsequent years. When the farmer has built 10 years of yield records, the insurance yield is calculated as a rolling average of the most recent 10 years of realized yields. This is a rather crude method for estimating the central tendency in yields. Due to sampling error, insurance yields can either underestimate or overestimate the true central tendency depending on the random weather events over the most recent 4‑10 years. The effect of sampling error is further compounded by the fact that for most multiple‑peril crop insurance programs, insurance yields are also the primary (if not the only) mechanism for relative yield risk classification. Thus, the mechanism for establishing insurance yields can lead to adverse selection where only those farmers who believe they are getting a fair or better offer will chose to participate. Farmers who think the insurance yield is too low will not participate. Also, since farmers provide the yield records on which insurance yields are based, there are opportunities for fraud. Loss adjustment: It is complicated and expensive to measure realized yields so that payable losses can be determined. Most farmers do not like the idea of having someone come to their farm to estimate the realized yield. Nor is loss estimation a precise science. As implied by the word “estimate,” measurement errors are common. Additional investment in personnel and training is required to minimize measurement errors. When losses are widespread, a very large workforce of trained individuals is needed. In the US, farmers are often allowed to self‑report realized yields. Spot checks are conducted with penalties for filing false reports, yet there are opportunities for farmers to receive unwarranted payments. Gross premium rate: For most insurance products, premium rate calculation is based on historical loss experience. However, calculating crop yield insurance premium rates is more complex. One would ideally like to know the yield distribution for each individual farm. That is, one would like to know all of the possible yield outcomes and the probability of occurrence for each of those outcomes. But as indicated above, most crop yield insurance programs have difficulty estimating even the central tendency in yields. Estimating factors that influence the higher moments of the yield distribution is much more problematic. Further, simply knowing the yield distribution for a well‑classified group of farmers may not be enough. Extra losses (beyond those represented by the yield distributions) can occur due to moral hazard. The US government has made significant investments in attempting to address these and other informational challenges inherent in farm‑level crop yield insurance. While improvements have been made, the federal crop insurance program still suffers from problems related to inadequate or asymmetrically distributed information. Many of the more obvious and inexpensive improvements in information gathering and monitoring systems have already been made. Needed additional improvements will likely come at much higher marginal cost. That cost will be borne by taxpayers and/or policyholders. If the cost is passed on to policyholders, many will decide that the insurance is too expensive and opt out of the program. The Index Insurance Alternative Index insurance makes payments based not on shortfalls in farm yields, but rather on measures of an index that is assumed to proxy farm yields. We will consider two types of index insurance products: those that are based on area yields where the area is some unit of geographical aggregation larger than the farm, and those that are based on weather events. Various area yield insurance products have been offered in Quebec, Sweden, India, and, since 1993, in the US (Miranda; Mishra; Skees, Black, and Barnett). Ontario, Canada currently offers an index insurance instrument based on rainfall. The Canadians are also experimenting with other index insurance plans. Alberta corn growers can use a temperature‑based index to insure against yield losses in corn. Alberta is also using an index based on satellite imagery to insure against pasture losses. Our discussion of index insurance focuses on the US Group Risk Plan (GRP) area yield insurance product. The information needed to run an index insurance program is much less than what is needed for a farm yield insurance program. One needs sufficient data to establish the expected value of the index and a reliable and trusted system to establish realized values. This is critical. In India the area yield insurance program has had bad actuarial experience due to poor systems for estimating area yields (Mishra). If reliable estimates of area yields can be provided, there is no need for any farm‑level information. For example, area yield insurance indemnities are based on estimates of official measurements of realized area yields relative to expected area yields. Areas are typically defined along political boundaries (e.g., counties in the US) for which historical yield databases already exist. The logic for using index insurance is relatively simple – there is no asymmetric information (Skees and Barnett). Farmers likely have no better information than the insurer regarding the likelihood of area yield shortfalls or unusual weather events, thus, there is no adverse selection. Farmers cannot, by changing their behaviour, increase the likelihood of an area yield shortfall (if areas are defined at large enough levels of aggregation) or an unusual weather event, thus there is no moral hazard. All of the information needed for loss adjustment is available from public sources. It is easy to tell whether or not a loss has occurred and accurately measure the indemnity, without having to rely on any information provided by the policyholder. All of these factors make it much less expensive for the insurer to provide index insurance than multiple‑peril crop insurance. Thus, the cost of index insurance can be significantly lower than the cost of multiple‑peril crop insurance. Also, since adverse selection and moral hazard are not problems, there is no need for deductibles. Of course, one could easily adapt this contract design to any number of other indexes such as aggregate rainfall measured over a stated period at a specific weather station or the number of days with temperatures above or below a specified level. The contract design used in GRP is sometimes called a “proportional contract” because the loss is measured as a percentage of the trigger. Proportional contracts contain an interesting feature called a “disappearing deductible.” As the realized index approaches zero, the indemnity approaches 100 per cent of liability, regardless of the coverage chosen. An alternative design has been proposed for rainfall index insurance (Martin, Barnett, and Coble).[1] Here Limit is a parameter selected by the policyholder and bounded by 0 <  Limit < Index Trigger. The choice of Limit determines how fast the maximum indemnity is paid. By their selection of Limit, policyholders can attempt to better match indemnities with expected losses over the domain of potential realized values for the index. For example, suppose that losses would occur when realized aggregate rainfall is less than 100 mm measured over a given time period at a given weather station. Further suppose that realized rainfall less than or equal to 50 mm would cause a complete loss. The policyholder would select an Index Trigger of 100 mm and a Limit of 50 mm. If realized rainfall is less than or equal to 50 mm the Indemnity would be equal to the full Liability. One can easily see that the GRP contract is simply a specific case of this more general contract design with Limit set equal to zero. At the other extreme, the closer Limit is set to Index Trigger, the more the contract resembles a “zero‑one” contract where Indemnity equals zero or the full Liability depending on whether or not the Realized Index < Index Trigger. Interest in Index Insurance In the US, GRP has been controversial for a variety of reasons. Obviously, is it quite different from traditional insurance, and this raises legitimate concerns from the insurance industry. Traditional insurers find it difficult to understand and accept an insurance product where indemnities are not based on farm‑level yield losses. Farmer interest has also been mixed. Not surprisingly, most GRP policies seem to be sold in areas where crop insurance sales agents are most familiar with GRP. In 2000, about 5.6 million acres were insured under GRP. That is relatively small percentage of the total insured acreage in the US. It is very difficult for GRP to compete with subsidized farm‑level insurance that is now being offered at coverage levels of up to 85 per cent. The Ontario rainfall insurance product was fully subscribed in the first year (2000) that it was introduced. However, this is a limited pilot test of only 150 farmers and the product was introduced following a major drought. By 2001, 235 farmers had purchased about USD 5.5 million in liability with large payments of USD 1.9 million[2]. For many developing countries, rainfall index insurance merits consideration (Hazell; Skees, Hazell, and Miranda; Varangis, Skees, and Barnett). While basis risk may generally be lower with area yield index insurance, there are several reasons why rainfall index insurance may be preferable in a developing country context. First, while it is not common to find statistics on area crop yields in developing countries, many countries have government meteorological agencies that have collected data on rainfall over long periods of time. Second, it is less costly to set up a system to measure rainfall for specific locations than to develop a reliable yield estimation procedure for small geographical areas. Finally, there is a strong correlation between rainfall and crop performance. Drought and excess rainfall are both a major source of risk for crop losses in many regions. Drought causes low yields and excess rainfall can cause either low yields or serious losses of yield and quality during harvest (Martin, Barnett, Coble). For irrigated farms, a drought can also cause increased irrigation costs. The World Bank Group is now studying the feasibility of rainfall index insurance in a number of countries. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group may take a financial interest in making rainfall insurance offers in developing countries. The IFC is interested in supporting these innovations so that developing countries can participate in emerging weather markets. A specially funded project was also awarded to a working group within the World Bank. This project has investigated the feasibility of developing weather‑based index insurance for four countries: Nicaragua, Morocco, Ethiopia and Tunisia. Since that project began, several of the professionals involved have begun similar investigations in Mexico and Argentina at the request of those governments. The governments of Turkey, Brazil, India and Mongolia have made similar requests. There is clearly a growing international interest in weather insurance. Index Contracts for Disaster Relief               As an alternative to a farm-level insurance program, developing country governments could institute an index based disaster program to offer protection against catastrophic events. An index based disaster program could provide reinsurance to financial institutions or could be offered to individuals. Having a mechanism in place to handle the risk of catastrophic losses would open the door for the development of risk management mechanisms in the private sector.               Organizations involved in disaster relief may also have an interest in index contracts.  An index based relief fund would overcome existing inefficiencies associated with time delays and misallocation of aid by providing a mechanism for quick and equitable disbursement of aid. Access to monetary resources rather than material goods should also improve the flexibility and effectiveness of relief services.               Alternatively, a relief organization could write index-based insurance contracts to micro-finance institutions or cooperatives to protect these groups from catastrophic losses resulting from natural disasters. Community groups often can provide formal or informal risk sharing among individuals for idiosyncratic risks, but may have insufficient resources to adequately manage losses when the entire group experiences a natural disaster.  The index contact would provide cash compensation to these groups when a disaster occurs. The recipients could then make their own decisions about how to use and distribute the money among the group or community as they can make the best assessment about their needs. There are economic advantages to circulating cash in the economy relative to the adverse effects associated with the dumping of food aid and household items. Basis Risk The phrase “basis risk” is most commonly heard in reference to commodity futures markets. In that context, “basis” is the difference between the futures market price for the commodity and the cash market price in a given location. Basis risk is variation over time in the relationship between the local cash price and the futures price. Consider a US example where farmers, in a specific locale choose to forward price their corn using the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) December futures contract. By selling December futures contracts, the farmers “lock in” a price at harvest that is conditional on an anticipated relationship between the futures market price and the local cash price. For instance, they may anticipate that when they harvest and sell their crop in November, the local cash price will be 20 cents per bushel lower than the November price on the December CBOT contract. If, however, local cash prices are much lower than expected relative to the CBOT, say, 35 cents per bushel below CBOT, the farmers do not get the price risk protection that they had hoped for. Their actual realized price, from the combined cash market and futures market activities, is 15 cents per bushel less than had been expected. Conversely, the local cash price may be much higher than expected relative to the CBOT price. For instance, the local cash price may be only 5 cents per bushel lower than the CBOT price. In this case, the farmers’ actual realized price, from the combined cash market and futures market activities, is 15 cents per bushel more than had been expected. Basis risk is a common phenomenon in futures markets. While futures contracts can still be effective price risk management tools for farmers, the existence of basis risk implies that farmers will not always receive the anticipated price. Sometimes it will be higher. Sometimes it will be lower. Because of basis risk, forward pricing in the futures market does not eliminate all exposure to price risk. Basis risk also occurs in insurance. It occurs when an insured has a loss and does not receive an insurance payment sufficient to cover the loss (minus any deductible). It also occurs when an insured has a loss and receives a payment that exceeds the amount of loss. Since indemnities are triggered by area yield shortfalls or weather events, an index insurance policyholder can experience a yield loss and not receive an indemnity. The policyholder may also not experience a farm yield loss and yet, receive an indemnity. The effectiveness of index insurance as a risk management tool depends on how positively correlated farm yield losses are with the underlying area yield or weather index. In general, the more homogeneous the area, the lower the basis risk and the more effective area yield insurance will be as a farm yield risk management tool. Similarly, the more that a given weather index actually represents weather events on the farm, the more effective the index will be as farm yield risk management tool. Recently, the academic literature on crop insurance has focused on basis risk that will naturally be part of any index insurance program. But there has been little discussion of the basis risk inherent in farm‑level insurance. To illustrate how basis risk is possible for farm‑level multiple‑peril insurance programs, one need only consider the major underwriting mechanism used in the US to establish the insurable yields. Recall that in the US, the insurance yield (a measure of central tendency) is based on a simple 4‑10 year average of historical yield data for the insurance unit. While crop yields are probably not normally distributed, the implications of this statistical formula would still hold for most reasonable assumptions of crop yield distributions. Namely, the higher (lower) the standard deviation of the true distribution, the higher (lower) will be the error in using an average as an estimate of central tendency. The higher (lower) the sample size, the lower (higher) will be the error in using an average as an estimate of central tendency. Consider the error in using an average to estimate the central tendency of crop yields with a sample size of only 4 to 10 years of farm yield data. For simplicity, we assume a corn farm where yield is normally distributed with a mean of 100 bushels per acre. We consider values for s of 25, 35, and 45 bushels per acre. Figure 1 presents the standard error of the estimate for different values of s and n. Clearly, the higher the variability in yield, measured by s, the higher the error in using a simple average as an estimate of central tendency. However, it is also striking how much higher the error is when using 4 years of data rather than 10 years. If the standard deviation is 35 bushels per acre (which is a reasonable value for the US), using only 4 years of data to estimate the insurance yield will result in a standard error of 17 bushels per acre. Thus, while two thirds of the APH yields would be between 83 and 117 bushels per acre, there is a 33 per cent chance that the calculated insurance yield will be less than 83 or more than 117 bushels per acre. Now consider a situation where, because of the error in using a simple average as an estimate of central tendency, the insurance yield is calculated as 120 bushels per acre when the true central tendency is only 100 bushels per acre. If the farmer selects an 85 per cent coverage level (15 per cent deductible) the trigger yield will be 102 bushels per acre, which is higher than the expected yield. While the farmer has been charged a premium rate based on a coverage level of 85 per cent, in effect, the farmer has been given a coverage level over 100 per cent. Due to the estimation error, this farmer could receive an insurance payment when the realized yield is at, or even slightly above, the central tendency. Alternatively, if the insurance yield is estimated at 80 bushels per acre, 85 per cent coverage will generate a trigger yield of 68 bushels per acre. While the farmer has been charged a premium rate based on a coverage level of 85 per cent, in effect, the farmer has been given a coverage level of only 68 per cent. If central tendency were estimated accurately, a yield loss in excess of 15 bushels per acre would trigger an insurance payment. Because of the estimation error, this farmer must have a yield loss in excess of 32 bushels per acre to receive an insurance payment. Because of the error in estimating central tendency, it is possible for farmers to receive insurance payments when yield losses have not occurred. It is also possible for farmers to not receive payments when payable losses have occurred. Thus, basis risk occurs not only in index insurance but also in farm‑level yield insurance. Another type of basis risk results from the estimate of realized yield. Even with careful farm‑level loss adjustment procedures, it is impossible to avoid errors in estimating the true realized yield. These errors can also result in under‑ and over‑payments. Between the two sources of error, measuring expected yields and measuring realized yields, farm‑level crop insurance programs also have significant basis risk. Longer series of data are generally available for area yields or weather events than for farm yields. The standard deviation of area yields is also lower than that of farm yields. Since n is higher and s is lower, the square root of n rule suggests that there will be less measurement error for area yield insurance than for farm yield insurance in estimating both the central tendency and the realization. Long series of weather data are also available, but it is not necessarily true that the standard deviation of weather measures will be less than that of farm yields. Managing Basis Risk in Index Insurance Contracts Basis risk in index contracts can be dealt with through a variety of different design mechanisms. Of extreme importance is to recognize the role that well constructed index insurance contracts can play in removing much of the correlated yield risk. Once the ‘big risk’ is removed with effective use of index insurance contracts, any number of possibilities exists for removing the basis risk. Local groups and institutions should be able to pool independent risks and use index contracts to hedge against correlated losses from major events such as drought or earthquakes. Using index contracts to transfer the risk of correlated losses, private companies may find they can develop effective multiple peril crop insurance that pays for losses not covered by government facilitated index insurance. Skees (2003) and Mahul (2002) press a bit harder in recognizing that index insurance contracts open the way for more effective pooling of independent risk via mutual insurance and/or rural finance entities. Weather index insurance could be sold through banks, farm cooperatives, input suppliers and micro‑finance organizations, as well as being sold directly to farmers. Banks and rural finance institutions could purchase such insurance to protect their portfolios against defaults caused by severe weather events. Rural finance entities aggregate and pool risk. With index insurance contracts one can take advantage of such entities to become the means of mitigating basis risk via loans to farmers who have a loss and do not receive a payment from the index insurance. Similarly, input suppliers could be the purchasers of such insurance. Once financial institutions are able to shift correlated risk out of local areas with index insurance contracts, they would be in a better position to expand credit to farmers, at perhaps improved terms. Summary of the Relative Advantages and Disadvantages of Index Insurance Index contracts offer numerous advantages over more traditional forms of farm‑level, multiple‑peril crop insurance. These advantages include: 1.         No moral hazard: Moral hazard arises with traditional insurance when insured parties can alter their behaviour so as to increase the potential likelihood or magnitude of a loss. This is not possible with index insurance because the indemnity does not depend on the individual producer’s realized yield. 2.         No adverse selection: Adverse selection is misclassification problem caused by asymmetric information. If the potential insured has better information than the insurer about the potential likelihood or magnitude of a loss, the potential insured can use that information to self‑select whether or not to purchase insurance. Those who are misclassified to their advantage will choose to purchase the insurance. Those who are misclassified to their disadvantage, will not. With index insurance products, insurers do not classify individual policyholders’ exposures to risk. Further, the index is based on widely available information. So there are no informational asymmetries to be exploited. It is true that some will find index insurance products more attractive than others. However, unlike individualized insurance products, such self‑selection will not affect the actuarial soundness of index insurance products. 3.         Low administrative costs: Unlike farm‑level, multiple‑peril, crop insurance policies, index insurance products do not require costly on‑farm inspections or claims adjustments. Nor is there a need to track individual farm yields or financial losses. Indemnities are paid solely on the realized value of the underlying index as measured by government agencies or other third parties. 4.         Standardized and transparent structure: Index insurance policies can be sold in various denominations as simple certificates with a structure that is uniform across underlying indexes. The terms of the contracts would therefore be relatively easy for purchasers to understand. 5.         Availability and negotiability: Since they are standardized and transparent, index insurance policies can easily be traded in secondary markets. Such markets would create liquidity and allow the policies to flow to where they are most highly valued. Individuals could buy or sell policies as the realization of the underlying index begins to unfold. Moreover, the contracts could be made available to a wide variety of parties, including farmers, agricultural lenders, traders, processors, input suppliers, shopkeepers, consumers, and agricultural workers. 6.         Reinsurance function: Index insurance can be used to transfer the risk of widespread, correlated, agricultural production losses. Thus, it can be used as a mechanism to reinsure insurance company portfolios of farm‑level insurance policies. Index insurance instruments allow farm‑level insurers to transfer their exposure to undiversifiable, correlated, loss risk while retaining the residual risk that is idiosyncratic and diversifiable (Black, Barnett, Hu). There are also challenges that must be addressed if index insurance markets are to be successful. 1.         Basis Risk: It is possible for index insurance policyholders to experience a loss and yet not receive an indemnity. Likewise, they may receive an indemnity when they have not experienced a loss. The frequency of these occurrences depends on the extent to which the insured’s losses are positively correlated with the index. Without sufficient correlation, basis risk becomes too severe, and index insurance is not an effective risk management tool. Careful design of index insurance policy parameters (coverage period, trigger, measurement site, etc.) can help reduce basis risk. 2.         Security and dissemination of measurements: The viability of index insurance depends critically on the underlying index being objectively and accurately measured. The index measurements must then be made widely available in a timely manner. Whether provided by governments or other third party sources, index measurements must be widely disseminated and secure from tampering. 3.         Precise actuarial modelling: Insurers will not sell index insurance products unless they can understand the statistical properties of the underlying index. This requires both sufficient historical data on the index and actuarial models that use these data to predict the likelihood of various index measures. 4.         Education: Index insurance policies are typically much simpler than traditional farm‑level insurance policies. However, since the policies are significantly different than traditional insurance policies, some education is generally required to help potential users assess whether or not index insurance instruments can provide them with effective risk management. Insurers and/or government agencies can help by providing training strategies and materials not only for farmers but also for other potential users such as bankers and agribusinesses. 5.         Marketing: A marketing plan must be developed that addresses how, when, and where index insurance policies are to be sold. Also, the government and other involved institutions, must consider whether to allow secondary markets in index insurance instruments and, if so, how to facilitate and regulate those markets. 6.         Reinsurance: In most transition economies, insurance companies do not have the financial resources to offer index insurance without adequate and affordable reinsurance. Effective arrangements must therefore be forged between local insurers, international reinsurers, local governments, and possibly international development organizations. Conclusion Index insurance is a different approach to insuring crop yields. A precondition for such insurance to work is that many farmers in the same location must be subjected to the same risk. When this is the case, index insurance has the potential to offer affordable and effective insurance for a large number of farmers. Such insurance requires a different way of thinking. It is possible to offer such contracts to anyone at risk when there is an area wide crop failure. Furthermore, unlike traditional insurance, there is no reason to place the same limits on the amount of liability an individual purchases. As more sophisticated systems to measure events that cause widespread problems are developed (such as satellite imagery) it is possible that indexing major events will be more straight forward and accepted by the international capital markets. Under these conditions, it may become quite possible to offer insurance in countries where traditional reinsurers and primary providers would have previously never considered. Insurance is about trust. If the system to index a major event is reliable and trustworthy, there are truly new opportunities in the world to offer a wide array of index insurance products. BIBLIOGRAPHY Ahsan S.M., A.A.G. Ali and  N.J. Kurian. 1982. Towards a theory of agricultural insurance. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 64 (3): 520-529. Bantwal, V.J. and H.C. Kunreuther. 2000. A cat bond premium puzzle? The Journal of Psychology and Financial Markets 1(1):76‑91. Black, J.R, B.J. Barnett, and Y. Hu. 1999. Cooperatives and capital markets: the case of Minnesota‑Dakota sugar cooperatives. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 81(5):1240‑46. Doherty, N.A. 1997. Financial innovation in the management of catastrophic risk. Paper presented at the ASTIN/AFIR conference, Cairns, Queensland, August 10‑15. Goodwin, B.K. and V.H. Smith. 1995. The Economics of Crop Insurance and Disaster Aid. The AEI Press, Washington, D.C. Hazell, P.B.R. 1992. The appropriate role of agricultural insurance in developing countries. Journal of International Development 4(6):567‑81. Lapan, H. and G. Moschini. 1994. Futures hedging under price, basis, and production risk. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 76(3):465‑77. Lapan, H., G. Moschini, and S.D. Hanson. 1991. Production, hedging, and speculative decisions with options and futures markets. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 73(1):66‑74. Mahul, O. 2002. Coping with Catastrophic Risk: The Role of (Non‑) Participating Contracts.” Working paper. Markowitz, Harry M. 1952. Portfolio selection. Journal of Finance VII: 77‑91. Martin, S.W., B.J. Barnett, and K.H. Coble. 2001. Developing and pricing precipitation insurance. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 26(1):261‑74. Meyers, R.J. and S.R. Thompson. 1989. Generalized optimal hedge ratio estimation. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 71(4):858‑868. Miranda, M.J. and J.W. Glauber. 1997. Systemic risk, reinsurance, and the failure of crop insurance markets. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 79(1):206‑15. Mishra, Pramod K. Agricultural Risk, Insurance and Income: A Study of the Impact and Design of India’s Comprehensive Crop Insurance Scheme. Brookfield: Avebury Press, 1996. Quiggin, J., G. Karagiannis and J. Stanton. 1994. Crop insurance and crop production: an empirical study of moral hazard and adverse selection. In Economics of Agricultural Crop Insurance, edited by D.L. Hueth and W.H. Furtan, pp. 253‑72. Norwell MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Skees, J.R. 1999. Opportunities for improved efficiency in risk sharing using capital markets. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 81(5):1228‑33. Skees, J.R. 2000. “A Role for Capital Markets in Natural Disasters: A Piece of the Food Security Puzzle.” Food Policy 25: 365‑378. Skees, J.R. 2001 “The Bad Harvest.” Regulation: The CATO Review of Business and Government. 24: 16‑21. Skees, J.R. and B.J. Barnett. 1999. Conceptual and practical considerations for sharing catastrophic/systemic risks. Review of Agricultural Economics 21(2):424‑41. Skees, J.R., J.R. Black, and B.J. Barnett. 1997. Designing and rating an area yield crop insurance contract. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 79(2):430‑38. Skees, J., P. Hazell, and M. Miranda. 1999. New approaches to public/private crop yield insurance. Unpublished working paper, The World Bank, Washington, DC. Skees, Jerry R. 2003. ‘Risk Management Challenges in Rural Financial Markets: Blending Risk Management Innovations with Rural Finance’. Thematic Paper Presented at Paving the Way Forward for Rural Finance: An International Conference on Best Practices. June 2 – 4, 2003 Washington, DC. Skees, J.R. and M.R. Reed. 1986. Rate‑making and farm‑level crop insurance: implications for adverse selection. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 68(3):653‑59. Varangis, P., J.R. Skees, and B. J. Barnett. 2002. Weather indexes for developing countries. In Climate Risk and the Weather Market: Financial Risk Management with Weather Hedges, R. S. Dischel, ed., London: Risk Books. [1].                 The presentation here is for index insurance that would protect against losses due to insufficient rainfall. Martin, Barnett, and Coble, present an analogous index insurance that would protect against losses due to excessive rainfall. [2].                 Personal email communication with Mr. Paul Cudmore of Agricorp, Canada, October 23, 2001. Workshop on Rural Finance and Credit Infrastructure in China, 13‑14 October 2003, Paris, France Skees is the H.B. Price professor of agricultural economics at the University of Kentucky. He is also President of GlobalAgRisk, Inc. Barnett is associate professor of agricultural and applied economics at the University of Georgia. All views, interpretations, recommendations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the supporting or collaborating institutions. A version of this paper will also be published in an Australian book on crop insurance (forthcoming fall, 2003). Correspondence should be addressed to Skees at jskees@globalagrisk.com

11.01.2007

Innovation in Agricultural Insurance: Linkages to Microfinance

Jerry R.Skees, University of Kentucky, GlobalAgRisk, Inc. This paper was prepared to complement a presentation made by Jerry Skees at a microfinance conference in Santa Cruz, Bolivia on May 11, 2004. Some sections of this paper also appear in a more detailed paper by Skees presented at the USAID conference entitled “Paving the Way Forward”, June 2003. The ideas are copyrighted by Jerry Skees. Please email your comments to mailto:jskees@globalagrisk.com  Anne Goes and Celeste Sullivan provided valuable assistance in drafting and editing this paper. For the full version of the paper please download Word file (170 kB) Introduction   This paper reviews an important innovation that provides unique opportunities for microfinance entities (MFEs) to manage correlated risk and expand their ability to assist rural households. The use of index insurance contracts to shift correlated natural disaster risk into global markets offers some promise for MFEs. Index-based insurance involves making insurance payments based upon an independent measure that is highly correlated with losses. When insurance payments are made based upon an independent measure of losses, the need for monitoring individual behavior is significantly reduced as compared to traditional approaches to insurance. Linking index insurance to microfinance activities could facilitate improved risk taking behavior and expansion of services for MFEs. Rural financial markets in emerging and developing economies face numerous challenges. Managing and coping with risks are among the most significant challenges. Effective financial markets should include both banking and insurance markets. Banking allows for ex post borrowing to smooth disruptions in consumption that result from unexpected shocks (risk) that beset a rural household. Insurance allows for ex ante indemnity payments for well-specified risk events that also disrupt consumption. Financial markets are largely about pooling risk. In banking, users have the opportunity to save and borrow. Pooling savings allows banks to loan to individuals who need funds most urgently. When a household needs to borrow funds they must pay interest. With insurance, rather than having a group of investors, a firm collects premiums from many individuals so that unfortunate individuals in the group can be paid when bad luck besets them. In either case, if everyone has bad luck and needs funds at the same time, the insurance solution cannot work. Thus, to the extent that rural financial markets are capable of pooling risk, the risks that are pooled must be independent (i.e., the groups participating cannot have bad luck at the same time). A major advantage of microfinance entities and other forms of collective action has been the ability to pool risk. However, correlated risk can not be pooled. Small and geographically concentrated MFEs are simply not capable of pooling and managing correlated risk on their own. Agriculture remains a dominant activity in many rural economies of the poorest nations in the world. A large majority of the poorest households in the world are directly linked to agriculture in some fashion. Risks in agriculture are most certainly not independent in nature. When one household suffers bad fortune it is likely that many are suffering. These common risks are referred to as correlated risk. When agricultural commodity prices decline everyone faces a lower price. When there is a natural disaster that destroys either crops or livestock, many suffer. Insurance markets are sorely lacking in most developing and emerging economies, and rarely do local insurance markets emerge to address correlated risk problems. If a group of individuals working within a MFE purchase either price insurance (via put options) or yield insurance (via index insurance with indemnity payments based upon extreme weather events), there are opportunities to mitigate the basis risk. The collective group could form a mutual insurance company or they could be involved in formal or informal lending to members of the group. As will be developed below, the use of innovations presented in this paper could clear the way for blending mutual banking and financial innovations at a local level (Mahul, 2002). The focus of the conceptual model presented here will be on localized rural finance (both formal and informal). Still, the risk management instruments that are introduced have a wider application: They can be used by larger MFEs as well as by individual households.[1] Linking the use of risk-shifting innovations that are being tried around the world directly to rural finance has been largely missing. This paper builds a set of recommendations for using index insurance and, in some cases, futures markets in combination with rural finance. The intent is for the MFE to have the opportunity to purchase index insurance and put options to protect against the correlated risk of crop disaster, livestock deaths due to natural disasters, and commodity price declines. The indemnity payments can be used by the small local banking interest to 1) protect against credit defaults that follow a risk event; 2) facilitate a form of mutual insurance, and 3) offer lower interest rates after the risk event. What is the Innovation? Index-based insurance products are an alternative form of insurance that make payments based not on measures of farm yields, but rather on either area yields or some objective weather event such as temperature or rainfall. Index insurance products are similar to several other innovations in global financial markets (e.g. use of CAT Bonds for natural disaster risk; emergence of weather markets; etc.). The major motivation for using index based insurance products rather than traditional agricultural insurance is well documented (Skees, Hazell, and Miranda). In some situations, index insurance offers superior risk protection when compared to traditional multiple-peril crop insurance that pays indemnities based on individual farm yields. This happens when the provider of traditional insurance must impose large deductibles. A deductible basically means that the insurance policy will not pay until the loss is very serious. Deductibles and co-payments (or partial payment for losses) are commonly used to combat adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Since these problems are not present with index insurance, there is less need for deductibles and co-payments. Index insurance provides an effective policy alternative as it seeks to protect the agricultural production sector from widespread, positively correlated, crop-yield losses (e.g., drought). When index insurance is used to shift the risk of widespread crop losses to financial and reinsurance markets, the residual idiosyncratic risk often has characteristics that make it more likely that rural banks can work to smooth consumption shortfalls with loans. Two types of index insurance products are considered; those that are based on area yields where the area is some unit of geographical aggregation larger than the farm, and those that are based on weather events. An area-based yield contract has been offered in the United States since 1993. This policy was developed by the author and is named the Group Risk Plan (GRP). There are numerous ways to calculate payments on index contracts (Skees, 2000). Expected county yields are estimated using up to 45 years of historical county yield data. For GRP, liability is calculated as where Expected County Revenue per Acre in the equation above is equal to the product of the official estimate of price and expected county yield per acre and Scale is chosen by the policyholder but is limited to between 90 and 150 percent.[2] To be clear, an example of how the Group Risk Plan works is in order. Estimates of the county yield are made using forecasting procedures that account for trends in yields due to technology. If the corn yield forecast for the county yield is 100 bushels, the farmer can obtain a contract that will pay any time the actual estimate of the county yield is below 90 bushels (the trigger= 90 bushels). Assume that the expected price on corn is $2.00 per bushel. The farmer can purchase a liability that is equal to 150 percent of the product of the expected county yield and the expected price, times their acres planted. The calculations for a farmer with 100 acres follow:    Liability = 100 x $2 x 1.5 x 100; or $30,000 If the farmer has a yield average that is above the county they have incentives to purchase the maximum protection or liability by using the maximum scale factor of 1.5. For a farmer who purchases a 90 percent coverage level, indemnity payments will be calculated by multiplying the percent shortfall in county yields times the $30,000 of liability. Thus, if the realized estimate of county yields for the year is 60 bushel (which is 1/3 below the 90 bushel trigger) the indemnity payment calculation is   Indemnity = (90 -60) / 90 * $30,000; or $10,000 Premium payments are based upon premium rates. Thus, if the rate is 5 percent for the 90 percent coverage level policy, the calculations for the premium would be   Premium = .05 x $30,000; or $1,500. Of course, one could easily adapt this contract design to any number of other indexes such as aggregate rainfall measured over a stated period at a specific weather station or the number of days with temperatures above or below a specified level. The contract design used in GRP is sometimes called a “proportional contract” because the loss is measured as a percentage of the trigger. Proportional contracts contain an interesting feature called a “disappearing deductible.”  As the realized index approaches zero, the indemnity approaches 100 percent of liability, regardless of the coverage chosen. The weather markets developed contracts that look very much like what Martin et al. (2001) proposed. They use unique language that is very similar to that used in futures markets. For example, rather than referring to the threshold where payments will begin as a ”trigger,” they refer to it as the ”strike.” In an attempt to make things more straightforward, they also pay in increments or what is referred to as ‘ticks’ in the exchange market world. Consider a situation where a contract is being written to protect against shortfall in rain. The writer of that contract may choose to make a fixed payment for every 1 mm of rainfall below the strike/trigger. If an individual or a MFE purchase a contract where the strike/trigger is 100 mm of rain and the limit is 50 mm, the amount of payment for each tick would be a function of how much liability was purchased. There are 50 ticks between the 100 mm and the limit of 50 mm. Thus, if $50,000 of insurance were purchased, the payment for each 1 mm below 100 mm would be equal to   $50,000/(100-50) or $1,000 Once the tick and the payment for each tick are known, the indemnity payments are easy to calculate. For example, if the rainfall is measured at 90 mm, there are 10 ticks of payment at $1,000 each; the indemnity payment will equal $10,000. Figure 1 maps the payout structure for a hypothetical $50,000 rainfall contract with a strike of 100 mm and a limit of 50 mm. Experience with Index Insurance Various area-yield insurance products have been offered in Quebec, Canada, Sweden, India, and, since 1993, in the United States (Miranda, 1991; Mishra, 1997; Skees, Black, and Barnett, 1997). Ontario, Canada currently offers an index insurance instrument based on rainfall. The Canadians are also experimenting with other index insurance plans. Alberta corn growers can use a temperature-based index to insure against yield losses in corn. Alberta is also using an index, based on satellite imagery to insure against pasture losses. Mexico is the first non-developed country to enter into a reinsurance arrangement that was based on weather derivatives. In the United States, participation in the area-yield based Group Risk Plan has been relatively low. Nonetheless, in 2003, over 18 million acres were insured under GRP or the GRIP (Group Revenue Insurance Program). Participation is strongest is some markets where sales agents have focused on GRP. The loss experience (indemnities divided by premiums) since the introduction of GRP has been good, around 90 percent. The Ontario rainfall insurance product was fully subscribed in the first year that it was introduced (2000). However, this is a limited pilot test of only 150 farmers and the product was introduced following a major drought. By 2001, 235 farmers had purchased about $5.5 million in liability with payments of $1.9 million.[3] This policy was targeted toward alfalfa hay production. Alberta has also introduced a rainfall index insurance product for forage production. This contract has been available for two years. In 2002, over 4000 ranchers subscribed to the contract. For many emerging economies or developing countries, weather index insurance merits consideration (Hazell, 1992; Skees, Hazell, and Miranda, 1999). While basis risk may generally be lower with area-yield index insurance, there are several reasons why weather index insurance may be preferable in a developing or emerging economy. First, the quality of historical weather data is generally much better than the quality of yield data in developing countries. Quality data are essential in pricing an insurance contract. Second, it may be less costly to set up a system to measure weather events for specific locations than to develop a reliable yield estimation procedure for small geographical areas. Finally, either insufficient or excess rainfall is a major source of risk for crop losses in many regions. Drought causes low yields and excess rainfall can cause either low yields or serious losses of yield and quality during harvest (Martin, Barnett, and Coble, 2001). The World Bank Group is pursuing the feasibility of rainfall index insurance in a number of countries. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank is interested in supporting these innovations so that developing countries can participate in emerging weather markets. The feasibility of weather-based index insurance is being considered for a number of countries, including Nicaragua, Morocco, Ethiopia, Ukraine, Tunisia, Mexico, and Argentina. The most progress has been made in India as is developed below. A major challenge in designing an index insurance product is minimizing basis risk. The phrase “basis risk” is most commonly heard in reference to commodity futures markets. In that context, “basis” is the difference between the futures market price for the commodity and the cash market price in a given location. Basis risk also occurs in insurance. It occurs when an insured has a loss and does not receive an insurance payment sufficient to cover the loss (minus any deductible). It also occurs when an insured has a loss and receives a payment that exceeds the amount of loss. Since index insurance indemnities are triggered by area-yield shortfalls or weather events, an index insurance policyholder can experience a yield loss and not receive an indemnity. The policyholder may also not experience a farm-yield loss and yet, receive an indemnity. The effectiveness of index insurance as a risk management tool depends on how positively correlated farm-yield losses are with the underlying area yield or weather index. In general, the more homogeneous the area, the lower the basis risk and the more effective area-yield insurance will be as a farm-yield risk management tool. Similarly, the more a given weather index actually represents weather events on the farm, the more effective the index will be as farm-yield risk management tool. While most of the academic literature has focused on basis risk for index type insurance products, it is important to recognize that farm-level multiple-peril crop insurance has basis risk as well. To begin, a very small sample size is used to develop estimates of the central tendency in yields. Given simple statistics about the error of the estimates with small samples, it can be easily demonstrated that large mistakes are made on estimating central tendency. This makes it possible for farmers to receive insurance payments when yield losses have not occurred. It is also possible for farmers to not receive payments when payable losses have occurred. Thus, basis risk occurs not only in index insurance but also in farm-level yield insurance. Another type of basis risk results from the estimate of realized yield. Even with careful farm-level loss adjustment procedures, it is impossible to avoid errors in estimating the true realized yield. These errors can also result in under- and over-payments. Between the two sources of error, measuring expected yields and measuring realized yields, farm-level crop insurance programs also have significant basis risk. Longer series of data are generally available for area yields or weather events than for farm yields. The standard deviation of area yields is also lower than that of farm yields. Since the number of observations (n) is higher and s (the standard deviation) is lower, the square root of n rule suggests that there will be less measurement error for area-yield insurance than for farm-yield insurance in estimating both the central tendency and the realization. In most developing countries, long series of weather data are available. Summary of Relative Advantages and Disadvantages of Index Insurance Index contracts offer numerous advantages over more traditional forms of farm-level multiple-peril crop insurance. These advantages include 1.      No moral hazard:  Moral hazard arises with traditional insurance when insured parties can alter their behavior so as to increase the potential likelihood or magnitude of a loss. This is not possible with index insurance because the indemnity does not depend on the individual producer’s realized yield. 2.      No adverse selection:  Adverse selection is a misclassification problem caused by asymmetric information. If the potential insured has better information than the insurer about the potential likelihood or magnitude of a loss, the potential insured can use that information to self-select whether or not to purchase insurance. Index insurance on the other hand is based on widely available information, so there are no informational asymmetries to be exploited. 3.      Low administrative costs:  Unlike farm-level multiple-peril crop insurance policies, index insurance products do not require underwriting and inspections of individual farms. Indemnities are paid solely on the realized value of the underlying index as measured by government agencies or other third parties. 4.      Standardized and transparent structure:  Index insurance policies can be sold in various denominations as simple certificates with a structure that is uniform across underlying indexes. The terms of the contracts would therefore be relatively easy for purchasers to understand. 5.      Availability and negotiability:  Since they are standardized and transparent, index insurance policies can easily be traded in secondary markets. Such markets would create liquidity and allow policies to flow where they are most highly valued. Individuals could buy or sell policies as the realization of the underlying index begins to unfold. Moreover, the contracts could be made available to a wide variety of parties, including farmers, agricultural lenders, traders, processors, input suppliers, shopkeepers, consumers, and agricultural workers. 6.      Reinsurance function:  Index insurance can be used to transfer the risk of widespread correlated agricultural production losses. Thus, it can be used as a mechanism to reinsure insurance company portfolios of farm-level insurance policies. Index insurance instruments allow farm-level insurers to transfer their exposure to undiversifiable correlated loss risk while retaining the residual risk that is idiosyncratic and diversifiable (Black, Barnett, and Hu, 1999). There are also challenges that must be addressed if index insurance markets are to be successful. 1.      Basis Risk:  The occurrence of basis risk depends on the extent to which the insured’s losses are positively correlated with the index. Without sufficient correlation, “basis risk” becomes too severe, and index insurance is not an effective risk management tool. Careful design of index insurance policy parameters (coverage period, trigger, measurement site, etc.) can help reduce basis risk. Selling the index insurance to microfinance or other collective groups can also pass the issue of basis risk to a local group that can develop mutual insurance at some level. Such a group is in the best position to know their neighbors and determine how to allocate index insurance payments within the group. 2.      Security and dissemination of measurements:  The viability of index insurance depends critically on the underlying index being objectively and accurately measured. The index measurements must then be made widely available in a timely manner. Whether provided by governments or other third party sources, index measurements must be widely disseminated and secure from tampering. 3.      Precise actuarial modeling:  Insurers will not sell index insurance products unless they can understand the statistical properties of the underlying index. This requires both sufficient historical data on the index and actuarial models that use these data to predict the likelihood of various index measures. 4.      Education:  Index insurance policies are typically much simpler than traditional farm-level insurance policies. However, since the policies are significantly different than traditional insurance policies, some education is generally required to help potential users assess whether or not index insurance instruments can provide them with effective risk management. Insurers and/or government agencies can help by providing training strategies and materials not only for farmers, but also for other potential users such as bankers and agribusinesses. 5.      Marketing:  A marketing plan must be developed that addresses how, when, and where index insurance policies are to be sold. Also, the government and other involved institutions must consider whether to allow secondary markets in index insurance instruments and, if so, how to facilitate and regulate those markets. 6.      Reinsurance:  In most transition economies, insurance companies do not have the financial resources to offer index insurance without adequate and affordable reinsurance. Effective arrangements must therefore be forged between local insurers, international reinsurers, national governments, and possibly international development organizations. Index insurance is a different approach to insuring crop yields. Unlike most insurance where independent risk is a precondition, the precondition for index insurance to work best for the individual farmer is correlated risk. It is possible to offer index contracts to anyone at risk when there is an area-wide (correlated) crop failure. Furthermore, unlike traditional insurance, there is no reason to place the same limits on the amount of liability an individual purchases. As long as the individual farmer cannot influence the outcome that results in payments, then placing limits on liability is not necessary as it is with individual insurance contracts. Finally, the true advantage of blending index insurance into banking is that the banking entity can use such contracts to manage correlated risk. In turn, the bank should be able to work with the individual to help them manage the residual risk or basis risk. In simple terms, if the individual has an independent loss when the index insurance does not pay, they should be able to borrow from the bank to smooth that shock. This could effectively remove the primary concern associated with index insurance contracts ¾ that someone can have a loss and not be paid. As more sophisticated systems are developed to measure events that cause widespread problems (such as satellite imagery) it is possible that indexing major events will be more straightforward and accepted by international capital markets. Under these conditions, it may become possible to offer insurance to countries where traditional reinsurers and primary providers would previously have never considered. Insurance is about trust. If the system to index a major event is reliable and trustworthy, there are truly new opportunities in the world to offer a wide array of index insurance products. What is Needed to Make the Innovation Work? There are market makers who are keenly interested in offering rainfall index insurance in developing countries. For example, PartnerRE New Solutions from Connecticut presented the following list of items that are needed to get them interested in offering such contracts[4] ü      Historic Weather Data ü      Prefer 30+ years of data, especially to cover extreme risk ü      Limited Missing Values and Out of Range Values ü      Prefer Less than 1% Missing ü      Data Integrity ü      Availability of a nearby station for a “buddy check” ü      Consistency of Observation Techniques: Manual vs. Automated ü      Limited changes of Instrumentation / Orientation / Configuration ü      Reliable settlement Mechanism ü      Integrity of recording procedure ü      Little potential for measurement tampering The Role of Technology in Providing Needed Information In recent years, state-of-the-art methods to forecast food shortages created by bad weather have significantly improved. For example, the East African Livestock Early Warning System (LEWS) is now able to provide reliable estimates of the deviation below normal up to 90 days prior to serious problems. These systems use a variety of information: 1) satellite images; 2) weather data from traditional ground instruments; 3) weather data from new systems, and 4) sampling from grasslands to determine nutrient content. More importantly, these systems allow problems to be forecast at a local level using geographic information systems. Since many of the early warning systems have now been in place for as long as twenty years, it is now possible to model the risk and begin pricing insurance contracts that match the risk profile. Reinsurance and Weather Markets Much can be said about the international reinsurance community and their resistance to entering new and untested markets. The use of the capital markets for sharing “in-between” risks remains in the infant stages, leaving the issue of capacity and efficiency in doubt. This raises questions about the role of government in sharing such risk. For the United States, Lewis and Murdock (1996) recommend government catastrophic options that are auctioned to reinsurers. Part of the thinking is that the government has adequate capital to back stop such options and may be less likely to load these options as much as the reinsurance market. Skees and Barnett (1999) have also written about a role for government in offering insurance options for catastrophes as a means of getting affordable capital into the market. However, the demand for catastrophic insurance will be limited where free disaster assistance is available. Reinsurers have now acquired many of the professionals who were trading weather. SwissRe acquired professionals from Enron and PartnerRe and ACE acquired professionals from Aquila. Reinsurers are now in a position to offer reinsurance using weather-based indexes. This type of reinsurance should be more affordable since it is not subject to the same adverse selection and moral hazard problems as traditional insurance. Country Case Examples for Using Index Insurance Mexico: Use of Weather Index Insurance for Mutual Insurance, Reinsurance, and to Facilitate Water Markets Mexico has experience with using weather indexes to reinsure their crop insurance. Developments within the weather markets prompted new thinking about sharing catastrophic risk in agriculture. In 2001, the Mexican agricultural insurance program (Agroasemex) used the weather markets to reinsure part of their multiple crop insurance programs. By using weather indexes that were based on temperature and rainfall in the major production regions, a weather index was created that was highly correlated with the Mexican crop insurance loss experience. This method of reinsurance proved to be more efficient than traditional reinsurance. The Mexican contract is an important development for many of the ideas presented in this paper. But beyond the use of weather indexes for reinsurance, Agroasemex also has begun working with Fondos, mutual insurance funds whose members are commercially oriented small farmers, to implement programs whereby they would purchase weather index insurance and then decide what type of mutual insurance to provide their members. These efforts remain in the early development stages. Agroasemex researchers are also pursing the idea of using index insurance as a means of providing important linkages to the emerging water markets in Mexico. Under such a plan, the water irrigation authority would offer a certain amount of water or indemnity payments in years when water availability restricted how much irrigation water could be delivered. In principle, such an offering should improve the efficiency of water markets and provide improved incentives to irrigation authorities to manage water in such a fashion that they are making commitments to users (Skees and Zeuli, 1999). Mongolia ¾ Using Livestock Mortality Rates as Index Insurance to Cover Deaths of Large Numbers of Animals in Mongolia Herders in Mongolia have suffered tremendous losses in recent dzud (major event, ex. winter disasters) with mortality rates of over 50 percent of the livestock in some locales. Recent work by the World Bank has focused on the feasibility of offering insurance to compensate for animal deaths. Such an undertaking is challenging in any country. Mongolia offers even more challenges given the vast territory in which herders tend over 30 million animals. Traditional insurance approaches that insure individual animals are simply not workable. The ability to understand even the simplest issue of who owns specific livestock would require very high transaction costs. The opportunities for fraud and abuse are significant. Monitoring costs required to mitigate this behavior would be very high. Work is moving ahead for using the livestock mortality rate at a local level (e.g. the sum or rural district) as the basis for indemnifying herders. Plans are to launch a pilot test of this program in the summer of 2005. No country has so far implemented such insurance for livestock deaths. But few countries have such frequent and high rates of localized animal deaths as does Mongolia, and Mongolia is one of the few countries to perform an animal census every year. This concept may therefore be precisely what is needed to start a social livestock insurance program. India ¾ Linking Index Insurance to Microfinance (BASIX) India began a privately supported pilot program on rainfall insurance in 2003 (Hess). ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company began a pilot insurance program that will pay farmers when there are shortfalls in rainfall in one area and pay others in case of excess rain. ICICI Lombard offers the drought cover policies via a small microfinance bank in southern India (BASIX) and the excess rain covers through the ICICI Bank. Such contracts offer the distinct advantage of solving the delayed payment problem that exist with India’s current area yield insurance program. BASIX launched its first weather insurance program in July 2003 through its local area bank KBS in Mahbubnagar. Local area banks are limited to operations in three adjacent districts and therefore face limited natural portfolio diversification, which helped to convince KBS that weather insurance contracts for its borrowers could mitigate the natural default risk inherent in lending in drought prone areas such as Mahbubnagar, at the extreme eastern end of Andhra Pradesh, bordering Karnataka. ICICI Lombard also offered excess rain policies to around 5,000 wheat farmers in Uttar Pradesh (in conjunction with ICICI Bank) and 150 soya farmers in Madhya Pradesh in 2003/2004 (in conjunction with BASIX). D Sattaiah of BASIX presented updates on the progress[5] of the index insurance recently. He reports that they plan to improve the product and expand to target over 1,500 farmers in Andhra Pradesh in 2004. Further, BASIX itself is now interested in purchasing the index to protect their portfolio risk for three unit office operating locations. Sattaiah goes on to point to a list of improvements that are needed in the program offerings: ü      Simplification of the pay-out structure. ü      Reference to local rainfall stations. ü      Add excess rainfall as another risk to be covered. ü      Introduced phased payouts so that farmers don’t have to wait until the end of the season. ü      Improve client awareness on the product offerings. ü      More frequent meeting with farmers to clarify doubts. ü      Use of opinion leaders for information dissemination. ü      Build credibility of external systems. ü      Install village rain gauges. ü      Provide comparison with the reference station. In addition to the introduction of rainfall index insurance by BASIX, Mosley also describes an alternative form of insurance that has been offered by BASIX. The BASIX program operates similarly to a cooperative and relies on peer monitoring to reduce incidences of moral hazard and adverse selection. Village committees perform individual loss adjustments. Because payments are based on individual losses, premium rates are higher than the Ugandan CERUDEB program, at 20 percent. Half of the premium is deposited into the village fund, a quarter goes to BASIX, and the remainder goes towards the inter-village fund that provides indemnity payments. Recommendations for Blending Index Insurance and Rural Finance Progress has been made in designing and offering index insurance contracts for a variety of correlated risk in developing countries. The motivation for using index insurance contracts rather than individual indemnity has been developed. Index insurance can shift correlated risk out of small countries into the global market. To the extent that the index is based upon a secure and objective measure of risk, this approach provides an important risk shifting innovation for developing countries where the legal structure for more sophisticated insurance products is commonly woefully inadequate. Index insurance contracts involve significantly lower transaction costs and can be offered directly to end users from companies that operate in a global market, particularly if the end user is positioned to aggregate large amounts of risk (e.g., MFEs). It is possible that offering index insurance directly to the MFE can circumvent bad government, poor macroeconomic policies, and inadequate legal frameworks. To the extent that the writer of the index insurance is a reputable global partner, the MFE could pay premiums in dollars and be paid indemnities in dollars as well. This would mitigate inflation risk within the country. The legal framework that is needed to allow MFEs to purchase these contracts from a global writer should be much more straightforward than the legal framework needed to offer traditional insurance.  The major challenge within the developing country will be in knowing that the global partner has the reputation and the resources to pay indemnities.  Should the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank Group become more involved in partnering on writing index insurance contracts for price, yield, weather, and livestock, many of these concerns could be eased. The issue of basis risk has been of some concern if one is selling index insurance contracts to individuals. However, if these contracts are sold to MFEs, the MFE should be in a position to mitigate basis risk in a number of creative ways. It is useful to illustrate some potential arrangements that could emerge between global sellers of index insurance contracts and rural finance entities. Consider a microfinance group or a small rural finance entity (MFE) with members having household activities in the same neighborhood. While this group of individuals may use many informal mechanisms to pool risk and assist individuals when bad fortune visits one of their members, they are unable to cope with a major event such as drought that adversely impacts all members at the same time. If the group could purchase an index insurance contract that would simply make payments based upon the level of rainfall (an excellent proxy for drought), the group would be in a much better position to cope when everyone suffers a loss at the same time. The MFE would need to develop ex ante rules regarding how indemnity payments from index insurance would be used. Three examples of how those ex ante rules may be developed are presented for illustration. Indemnity Payments Could be Used to Forgive Debt Since making loans is a major activity of most MFEs, the ability to repay the loans will likely be in jeopardy when there is an event that adversely impacts everyone. Having loan defaults from a large number of borrowers at the same time is likely to put the MFE at some risk. Thus, indemnity payments from index insurance can be used to offset defaults that occur due to natural disaster. Effectively, indemnity payments become a form of credit default insurance. The MFE would still need to implement rules regarding debt forgiveness for individuals. Indemnity Payments Could be Used to Facilitate a Form of Mutual Insurance The indemnity payment from index insurance could be directly distributed to members of the MFE via insurance-like rules that are determined by the members. Given that only actual indemnity payments received would be distributed, a common problem among mutual insurance providers in developing countries would be avoided ¾ inadequate cash to pay for indemnities that are specified in insurance contracts (McCord, 2003). To the extent that the MFE is relatively small and members know one another, the asymmetric information problems discussed earlier would be avoided. This, of course, is the advantage of mutual insurance. Indemnity Payments Could be Used to Facilitate Better Terms of Credit Since lending is an excellent means of smoothing consumption when there are unexpected cash flow problems, the MFE could tie the index insurance directly into the loan arrangements. Loans that are made immediately following a good season where no indemnity payments are made could be higher than normal to collect premiums that would pay for the index insurance. Interest rates could be lowered using indemnity payments directly, immediately after a major event. Interest rate reductions could be tied directly to the severity of the event. (Parchure, 2002). Challenges and the Path Ahead While there are many challenges to making some of the ideas presented here work, possibly the most significant among them involves paying for insurance. This is especially true if one expects the rural poor to pay. Premiums for some natural disaster risk could be quite expensive. Goes and Skees (2003) have been working with the concept of persuading those who give to victims of natural disasters ex post, that ex ante giving might be more effective. In fact, there are potentially some financial advantages to individuals to provide ex ante donations. NGOs and charities of all types have been quick to respond when a natural disaster such as a major drought or the Mongolia dzud victimizes the rural poor. Dumping in supplies or even large sums of money after the event is highly inefficient and many questions can be raised about who obtains the benefits. To the extent that a credible risk consortium could be developed to write index-based insurance contracts for a wide array of disaster risk, NGOs and charities may be better served by purchasing these contracts. This would give them the needed resources for quick response. Further, they would have more influence in working with local groups regarding ex ante rules about how to spend the money. Progress has been made on the ideas presented in this paper. While reliable historic data are important, integrity of data is still among the most significant requirements for gaining confidence from global markets that might be willing to take on natural hazard risk. Anyone interested in making these ideas work must pay close attention to the advice of global market makers. BASIX in India is in the best position to make many of the ideas for linking MFEs and index insurance work. In addition, COPEME of Peru has now contracted with GlobalAgRisk to pursue some of these ideas[6]. 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Valdes. 1986. “Should Crop Insurance be Subsidized?” In Crop Insurance for Agricultural Development: Issues and Experience, P. Hazell, C. Pomareda, and A. Valdes (eds.) Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. Skees, J. 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Enkh-Amgalan. 2002. “Examining the feasibility of livestock insurance in Mongolia.” World Bank Working Paper 2886, September 17. Skees, J. R. and B. J. Barnett. 1999. “Conceptual and Practical Considerations for Sharing Catastrophic/Systemic Risks.” Review of Agricultural Economics 21: 424-441. Skees, J. R. and K. A. Zeuli. 1999. “Using Capital Markets to Increase Water Market Efficiency.”  Paper Presented at the 1999 International Symposium on Society and Resource Management, July 8, Brisbane, Australia. Skees, J. R. and M. R. Reed. 1986. “Rate Making for Farm-Level Crop Insurance: Implications for Adverse Selection.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 68: 653-59. Skees, J. R., P. B. R. Hazell, and M. Miranda. 1999. “New Approaches to Crop Yield Insurance in Developing Countries.” International Food Policy Research Institute: Environment and Production Technology Division Discussion Paper No. 55. Skees, J. R., J.R. Black, and B. J. Barnett. 1997. "Designing and Rating an Area Yield Crop Insurance Contract." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 79: 430-438. Skees, J. R., P. Varangis, D. Larson, and P. Siegel. 2002. “Can Financial Markets be Tapped to Help Poor People Cope with Weather Risks?” Wider Press of the United Nations, Discussion Paper. Skees, J. R., J. Harwood, A. Somwaru, and J. Perry. 1998. “The Potential for Revenue Insurance Policies in the South.” Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 30: 46-71. Townsend, R.M. 1995. “Consumption Insurance: An Evaluation of Risk-Bearing Systems in Low-Income Economies.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(3): 83-102. U.S. General Accounting Office. 1989. “Disaster Assistance: Crop Insurance Can Provide Assistance More Effectively than Other Programs.”  RCED-89-211. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. ¾¾¾. 1980. “Federal Disaster Assistance: What Should the Policy Be?”  PAD-80-39. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Udry, C. 1994. “Risk and Insurance in a Rural Credit Market: An Empirical Investigation in Northern Nigeria.”  Review of Economic Studies 61: 495 – 526. Zeuli, K. 1999. “New Risk Management Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives.”  American Journal of Agricultural Economics. [1] See Skees et al. (2002) for development of the same infrastructure on weather disasters in several settings: 1) as a replacement for traditional crop insurance; 2) as a means to insure groups of farmers and facilitate mutual insurance; 3) as a means of providing more affordable reinsurance for traditional crop insurance, and 4) as a mechanism to trigger objective disaster payments. [2] The limitations on both Coverage and Scale were politically dictated. In principle, there is no reason that these parameters would need to be limited with index contracts. Still it is common to set some limits on how much index insurance a farmer can purchase. Some estimates of value-at-risk may be used for this purpose. For the GRP program, the farmer must certify the planted acreage used to calculate liability. [3] Personal email communication with Mr. Paul Cudmore of Agricorp, Canada, October 23, 2001. [4] Brian Tobben presented these items at the Annual Meeting of the International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management, Jointly Sponsored by the FAO and the World Bank at the FAO, Rome, 5 and 6 May, 2004. [5] D. Sattaiah presented these items at the Annual Meeting of the International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management, Jointly Sponsored by the FAO and the World Bank at the FAO, Rome, 5 and 6 May, 2004. [6] This contract is funded by USAID and GTZ. COPEME is an association that represents a number of microfinance entities operating in Peru. In early meetings with management of the MFEs, they understood the potential value of such contracts that would allow them to shift some of the most catastrophic risk to capital markets.

03.01.2007

Agricultural Insurance Revisited: New Developments and Perspectives in Latin America and the Caribbean

Agricultural Insurance Revisited: New Developments and Perspectives in Latin America and the Caribbean Mark Wenner, Rural Development Unit, Inter-American Development BankAgriculture is an inherently risky business. It is subject to a number of random price, climatic, biological, and geological shocks that require coping strategies and financial management instruments to deal with the implications. Traditional risk management strategies and ex post government provided emergency relief have often not proven to be sufficiently effective and robust in preventing serious economic loss or permitting a speedy recovery. This paper focuses on production risk management, explaining key concepts, understanding why crop insurance markets have been slow to develop, and making recommendations about how to build sustainable markets in developing country contexts. Agriculture is an inherently risky business. It is subject to a number of random price, climatic, biological, and geological shocks that require coping strategies and financial management instruments to deal with the implications. Traditional risk management strategies and ex post government provided emergency relief have often not proven to be sufficiently effective and robust in preventing serious economic loss or permitting a speedy recovery. This paper focuses on production risk management, explaining key concepts, understanding why crop insurance markets have been slow to develop, and making recommendations about how to build sustainable markets in developing country contexts. For the most part, producers in developing countries are quite exposed to weather vagaries and have little access to formal agricultural insurance products that would allow them to transfer production risk to other parties. Agricultural insurance was more widespread in Latin America and other developing regions of the world during the 1960s and 1970s. However, most of the comprehensive, multiple peril programs common then, encountered financial difficulties and were either scaled back or completely closed. At present in Latin America, the volume of agricultural insurance premiums is a miniscule share of total insurance premiums. Nonetheless, agricultural insurance is reemerging as a topic of interest, especially in light of the need to improve agricultural competitiveness in increasingly integrated commodity markets. The challenge is how to overcome obstacles and deliver efficient and sustainable agricultural insurance products. The principal obstacles—lack of high quality information, inadequate regulatory frameworks, weak supervision, lack of actuarial expertise, lack of professional expertise in designing and monitoring agricultural insurance products, a mass of low-income, dispersed clients, who may not be willing or able to pay actuarially sound premiums for multiple peril products, and the tendency of governments to undermine market development through inappropriate use of subsidies and disaster relief funds--are highlighted and discussed. Case studies on Uruguay, the Dominican Republic, and Peru reveal how crop insurance products are evolving and/or what government-supported initiatives are under the way to expand coverage. Recommendations of how to build markets step-by-step and the importance of applying new technology to lower costs are made. Agricultural insurance is presented as important financial risk management tool but not as a panacea for unprofitable farms, management failures, underinvestment in public infrastructure, or compensation for other poorly functioning factor markets. Different types of agricultural insurance products—single peril, multiple peril, parametric, and revenue—each have a niche but should adhere to basic principles of actuarial fairness, seek to minimize problems with adverse selection, moral hazard, and administrative costs. Governments have a vital role to play in providing the necessary information needed to measure, evaluate, and monitor risk, in maintaining an auspicious but sound regulatory and supervisory framework, in helping with reinsurance and catastrophic disaster relief, and supporting private insurance providers with technical assistance and training. Often time, the argument is made that “public subsidies for premiums” are necessary in order to make premiums more affordable for the majority of farmers. The argument presented here is that scarce pubic monies may be better spent on creating favorable market conditions for the development of the industry ( i.e. the maintenance of databases, training, and pilots) than on making transfers to private individuals. In the context of developing countries, with large rural populations (often exceeding 20%), sizeable agrarian sectors (agricultural share of GDP >10 %, agricultural exports as a share of total exports > 30%), and severe fiscal constraints, agricultural insurance systems should be cost effective and operate as part of a larger, layered risk management framework. Installing comprehensive and universal systems, as is the case for several industrialized countries, may be an inefficient use of scarce public monies for developing countries. In a layered framework, farmers should be trained how to reduce and cope effectively with some of the production risks on-farm through better management practices and diversification strategies; how to transfer some of the production risks to financial markets through efficient and sustainable instruments (insurance, savings, and credit); and how to rely on the government assistance for catastrophic events. In the latter case, rules for accessing disaster relief should be clear ex ante and not remove or undercut incentives for the adoption of better on-farm management techniques (moral hazard), the purchase of private agricultural insurance, or the accumulation of personal savings. AGRICULTURAL YIELD INSURANCE: A PRIMER Importance of Production Risk in Agriculture Agriculture is a risky business. Producers face a host of different risks among them production or yield risk. While production risk cannot be totally eliminated, it can be reduced and managed. In order to address the financial implications of this type of risk, producers have historically relied on a variety of strategies and coping mechanisms that can be categorized into three general classes: risk mitigation, risk transfer, and risk retention. This paper focuses on how to effectively transfer risk. Producers often report that production and price risks as their two major concerns. Each year, unmanaged production risk contributes significantly to high economic losses throughout the developing world and helps to perpetuate poverty and income inequality. Among the numerous sources of production or yield variability, weather is universally recognized as the dominant one. Figure 1 lists the principal sources of yield variability—quality of soil, planting date, genetic potential of the plant or animal, application of fertilizer, husbandry practices. Recent research from the Baltic states show that weather differences alone explained 35% of the variation in yield for a representative sample of farmers (See Figure 1). Of course, the relative importance of the factors may vary from place to place and with the level of technology employed. But what distinguishes climate risk from the other listed factors, however, is the degree of human control possible. The non-weather factors can be significantly reduced or mitigated with on-farm strategies, with the principal constraints being farmer knowledge and financial resources. In contrast, weather cannot be controlled and constitutes a residual risk that should be transferred, and it cannot be retained with serious financial indications. For example, the farmer can select the best seeds for planting, match plant agronomic requirements with soil characteristics, take preventive actions to minimize the risks of insect infestations or disease, and fertilize according to a schedule based on best available extension service knowledge and nutrient analysis of the soil. In practice, however, the degree of effective control is far from ideal, more so in the case of developing countries where extension services are weak, farmers have less access to information, and have less years of education, and limited access to credit. Thus, the combination of management shortcomings and weather vagaries makes agriculture more risky than most other economic enterprises in developing countries. This high degree of riskiness, especially in a sector dominated by producers with low-incomes and scant assets, has serious implications for economic growth, social equity, and poverty alleviation. Market and government-based solutions are needed. Three major types of natural phenomena contribute to yield risks in agriculture: hydro-meteorological, geological, and biological. Hydro-meteorological risks include excessive rain, floods, droughts, high winds, tornados, hurricanes, hail, frost, abrupt temperature changes, heat waves, blizzards, prolonged cold spells, avalanches, landsides, high waves, storm surges. Geological risks include earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and tsunamis. Biological risks include diseases and insect infestations. Each of these risks can then be categorized as either catastrophic or non-catastrophic, depending on frequency, scale, intensity, and duration. Catastrophic risk refers to natural disasters (earthquakes, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, tidal waves, storm surges, etc.) that inflict large-scale damage over an extended area but are infrequent, low probability events. Non-catastrophic climatic risks (droughts, floods, landslides, mudslides, hail storms, freezes, heat waves, etc) affect localized areas (one or two provinces) or sometimes only a few farms. They tend to be more frequent, last longer, but cause less total economic damage. Biological risks such as insect infestations and disease epidemics tend to be localized but in some instances, if the disease is highly communicable, livestock may have to be slaughtered over a very wide swath surrounding the original outbreak point as a containment measure. Thus, an outbreak of brucellosis, a bacterial infection that affects ruminants, on one farm is a non-catastrophic risk whereas an outbreak of mad cow disease (BSP) would be a catastrophe for the entire cattle industry in a particular country. Over the last decade the occurrence of natural disasters has been trending upward. The set of countries experiencing the least growth in disasters are the Central European States and the former Soviet Republics. By the year 2050, the United Nations estimates that natural disasters will cost 300,000 lives and approximately $250 billion in economic losses per year worldwide, if more measures are not taken to mitigate risks and reduce global warming (UNISDR, 2002). For the period 1994-2003, the countries that are most vulnerable to natural disasters are developing countries, particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia. Latin America and the Caribbean are most exposed to windstorms, floods, and droughts, and windstorms (See Table 1). Within the region, however, there are marked differences. For example, while windstorms are the most frequent threat for the Caribbean, whereas floods are virtually six times more frequent than windstorms for South America. The seven Central American states, in turn, differ markedly from the other two sub-regions. They are disproportionately exposed to a larger array of threats—windstorms, floods, droughts, earthquake, volcanic eruptions, and epidemics-- and thus accounted for 35% of all the region’s disasters. South America, with a larger number of states and with each state being larger in landmass than any of the Central American states, accounts for 47% of the natural disasters. According to the World Bank (2001), between 1988 and 1997 natural disasters in the developing countries claimed an estimated 50,000 lives and caused direct damage valued at more than US$60 billion a year. In the Latin American and Caribbean region, as can be seen in the figures that follow (Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c), the economic losses for the Latin American and Caribbean region was US$31.9 billion for the period 1990-99 (CRED International Disaster Database, 2005). In the period 2000-05, the losses sum to US$17.5 billion (CRED International Database, 2005), the Caribbean having experienced double the losses than the entire previous decade as a result of hurricane damage in Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Grenada in 2004. These costs create dislocations at many levels— farm household, local regional economies, and national economies. Effects of Shocks and Common Traditional Production Risk Management and Coping Mechanisms The typical effects of a hydro-meteorological, geological, or biological disaster are one or more of the following. The number of effects detectable is a function of the scale, severity, and duration of the initial shock. The more spatially correlated the shock, the more effects will be noted. • A decrease in farm income. • A decrease in employment for hired farm workers. • A generalized fall in demand throughout the local or regional economy as a result of the reduced agricultural income of affected farm families and agroindustries. • An increase in loan defaults in affected region, affecting both financial intermediaries and agricultural input suppliers who sold on credit. • A decrease in government tax revenue and foreign earnings due to a fall in agricultural exports. • An increase in the price of basic food items, if the affected commodities where normally marketed domestically. Ex post, the affected rural population in response to the shock may engage in more than one of the following behaviors depending on the severity of the shock and initial economic conditions. Note that some of the behaviors have primarily micro or local effects, that is they affect mostly the household and immediate neighbors while other behaviors have macro or farther reaching external effects in that they affect not only the household in question but other parties such as municipal, state, and national governments, financial intermediaries, and urban residents. MICRO EFFECTS: • Drawdown accumulated savings • Seek loans • Reduce consumption, including food intake and withdrawing children from school nutritional threshold that would impair health. • Liquidate assets • Seek off-farm wage employment • Depend on remittances. • Depend on informal reciprocal sharing arrangements with neighbors and kin (mutual insurance) MACRO EFFECTS: • Seek to refinance existing loans • Seek debt forgiveness for existing formal loans • Petition the regional and national government authorities for emergency relief • Exit farming permanently and migrate to an urban area • If persistent over time, competitiveness of agricultural production unit(s) reduced. Ex ante, farm households, in the absence of affordable, formal risk transfer instruments such as insurance, tend to rely on a series of informal risk reducing and risk retention coping strategies. The only informal risk transfer strategies are share tenancy and mutual aid: • Use lower yielding but drought resistant varieties • Stagger planting times to assure that a fair percentage of the crop receives sufficient rain in first stage of development • Fragment plots to take advantage of different soils, elevations, slopes, and microclimates, going as far as to rent land that has distinct agroecologic characteristics from own land • Intercrop two or more crops and/or tree species on a parcel • Diversify income streams • Conserve soil moisture by applying litter and mulch to the roots of plants or using raised beds. • Use of integrated pest management • Allocate relatively more labor resources of the household to other non-farm businesses or off-farm employment opportunities if crop yields are threaten by bad weather or pests during the growing season • Adopt irrigation technology • Sharecrop • Engage in reciprocal lending where in a household provides a no interest loan to another distressed household in good times and in turn expects to be able to borrow in bad times. • Engage in gift giving to build social capital in the community and to create “chits” that can be called in time of economic distress. • Participate in informal group mutual aid , savings, and insurance schemes such as ROSCAs and ASCAs (Rotating savings and Credit Associations and Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations). • Accumulate buffer stocks or liquid assets • Maintain a credit reserve with a bank or agricultural supplier • Reduce amount of purchased agricultural inputs and thereby minimize debt load or reduce the amount of target income needed to assure survival of the household Public Policy Implications of Inadequate Traditional Risk Management and Coping Strategies While some of the on-farm, risk mitigation practices are time tested and highly recommendable such as crop diversification, intercropping, soil humidity management, integrated pest management, irrigation, and accumulating savings. Many of the other practices such as such as plot fragmentation, economizing on purchased inputs, and the use of low-yielding but drought resistant varieties, represent production efficiency losses (Rosenweig and Binswanger, 1993; Morduch, 1995; and Kurosaki and Fafchamps, 2002). By foregoing specialization, farmers tradeoff income variability for lost profitability and reduced future earning ability. Others such as reciprocal lending, gift giving, and participation in ROSCAs and ASCAs work for idiosyncratic risk but maybe overwhelmed and useless if the risk is covariant, that is affecting with more or less equal severity all the households in a particular community or region. Consequently, these costly risk mitigating techniques and can contribute to chronic poverty and increased vulnerability. In a setting of increasing trade liberalization and integration, the absence of absence of agricultural insurance instruments places developing country producers at a serious disadvantage vis-à-vis farmers in industrialized countries that have greater access to such instruments. The result is less trade competitiveness ceteris paribus. In short, the farm household produces inside its production possibility curve and increases its chances of remaining below or close to the poverty line. At the level of the regional economy, a large number of households engaging in risk avoidance behaviors and producing at a suboptimal level, reduce tax revenue, limit the ability to finance social services, makes for a stagnant regional economy due to less effective demand. At the national government level, a slow growing or stagnant agricultural sector contributes to less marketed food output, less export earnings, high rural-urban migration rates, incomplete financial markets, and increases the demand for extraordinary fiscal assistance to cope with major emergencies. The cumulative micro effects create the setting for the existence of a poverty trap and the cumulative macro effects create the setting where government intervenes inappropriately and instead of solving a market failure aggravates the situation by creating a government failure. Lack of Modern Risk Management Instruments Increases the Vulnerability of the Rural Poor and May Contribute to the Persistence of a Poverty Trap: One of the distinguishing characteristics of the poor is their vulnerability to risk. Poor people in developing countries depend heavily on agricultural production and selling their labor to survive. Since consumption takes a greater share of income among low-income families, shocks that create a marked drop in income can easily force the household below minimal nutritional thresholds. Some can recover quickly, especially if they have enough tangible assets. Others do not fare as well and are unable to break the cycle of poverty and stagnation and remain in a poverty trap. The lack of formal, risk transfer instruments makes the poor and near poor more vulnerable and adverse to making risky and uncertain investment decisions that would put at make their income levels more variable than it is and risk their meager stock of physical assets. Thus, a low-productivity, poverty equilibrium could arise. Recent research has shown that not only is the magnitude of poverty different between industrialized countries and developing countries (rates of poverty in developing countries surpass 30% on average while it is less than 20% for higher income countries) but also the dynamics of poverty (Naifeh, 1998). Whereas the monthly poverty exit rate hovers around 7% for the U.S., exit rates in developing countries such as Cote d’Ivorie and KwaZulu Natal state in South Africa range between .7%-1.3%, meaning that the median duration of poverty for many in developing countries can last a lifetime while the median time in poverty is 4.5 months for the U.S. (Barrett and McPeak, 2005). In developing countries, some individuals have accumulated sufficient assets that qualifies them as non poor but a transitory shock reduces their income and expenditures levels and forces them below the poverty line (stochastic poverty). Others lack a sufficient endowment of assets and can never seem to improve returns to their assets or accumulate more, so they languish below the poverty line (structural poverty). This phenomenon is illustrated in the two figures below. Taking a static view in figure 4, a household is pictured as mired in a vicious cycle. Insufficient income and assets contribute to hunger, lethargy, and poor health, which in turn reduce income-earning ability and prevents investments in activities that would enhance upward mobility such as education. Taking the dynamic perspective in figure 5, a poor household (II) is much more vulnerable to falling deeper into income poverty and staying poor, than say household (I), when both households experience the same adverse shock at Time period 4 resulting in an income decline, systemic economic growth processes would be sufficient for household (I) to reemerge from poverty but it would be insufficient to break the cycle of poverty for household (II). In the case of household (II), the causes of structural poverty and income inequality will have to be attacked through asset based poverty reduction strategies—asset redistribution, social safety nets, targeting, better protection of property rights, more investments in human capital. The introduction of a more modern risk management instrument such as crop insurance as one element in a larger package of interventions could theoretically help household (II) protect what few productive assets it has during a downturn and then to leverage those assets to a higher extent to grow out of poverty over time. The use of crop insurance could help to place household (II) on the dashed orange upward growth trajectory II preventing the liquidation of assets. The Lack of Ex Ante Crop Insurance Can Retard Rural Lending, Create Fiscal Stresses for Central Governments, and Promote Rent Seeking Behavior: When crop insurance does not exist or is not used to an appreciable extent in an agrarian economy, the central government and international donors are relied upon to provide relief in the case of very severe disasters. While it can not be denied that central governments and international organizations must respond and play a role in the case of massive catastrophes, the use of ad hoc, ex post interventions sets dangerous precedents and tends to have four negative consequences if the role of government is not clear and actions are not well designed. First, ad hoc emergency programs disrupt budget planning and administration. Funds often time have to be diverted from other ongoing and approved government programs to attend to the agricultural emergency. In the absence of a well-established emergency disaster fund with transparent rules and adequate funding, governments can easily fall into the trap of “robbing Paul to pay Peter.” If the country in question is under budget stress, it may have to engage in deficit financing and as a consequence contribute to upward pressure on interest rates in the banking system. Higher lending rates reduces the demand for loans and makes agricultural financing ever more problematic, since as a whole agriculture is a sector noted for smaller profit margins than others. Second, the knowledge that the government is likely to “bail out” affected parties creates moral hazard conditions and depresses the market for private crop insurance. Farmers do not do all that they can do to reduce individual vulnerability to adverse climatic conditions and other biological threats. Similarly, insurance companies have little incentive to enter rural markets and offer costly insurance products since they fear that demand for their products will be weak since farmers would prefer free ex post assistance from the government as opposed to paying a premium ex ante. The negative results are represented in Figure 6. Central governments should provide disaster assistance but should set rules of eligibility so as to encourage the purchase of private insurance and/or precautionary actions to reduce vulnerability to losses. Third, well-organized groups of farmers have a strong incentive to lobby the government for relief from a wide and varied number of adverse climatic and price effects. Thus, government can be called upon to provide relief for non-catastrophic events, which normally should be in the domain of private insurers. Many times, the farmers that are more organized and most influential tend not to be the poorest. They, tend to produce a crop that is “strategic” i.e. a domestic staple like rice or an export commodity like beef cattle, wine, cotton, or sugar. Thus, the government provides transfers to relatively non-poor farmers. To counteract and limit rent seeking opportunities, the government should be clear as to how risk management will “layered” in that private individuals will be responsible for certain types of risk and up to a certain limit, private insurance markets for another segment, and as last resort, central government will be responsible for risk losses that surpasses the limits of both private insurance and reinsurance companies. Fourth, the ready willingness of central governments to use debt forgiveness of formal agricultural loans undermines the solvency of banks, destroys repayment culture and dampens the willingness of financial intermediaries to expand and innovate in rural areas. Financial intermediaries tend to retreat from the agricultural sector after such an event, and if they stay, they only lend to collateral rich and well-known clients. Thus, financial markets remain shallow, noncompetitive, and incomplete. Debt forgiveness, while timely and easy to implement from the perspective of politicians, also tends to be regressive in nature. It benefits larger farmers much more so than smaller one because they tend to have more access to formal credit and take out on average larger loans. Smaller farmers tend to experience greater difficult accessing formal credit, and if successful, borrow smaller amounts. Over time, the combination of intermediary weakening and regressive transfers, contributes to increased income inequality. Those with access to finance can invest in more productive technology, diversify faster, expand their scale of operations, and thus experience faster income growth, all else equal. The use of debt forgiveness should be avoided and used sparingly. Formal Agricultural Yield Insurance: Definition, Basic Requirements, and Benefits In previous sections, we have argued that traditional risk management and coping mechanisms are often time neither sufficiently robust nor cost effective. The amount of residual risk that remains with the household in question may induce asset liquidation and poverty. Ex post government relief actions also create incentive problems and are costly to the treasury. But what is agricultural yield insurance and how does it function? Agricultural yield insurance is a financial contingency contract that transfers production risk from a producer to another party via the payment of a premium that reflects the true long-term cost of the insurer who is assuming the risks. The insurer pools the risks faced by a large number of individuals and covers losses incurred by any one individual in the pool. It serves to essentially protect assets, stabilize income, and smooth consumption. However, for insurance to be viable and sustainable, certain “ideal” conditions for the risk to be considered insurable and for a self-sustaining market to appear. 1. Symmetric Information: The insurer and the insured should have the same approximate knowledge of the distribution of probable losses so that proper risk classification can occur. Insurers typically do not develop premium rates on an individual basis since it would be extraordinarily expensive. Instead, insurers classify applicants into homogeneous risk pools and calculate a premium for everyone in that group. In order to estimate probable losses for different groups of risks, extensive amount of reliable and accurate information is needed on weather patterns, yields, market trends, farm conditions, farm management ability, risk attitudes, and capacity to pay for the insurance. 2. Large Number of Similar Exposed Units: The statistical Law of Large Numbers upon which the actuarial models use to calculate coverage, indemnity, and premium levels , states that the more uncorrelated risks that are added to a portfolio the lower the variance of outcomes for the entire portfolio. Thus, for the actuarial models to be accurate the size of the pool or portfolio should be large and the risks faced in a particular class or group should be similar. 3. Statistical Independence of Risks: Risk should be nearly or perfectly independent across insured individuals and spatially uncorrelated. Insurance is based on the principles of diversification so that a major consideration is the degree of correlation in financial losses caused by the risk to be insured. The more spatial correlation there is the less efficient insurance will be as a risk transfer mechanism. When losses are catastrophic, the risk–pooling advantage of insurance breaks down because the contributions of the unaffected are insufficient to cover the damages of the affected. 4. Calculable Expectancy Frequency and Magnitude of Loss: The insurance company should be able to estimate both average frequency of the random event to be insured and the average severity of loss. For low-probability risks with potentially catastrophic outcomes it is often difficult to estimate the average expected loss, because there are so few data points. 5. Actual Losses must be Determinable and Measurable: The actual loss should be clearly and causally linked to the random event insured and it should be a tangible and measurable loss. If this is not the case, claims settlements will tend to be highly contentious. Purchasers will lose faith in the process and insurer’s administrative costs will skyrocket. 6. Potential Losses Must be Significant and an Insurable Interest Must Exist: Potential buyers must perceive the probable loss as significant and beyond their own means to cover; otherwise there will be no incentive to purchase insurance. Furthermore, insurance cannot be provided to policyholders who have a vested interest in a loss occurring. For example, a property insurance policy cannot be sold to anyone other than the owners of the home and/or the owners of the furniture in the case of a renter with an unfurnished lease. If someone else could purchase such a policy, they would experience no loss if the house or furnishings were damaged or destroyed but would receive a pay-out from the insurance company. Owners and renters with “insurable interests” would have incentives to take precautions because of deductibles. 7. Limited Policyholder Control over the Insured Event: Insurance protection should not be offered if policyholders can control whether an insured event will occur. If a policyholder has sufficient control over whether a risk can occur, they can take advantage of the insurance and generate “moral hazard or suspect claims”. For example, a farmer can fail to properly care for livestock, which could induce disease causing the death of the animal, and then file a claim for loss. 8. Premiums should be Economically Affordable: In general, for an insurance policy to be attractive to potential policyholders, the annual premium cost must be substantially less than the potential benefit offered by the policy, should the insured event occur. A market for insurance may fail to appear, if the majority of clients are very poor, very isolated, and/or the chances of losses are high. A fully loaded premium could exceed the estimated cost of a one-time loss and make the product uneconomical and useless. When insurance premiums are very high, credit and savings instruments become preferable risk management instruments. If the above conditions are met, agricultural insurance can be offered on a sustainable basis and has five main benefits. First, agricultural insurance is often time a more efficient and potent financial instrument than either using liquid savings or credit in managing yield risk. If a household or farm enterprises is subject to a series of shocks in a short span of time, it may deplete its entire savings and not have enough to invest to improve future earnings. In many countries rural formal credit markets are very undeveloped and access is problematic. Thus, in the event of a sudden income loss, a credit-constrained household may have to rely on informal sources, friends, family, and moneylenders that may not extend sufficient volume of credit necessary to meet the crisis or at a very high interest rate. Recent empirical research from rural China, that analyzed portfolio behavior in represent to income and health risks shows that households in the lowest and highest quintiles did not appreciably reduce wealth held in liquid forms while those in the middle quintiles did to a higher extent (Jalan and Ravallion, 1998). The authors reason that the rich do not need to hold unproductive precautionary liquid wealth to deal with income losses because they had access to credit and the poor could not afford to hold precautionary savings. Thus, in the context of undeveloped savings and credit markets, making formal insurance accessible to the very poor households would permit them to transfer unmitigated residual risk to an external party and thus avoiding sinking deeper into poverty. Second, the use of agricultural insurance can facilitate the adoption of higher yielding technologies and intensification of production by risk adverse farmers. The presence of insurance gives added comfort to innovators. Third, agricultural insurance reduces credit default risk for financial intermediaries financing agricultural production. Crop insurance policies can serve as a substitute for physical collateral and give financial intermediaries more comfort and incentive to lend to the sector. Insurance policies can be made endorsable to a credit lender. Fourth, agricultural insurance would help both rural households and governments manage natural hazards better and reduce the vulnerability of the rural poor. Insurance could help a rural house avoid falling into poverty traps. It would help forestall political demands for ad hoc disaster relief. Governments normally provide monetary compensation to affected households in ex post disaster relief efforts but often distribution of the aid is not timely. Fifth, agricultural insurance in a world marked by increasing agricultural trade liberalization and integration is a means to enhance agricultural competitiveness. In a global marketplace, producers that enjoy the benefits of crop insurance are better able to assume new investment risks without mortal fear of losing a significant share of their asset base or being forced to exit agriculture if the undertaking fails due to adverse weather. Many producers in OECD countries enjoy the benefits of crop and livestock insurance and the spread of agricultural insurance to developing regions with help to level the playing field. Impediments to the Development of Agricultural Insurance Markets Despite the inadequacies of informal risk management systems and problems with ex post government actions, agricultural insurance is grossly underdeveloped in middle and low-income countries. One may ask why this is so given the clear benefits. The fundamental reason is that the ideal conditions laid out in the previous section are not often met in reality and the adjustments and compromises made often prove to be inadequate so one veers between markets with a few insurers offering sustainable but limited appeal single peril products to markets heavily intervened by governments either directly or indirectly offering multiple peril products with broader appeal but which are unsustainable. Many of the crop insurance programs that appeared in the 1970s and 1980s failed miserably because the “golden rules” were not adhered too. Below is a complete list of impediments to a more stable and complete insurance market. Lack of Statistical Independence Asymmetric Information High Administrative Costs Mismatch between Farmers Preferences and Capacity to Pay Inadequate Legal and Regulatory Frameworks Distorted Government Incentives Reluctance of Reinsurers to Enter the Market Lack of Statistical Independence: Formal insurance work best when the risks to be insured are perfectly independent and spatially uncorrelated, but agricultural production risks are in between. Agricultural production losses, deviate from the ideal and tend to fall between the two extremes of being 100% uncorrelated and 100% correlated. Agricultural yield losses tend to be characterized by some degree of positive spatial correlation. The degree of spatial correlation is often inversely related to the size of the region or country where activities will be insured. Thus, relatively small countries are likely to be characterized by more positively correlated agricultural losses than a large country. Moreover, positive spatial correlation in losses reduces the benefits that can be obtained by pooling risks from different geographical areas. When, risks are perfectly correlated, insurance fails as an instrument of risk transfer, and capital market instruments such are derivatives are more appropriate. A good agricultural insurance risk would be an idiosyncratic or largely uncorrelated one, a risk that is unique to a household and unrelated to neighbors and possibly due to management differences. Examples would be hail or fire. Hail and fire tend to be very localized events. In the case of fire, people can take preventive measures against fire. Thus, with inspections and a large and geographically diverse pool, theses risks are insurable. On the other hand, private insurers do not like to insure against drought or hurricanes (systemic or correlated risks), which affect large areas, unless reinsurance is available. Asymmetric Information: Problems arise when prospective farm insurance clients have more knowledge about their own distribution of probable losses than the insurer cannot correctly classify potential clients by risk type and subsequently calculate premium rates that accurately reflect the true likelihood of losses for individual farmers, or monitor them effectively once a contract has been purchased. As a result, two attendant problems emerge—adverse selection and moral hazard. In the case of adverse selection, persons with very risky profiles will purchase the insurance in greater proportion than persons with less risky profiles, generating an imbalance between indemnity payments and premium revenue. If the insurer raises the premium higher in subsequent periods, less risky clients will withdraw and the profits of the company will fall further. In order to overcome adverse selection problem, the company will have to invest more heavily in obtaining better information, especially farm level yield data for long periods, so as to permit better risk classification. The other related information problem is one of moral hazard, wherein the insured changes behavior and may become less diligent in minimizing production risks knowing that potential losses are covered. Since monitoring the behavior of the insured is costly and imperfect, this could lead to potential losses for the insurer. To overcome this problem, the insurer has to design better contract designs and rely on less costly systems of monitoring. High Administrative Costs: Information is vital to risk measurement and evaluation yet it is tends to be costly to obtain, process, and analyze. Agricultural insurance companies have to gather significant amounts of data on climate, production conditions, yield distributions, prices; capacity to pay; develop models to determine probable losses; design appropriate contracts and set premiums and indemnity levels; establish, inspection, monitoring and claim adjustment processes; and seek reinsurance. The more disperse the client base, the more heterogeneous the farm production systems, and the smaller the insured value, the higher the administrative costs are as a percentage of premiums. Compared to other lines of insurance, agricultural underwriting and claims adjustments are generally much more costly. In the context of developing countries, where data tend to be unreliable and difficult to obtain in a timely manner, the costs escalate. In rural areas with poor roads and telecommunications systems, the cost of client monitoring and making quick claim adjustments escalates. Mismach between Farmers Preferences and Willingness to Pay: Many farmers seem to have a limited willingness to pay a premium that covers the cost of the service provided. As a result a sustainable market does not appear. Farmers seem to prefer insurance that protects a sizeable proportion of income from multiple threats as opposed to ones that partially cover income loss from a specific threat. These types of insurance products, revenue and multiple peril, are the most costly and difficult products for private insurance companies to provide in a profitable and sustainable manner (Goodwin, 2001). The financial performance of multiple peril insurance programs has been universally disappointing (Just et al, 1999). The fact that insurance these insurances are designed to protect against losses from a multitude of perils makes the calculation of probable losses and the determination of actuarially fair premiums very difficult if not impossible. In the countries were these types of policies are offered, they normally require substantial government subsidization. The products that can be delivered profitably and at affordable premiums are specific or single peril policies—hail and fire – and parametric or indexed based products. But they have less broad based appeal. In the case of parametric products, ones that pay an indemnity when an easily observable and independently verifiable “trigger”, usually a particular temperature or rainfall level is struck, suffer from basis risk. Basis risk is when insurance is brought and an economic loss is realized but the indemnity payment is not made. Due to differences in microclimates and quality of information, an individual farmer’s crop yield distribution may not closely correspond to the distribution used for the index. In the case of developing countries, much more empirical research is needed to measure farmer’s risk attitudes and capacity to pay for crop insurance. Cognitive Failure: Some farmers may perceive the risks they face as being smaller than they actually are. This phenomenon is called “cognitive failure” and can stem from either insufficient information or an inability to properly process and assess information. In common language, it is the feeling of invincibility: “That can’t happen to me”. Also it refers to the common feeling among farmers that “premiums paid are lost money if nothing happens”. Many farmers tend to dismiss low probability but high cost events in their decision-making processes and to just focus on developing risk management strategies for high frequency, low cost events, the “commonplace threats” (Skees, Barnett, and Hartell, 2005). Inadequate Legal and Regulatory Frameworks: Legal and regulatory frameworks can either help promote or hinder the development of agricultural markets. The most common areas of complaint from insurers and observers concern the following. Inappropriate Reserve Requirements: Often time capital reserve requirements are adequate for life, auto, property, and casualty lines of insurance but not for agricultural insurance due to higher rates of rotation in the portfolio. Many agricultural production cycles are a few months long and if capital has to be reserved for period longer than the actual length of risk exposure, it increases the reserve load in the premium and makes the product unattractive to client. Possible solutions could entail treating agricultural insurance reserves like marine insurance reserves and use of more sophisticated calculations. Agent Licensing Requirements: How to deliver agricultural insurance to smallholders is a big obstacle and one obvious way around this obstacle would be for rural microfinance institutions and rural development NGOs, and cooperatives to serve as agents for insurance companies selling agricultural insurance products. Often the agent licensing provisions are either too strict or too lax. Some country’s insurance laws may require a long number of years, formal training, and other high qualifications, which make it difficult for young microfinance institutions to qualify. Other time, the laws may require that the agent be a natural person, thereby eliminating the possibility for a cooperative or NGO. Traditional individual agents have little incentive to sell agricultural insurance compared to auto and life. The latter two are high margin and imply less administrative costs and time. Possible solutions to help protect consumers against misselling of insurance policies but at the same time facilitate the development of agricultural insurance would be specialized training for financial intermediaries, NGOs, cooperatives etc. in the selling of agricultural insurance and the adoption of market conduct standards subject to compliance checks. Reporting requirements: Lastly, the reporting requirements can place a high burden on an insurance company that wants to specialize in a low-income, high-risk segment of the market. The impetus to the insurance company would be to specialize in more lucrative lines such as auto and life, where the high cost can be more easily borne. Regulators do need information but the practical issue of maintaining computerized databases for a dispersed, low-come clientele is a serious one for crop insurers wanting expand in developing countries. Possible solutions may involve more streamlined and effective reporting for agricultural insurers and encouragement and support for agricultural insurers invest more heavily in wireless technology, if the infrastructure of the country permits. Product Classification: Many times when an insurance company wants to introduce an weather based index there is a legal debate as to whether it is a derivative and therefore subject to the rules governing capital market securities or whether is covers an “insurable loss” and should be subject to the rules governing insurance products. If the crop insurance market is to develop, parametric or index based instruments need to be classified as insurance products and not as derivatives so that easier and more flexible delivery systems can be used to get the product to small holders. The most promising retail delivery channels for parametric products and other insurance products targeting the low-income are indirect ones. Urban-based broker and insurance office outlets will not suffice. Moreover, capital market instruments are aimed at sophisticated and knowledgeable market participants and may be subject to very little regulation or a very direct regulatory regime than insurance products. The capital market regulatory regime may not include sufficiently strict financial reserve requirements nor be subject to market conduct rules equivalent to those that international standards require should apply to the sale of insurance. Thus, small farmers with in regime where parametric products are classified as derivatives will not have the benefit of the regulatory protection that he needs. In short, the farmer client is at serious risk of abuse. If index based risk management products are not recognized as insurance products with an "insurable interest" and the requirement that an insurance policy indemnifies a loss, there is a risk that the framework will not recognize payment against an index. Distorted Incentives: When governments intervene and make ex post unconditional emergency relief payments, forgive loan contracts, and/or offer subsidized emergency loans, it removes the incentives for farmers to purchase insurance ex ante and for insurance companies to innovate and offer appropriate crop insurance products. The government intervention is often justified on the grounds that private insurance companies are unwilling or unable to supply crop insurance in an efficient manner. This dilemma of “crowding out” or market failure has raged, at least in the U.S. economic literature, for decades. The issue needs to be recast as finding an appropriate facilitation role for the government and distinguishing clearly between disguised income transfers and risk management tools. Thin International Reinsurance Market: The market for agricultural reinsurance is limited due to the high cost of reinsurance premiums and reluctance on the part of reinsurers to develop a cadre with the necessary specialized knowledge and information systems required to properly monitor and evaluate agricultural risks. Since crop yields are highly spatially correlated, private insurance companies cannot effectively pool risk at the regional or even at a country level, especially if it is a small country. The Maximum Probable Loss and Maximum Foreseeable Loss estimates would exceed capital reserves and thus the insurer needs to cede or transfer a portion of the portfolio risk to an external party, either an international reinsurance company, a national government, or a supranational government agency. International reinsurance companies have the capacity to absorb large insured losses and for years have done so, especially for major natural catastrophes. For instance, in 1992 international reinsures paid out $23 billion to cover insured losses association with Hurricane Andrew and in 2005 will pay out in the order of $60-80 billion for Hurricane Katrina. Agricultural losses due to drought or flood are likely to be less than the cost of a major hurricane or earthquake, but the levels could be appreciable and repeated from year to year. Accordingly, only a few of the international reinsurance companies have agricultural divisions. The combination of lack of analytical capacity and expensive reinsurance premiums at the international level dampens insurers’ capacity to offer crop insurance products at the national level. At present, only four of the more than 60 reinsurers worldwide have substantial agricultural portfolios, Munich Re, Partner Re, Hanover Re and Swiss Re. Two in particular have strong expertise in analyzing weather-based indexes, Swiss RE and ACE, because they hired many former Enron employees. Enron was the pioneer the use of weather index derivatives in energy markets in the early 1990s. Given this list of formidable problems in the path of sustainable development of agricultural insurance, the question becomes what have we learned from previous experiences with crop insurance, what trends are discernible in Latin American markets, and what should be done to promote market development? AGRICULTURAL INSURANCE OVERVIEW: MARKET TRENDS, PRODUCT EVOLUTION, LESSONS LEARNED, AND PROMISE OF NEW TECHNOLOGY Market Trends Overall, agricultural insurance is underdeveloped worldwide. In 2001, total agricultural premiums (including fishery and forestry) amounted to US$6.5 billion while the estimated total value of agricultural production worldwide was US$1.4 trillion. Thus, agricultural premiums as a share of output were a miniscule .4% (Schuetz, 2005). Moreover, the regional distribution of coverage is bimodal as can be seen in Table 4. Developed countries account for 87% of the agricultural premiums in that year as opposed for 13% for developing countries. Whereas 75% if the cultivated land in the US is insured, only five Latin American countries have more than 1% of cropped area insured, and only one, Mexico exceeds 10% (See Table 5). Table 4: Agricultural Insurance at a Glance Region of the World Share of Agricultural Insurance Premiums 2001 Cumulative Share North America (U.S. and Canada) 55 55 Western Europe 29 84 Australia and New Zealand 3 87 Latin America and the Caribbean 4 91 Asia 4 95 Central and Eastern Europe 3 98 Africa 2 100 Source: Schuetz, 2005 (FAO) In the developed countries, the four leading markets are found in the United States, Canada, Spain, and Japan. Within Latin America and the Caribbean, the leading agricultural insurance markets can be found in Mexico, Argentine, Brazil, and Venezuela. In Central America, the region most exposed to the widest number of natural hazards, only ten companies are active and a miniscule proportion of the cultivated area. In many countries, there is no commercial agricultural insurance available: Bolivia, Suriname, Guyana, Belize, Bahamas, Jamaica, Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago. In many of the countries, however, active efforts are being made to promote agricultural insurance. Products: Strengths and Weaknesses There are four broad types of products that are offered in agricultural insurance markets: single peril, multiple peril, revenue and parametric. Historically, the first type of crop insurance to be offered was single peril for hail in Europe and North America in the 19th century. In the developing world, there were some early adopters of single peril and mutual insurance products--Uruguay (1914), Mexico (1926) and Mauritius (1945). In the 1930s, the U.S. government started to experiment with multiple peril policies as a means to help farmers recover from the devastating effects of the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl (a prolonged drought that affected the Plain states). After WWII, the use of this product was introduced in Western Europe and Japan. Later on it spread to African, South Asian, and Latin American countries. Some of the developing country pioneers of multiple peril programs were Brazil (1954), Costa Rica (1970), Mexico (1971), India (1972), Chile (1980), Dominican Republic (1984), and Venezuela (1984). By the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, most of the multiple peril programs in developing countries where experiencing substantial losses. With the advent of structural adjustment programs and the general reduction in public subsidies available for the agricultural sector, reforms and retrenchments occurred. In the 1990’s, the U.S. started to experiment on a large scale with area yield, crop revenue, and income insurance products. In the developing world, India has been the leader in introducing area yield products. In most other developing countries, single and multiple peril products continue to predominate. In the late 1990s and early part of this millennium, Spain, Mexico, India, and Mongolia have either introduced parametric or indexed based products or have products under design. Canada has an area-yield product since the 1970s and India and Morocco have had such products since the 1990s. Table 5: Principal Characteristics of Crop Insurance Markets in Latin America and the Caribbean Country Types of System Principal Crops Insured and Risks Covered Typical Contract Percent of Area Cultivated that is Insured Public Subsidies Argentina Private Grains, fruits, and livestock Hail, fire, frost, high winds, excessive rain, pest infestations, plant diseases, replanting, livestock death due to disease or accidents Pay 60-90% of difference between actual and historic yield 1% in 2002 No (Subsidy plan has been proposed in late 2003 and since 2004 a pilot has been operating in State of Sao Paulo) Brazil Private Most crops and livestock Climate, pests, disease, livestock death due to sickness or accidents Contract 1: Cover cost of production; Contract 2: Cover the difference between expected and actual .22% in 2000/01 No (Pilots with state subsidies where executed in Rio Grande do Sul (2000) and Sao Paolo (2003)) Chile Mixed (Public-Private) Grains, pulses, vegetables, industrial crops Drought, excessive rain, freezes, hail, snow, and high winds Difference between insured valor and actual yield 2% in 2002 Yes Colombia Mixed Banana, cotton, potato, sugar cane Drought, flood, excessive moisture, hail, high winds. Covers project investment costs, including use of borrowed funds Less than 1% Yes. Government pays between 10-45% of premium depending on crop Costa Rica Public Monopoly (Will liberalize by 2008-09 if CAFTA treaty is ratified) Crops and cattle. Note: 90% of coverage is for rice, a “strategic” good. Uncontrollable climatic risk and death of cattle caused by accident or a few specified diseases Cover total or partial losses produced by the risks stated in the policy 2% in 2000 Yes Dominican Republic Public Rice All climatic risks and plant infestations and diseases Covers losses Less than 1% Yes Ecuador Private Banana, cotton, potato, sugar cane, cattle, horses Hail, drought, freezes, excessive moisture, high winds, pests, diseases, livestock death due to sickness, accident, or forced sacrifice Cover losses realized. Less than 1% No Mexico Climate, pests, diseases, livestock death Most crops and most types of livestock Many varieties of contracts offered (some cover production cost, other yield loss, revenue loss) 15% in 2002 Yes Panama Public Rice, corn, vegetables, cattle, horses, Swine, and farm machinery/buildings Climate, pests, disease, livestock disease Covers production costs or market value of equipment. Less than 1% Yes (administrative costs of state provider Paraguay Private Wheat, soybean, corn Hail and fire Covers actual value of actual losses .1% en 2001 No Venezuela Private Covers the difference between average and realized yields. 4% Yes Source: ENESA, 2004 As can be seen from Table 5, the most common type of product offered in Latin America is a multiple peril product that covers natural and biological hazards. In evaluating insuring products, five variables are normally used: commodity coverage (number of products that can be insured); penetration ratio (amount of acreage insured as a share of total cultivated area); participation rate (number of farmers purchasing insurance); loss ratio (indemnities/premiums); and long-term viability (Indemnity Payments +Administrative Cost + Reinsurance Cost+ Capital Reserve Load +Profit)/ Premium <1). The financial performance of single peril products (loss ratio) has been impressive but coverage and farmer participation has limited. In comparison, the financial performance (loss ratio and viability) of multiple peril products has been universally unsatisfactory despite massive public sector subsidies for premiums, operational expenses, and reinsurance. Parametric or index based products, on the other hand, despite noteworthy theoretical features has not been widely attempted and in the few places that it had introduced, acceptance has been limited. It is still a novel product that is seen as plagued with basis risk. The biggest practical success has been the program run by ICICI Lombard-BASIX in India. The program is still very young, three years old, and no rigorous and independent evaluation has taken place. In other areas of the developing world, several pilots are in various stages of development. Examples of Parametric or Index Insurance Index products use any independent random variable measurement that is readily observable, protected from tampering, and is highly correlated with agricultural or livestock losses. Four examples are: 1. Weather based index uses a specific amount of rainfall or a certain number of days with temperatures in a particular range as a trigger. If the trigger is struck a payment is made. In use in Morocco, Mexico, and India. 2. Area yield Index. Uses the average crop yield in a country or particular jurisdiction as a trigger. If an individual farmer has a yield less than the reference average, an indemnity payment is made as a function of the degree of deviation from the norm. In use in the US., India, Brazil, and Quebec, Canada. 3. Satellite Vegetative Index: Satellite images are used to calculate the health of a pasture based on “previous” normal years and payment is made to the rancher based on degree of deviation. In use in Alberta, Canada and Spain. 4. Mortality Rates for Livestock: A yearly census of livestock is used as a reference point to estimate “annual average death rates” from yearly censuses comparing end of year to mid year points. The trigger will be a certain pre-fixed percentage of average mortality. When death rates surpass the “trigger” payments will be made. Under design in Mongolia. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE MARKET DEVELOPMENT The development of agricultural insurance markets as can be seen in the previous exposition is saddled by inertia, lack of actuarial and agriculture specific knowledge, lack of information, and in some cases weak legal and regulatory frameworks. One of the key debates in the promotion of agricultural insurance revolves around the question of the role of public subsidies. This section discusses the pros and cons of subsidies and sets theoretical and practical guidelines for the use of subsidies and delineates the short and medium steps that national donors, donor organizations, insurance companies and farmers should follow to develop a sustainable, broad-based and competitive agricultural insurance markets. The Role and Allocation of Public Subsidies Many industry representatives vehemently claim that agricultural insurance can only be developed with government subsidies for premiums and operational expenses. The traditional argument for government subsidies, especially for premium payments is based on three elements. First, farmers have repeatedly expressed more of an interest in purchasing multiple peril and revenue/income insurance, than single peril or parametric instruments, which are still a novelty. Thus, if a large market is to be developed, as measured by insured area cultivated, value of policies, and number of participants, then the desired types of insurance products must be offered. Second, these two types of products are so costly to deliver to the majority of farmers that government subsidies are required otherwise the charged premiums would be unaffordable and no market or a very small market comprised only of the largest farmers will appear. Third, agrifood sector is too politically sensitive to consign to this quandary of suboptimal risk management due to “market imperfection”. Therefore, on political economy and social benefit grounds, the intervention of the state can be justified to enhance national welfare, otherwise society will suffer the negative effects of fluctuating agricultural supplies and prices, the economic and social dislocations associated with the distressed family families and communities, as well as the probable loss of international competitiveness when foreign producers have access to insurance. According to the proponents of this argument, the three roles that the state can play a role is (1) providing a subsidy directly to farmers to help play for the premium; (2) providing a subsidy to help private insurance companies obtain reinsurance, and (3) providing direct subsidies to private insurance companies in order to help defray the high costs of serving numerous, dispersed, small-scale rural clients. This paper argues that insurance market development does indeed require government assistance and investment but that public subsidies should be more orientated to providing “public goods” that will help lay the foundation for private risk taking and less on providing “income transfers” as occurs when the emphasis is on providing subsidies in the premium in order to make the product more affordable to a larger set of farmers. In the context of fiscally constrained treasuries, public expenditures should be rationalized and allocated to the ends that would generate the highest economic return. Moreover, developing countries have a much larger farm population than developed countries, making the implementation of a comprehensive and broad-based program extremely expensive and failing universal reach, prone to politicization. For example, the farm population (owners/operators) of the U.S. is 2 million out of a total population of 295 million (.6%) whereas the farm population (owners/operators) of Bolivia is 660,000 out of total population of 8 million (8%). The US spends approximately $3 billion on crop insurance subsidies per year or approximately $1500 per each farmer to get 72% of cultivated area covered. Using extrapolation, Bolivia would have to spend $990 million to get significant coverage. Bolivia, however, is a much smaller economy than the U.S. $22.33 billion (PPP est. 2004), vs. 11.75 trillion (PPP est. 2004), meaning that Bolivia would be spending approximately 4% of its GDP on crop insurance subsidies annually, whereas the US is spending .0002% (CIA World Factbook). The question becomes one of cost effectiveness. Given all of the pressing investments needs in such a low-income country as Bolivia, would spending scarce public monies on crop insurance yield a higher rate than on other activities such as rural education, rural roads, potable water, electrification, agricultural research, extension and marketing services? Favored Uses of Public Subsidies to Promote Agricultural Insurance: Public subsidies and monies can and should be used to the following activities: 1. Market Development a. creation and maintenance of information databases including purchase of data and images b. promotion of innovative products and their pilot testing c. training of staff in insurance companies (actuarial sciences, risk modeling, claim adjustments, analysis and familiarization with agricultural commodity markets) d. measurement of farmer’s risk attitudes so that coefficients of risk aversion can be used to setting pricing e. education of farmers on insurance products and contracts f. education of government policy makers on how to create favorable settings for the introduction of insurance products. g. purchase, installation, and maintenance of weather stations h. payment on a permanent or declining basis the cost of broadband internet and satellite connections the entity consolidating the information and transferring it to private users. i. development of sophisticated models of weather phenomena j. acquisition of computers with greater and faster processing capacity. k. acquisition of data storage devices. l. modeling impacts of climate change on precipitation patterns and extreme weather events 2. Legal and Regulatory Reform a. Hiring legal and economic consultants to determine if biases against agricultural insurance products exist in the regulatory framework and to determine the most logical way to remove them without jeopardizing the soundness and solvency of the entire insurance industry. b. Hiring legal and financial sector consultants to help draft laws and regulations c. Educate and train staff responsible for the supervision of the insurance industry d. Help improve contract enforcement and consumer protection mechanisms 3. Reinsurance a. Provide assistance to the local insurance industry in attracting private reinsurers interested in agricultural portfolios b. Provide subsidies to private insurance companies to purchase reinsurance or facilitate in bundling contracts c. Act as a co-reinsurer or direct reinsurer as a last resort 4. Disaster Relief Funds a. Design and financing of disaster preparedness and emergency relief funds aimed at dealing with the consequences of low probability but catastrophic events. b. Use innovative index insurance and bond instruments to transfer catastrophic the risk to international markets Unfavored Uses of Public Subsidies to Promote Crop Insurance In practice, special interest groups mobilize and lobby for a subsidy that benefits them but rarely is it known if the impact would be broader if the scarce public monies were spent on public versus private goods or one particular industry/sector versus another. Recent work by Ramon Lopez suggests that countries that dedicated a greater share of rural public expenditures dedicated to public goods rather than private goods, scored better on variables of policy concern, i.e. growth in agricultural output, reduction in rural poverty, and increase in rural employment (Lopez, 2004). A public subsidy toward the payment of a crop insurance premium is more of a private good than an expenditure on the eradication of an animal disease or investment in a rural university with research, teaching, and extension mandates. In the case of a catastrophe, where the welfare of many has been reduced and it has serious negative externalities, transfers to private individuals are warranted. In general public subsidies should not be used for premium because of a host of implementation problems—identification, sustainability, development effectiveness, efficient targeting, and adverse selection. Theoretically, a case could be made to subsidize only the operational and administrative cost elements in the premium and not the pure risk element, otherwise investment decisions could be skewed to favor riskier crops than would be the case without the subsidy. It would be possible to raise a farm household out of poverty by providing subsidized insurance (Expected Utility with insurance could be concave curve greater than Expected Utility without insurance over a range). The beneficiary household could be placed on a higher income growth trajectory that would get it out of poverty and keep it out of poverty over time. In practice, however, implementation problems loom large. Therefore, it is advisable le to apply scarce public subsidies to market development efforts rather than to private participation incentives. The implementation problems are listed below. First, it is difficult to distinguish between what is the risk element and the other non-risk element in the premium—the identification problem. See the significant differences reported in risk premiums in section 4 using different estimation methodologies. In practice, the subsidy is applied as a percentage of the total premium cost. To be theoretically consistent, one would have to calculate the “pure risk premium” for each policy or product and try to be certain that the correct yield distribution is being used. The additional effort and costs required to correctly “identify” the acceptable subsidy would be costly and even counterproductive. Second, even if the identification problem could be solved, the non-risk elements could easily dwarf the pure risk premium and still signify large fiscal outlays. Overtime, the central government may find it difficult to continue making these outlays and the market will tend to grow only as a function of subsidy availability (sustainability). In practice, one sees start and stop patterns in the data and in several cases it can be traced back to the availability of subsidies, i.e. BANDESA in Honduras and Banco Agrícola-AGODOSA in the Dominican Republic. Third, if the government is interested in pro-poor growth and reducing inequality as rapidly as possible, then a cost-benefit analysis may be warranted to determine how best to allocate scarce public monies. Government authorities should empirically decide whether if subsidizing crop insurance would generate higher rates of return than would the subsidizing other productive support services or investing in infrastructure such as rural roads, rural education, health services, potable water, sanitation, electrification, vocational training, agricultural research, or agricultural extension services (development effectiveness). Fourth, government subsidy programs tend to be captured by the higher income persons unless mean testing or targeting is used. Historically, the subsidy on insurance premiums has tended to be captured by larger farmers in both the developed and developing world (Skees, 2002 and 2005; Goodwin, 2001; Makki, 2001; and Hazell, 1986 and 1992). Differential subsidies can be paid, wherein small can benefit more but this would imply additional administrative costs to identify and verify who is a small farmer. Thus a problem of efficient targeting problem may arise (efficient targeting). Fifth and lastly, subsidies in practice tend to be a palliative for the problem of adverse selection. Insurance companies depend on premium subsidies to grow markets and overcome adverse selection. Without the subsidy, the lower-risk candidates would opt out of the market (Goodwin, 2001; 1993; Makki; 2001; and Just et. al., 1999). In conclusion, it would be advisable to focus scarce public monies on developing the conditions favorable for the emergence of insurance markets and the development of low cost insurance products such as weather and area-yield indexes where the premium would be affordable without the need for a subsidy. Recommendations Fiscally stressed, low-income countries would do best on developing an integrated and layered risk management system and not view crop insurance as a panacea. Crop insurance is but one element in an arsenal of instruments and policies that a government may need to rely on in order to spur agricultural growth, improve agricultural competitiveness, and reduce farm poverty. Adopt an Integrated Risk Management Strategy A “layered risk management strategy” should be followed wherein a series of coordinated and reinforcing activities are pursued. The government, international reinsurance companies, national insurance companies, insurance supervisors, and farmers have to work together. The cornerstone of the strategy is an effective and improved agricultural extension service that helps farmers educate themselves about risk management and to take individual on-farm actions to reduce vulnerability and mitigate risks. 1. Improved Extension Services a. Use improved seed and animal breeds b. Site plots away from flood plains, areas susceptible to land and mudslides, and avoid planting on easily erodible soils. c. Planting on time d. Use soil and water conservation aimed at improving fertility, increasing soil moisture, reducing soil borne diseases, maintaining soil structure, and reducing water run-off e. Use Integrated Pest Management whenever feasible f. Make environmentally sound use of pesticides and herbicides g. Apply fertilizer at the right time and the right amount h. Make greater use of drip irrigation i. Engage in crop diversification and rotational cropping j. Use good animal husbandry practices k. Use intercropping l. Adhere to animal and plant health inspection and control protocols m. Use of custom hire labor and equipment for timely harvest and post-harvest responsibilities Once the farmer has adopted as many of these good management practices as possible, the farmer should try to avail him/herself to formal financial instruments and marketing contracts that are within reach in order to further reduce risk exposure. 2. Financial Market Improvements a. Use of formal savings b. Use of futures, options, sales contracts, guaranteed marketing schemes to control price risk c. Use of single peril insurance for idiosyncratic risks d. Use of area-yield and weather index insurance for non-catastrophic, covariate climatic risks e. Use of multiple peril, income, and revenue insurance products to stabilize income f. Use of reinsurance to lower premium cost and transfer risk outside the country to parties willing to bear it. For risk that is not covered by these financial and market contracting instruments, such as severe earthquakes, massive volcanic eruptions, hurricanes of category 3 or greater intensity, massive flooding etc, the farmer will need to depend on government emergency assistance. 3. Improved Emergency Disaster Relief Systems. a. Non-reimbursable cash payments for immediate survival needs b. Temporary housing and allowances for relocation if necessary c. Distribution of in-kind materials d. Refinancing of existing loans e. Emergency low-interest loans for rebuilding and farm recovery The government, however, should condition the level of assistance on demonstrated prudence and diligence--the adoption of good management practices, avoidance of excessive risk, and the use of formal financial instruments whenever feasible prior to the event. Develop Crop Insurance Markets Sequentially Interested parties should focus on the following sequential activities. First, review of the legal and regulatory framework with particular attention to the following common impediments: (i) Barriers to entry. Foreign companies should be free to enter as long as they are solvent and have a track record. Exclusion of foreign companies and reinsurers impedes the diffusion of technical know-how as well as price competition. (ii) Reserve policies: The amounts that have to set aside for current risks should be consistent with the duration of the agricultural insurance policy and the loadings should not be for a catastrophic level. (iii) Agents: Few restrictions as to who can be an insurance agent capable of selling insurance should apply. i.e. only an individual with specific training. Greater flexibility should be allowed for legal entities such as NGOs, cooperatives, farmer and community associations, and credit granting institutions to affiliate with a recognized insurance and serve as an indirect delivery platform. In the developing rural areas, indirect delivery mechanisms may be preferable to direct mechanisms in order to lower the fixed costs of establishing an extensive branching system. (iv) Recognition of Parametric Instruments as Insurance Products and not as Derivatives: If parametric instruments are governed by capital market security frameworks, parametric instruments may never be widely adopted by farmers. It would be an instrument used primarily by corporations. After a thorough review, steps should be taken to remove biases and to educate insurance market supervisors about recent developments in agricultural insurance. Because agricultural insurance is such a tiny fraction of the total policies, many supervisors are not knowledgeable about this specialty market. Second, construct an information depositary that is easily accessible to insurance companies. The depositary would capture, transform, and clean data relevant to the design and monitoring of insurance products and policies. Information is vital to the measurement and evaluation of risk and is the bedrock of insurance underwriting. To design and price an agricultural insurance product a slew of different type of information is needed. Information systems that capture most, if not all, the above information and organize, clean, standardized, and made it readily available to the general public would greatly reduce the cost that each insurance company must bear at present if it wants to enter into agricultural insurance. By having all the information consolidated in one place and to be confidently cleaned, and transformed, and standardized, would represent a tremendous savings to insurance companies and other interested parties. Starting in the 1990s, public information systems began to appear in Latin America largely financed by international technical cooperation with the express purpose of facilitating better land use planning and land title regularization. These entities capture data from public as well as private sources of information. Once the information is cleaned and transformed it can be placed as layers in geo-referenced data facilitating spatial analysis of the data. More importantly, a wide number of different actors can use the same information for different ends. For example, banks can use the database to check title registrations and existence of liens for loan applicants. A hotel resort developer can search for the ideal location taking into account road access, location of major population centers, weather patterns, and scenic attractions. An insurance company can use the topological, crop use, and weather data and agronomic model to determine exposure to risks and calculate probable losses, i.e. a risk map. In Central America, there are four public information systems. The most advanced being Sistema Nacional de Información Terretorial (SINIT) in Honduras which by law receives data from a number of public agencies and then complements it with information from private sources such as Tela Rail Company and Standard Fruit to maintain a GIS database with over 3,000 layers. Via the web anyone can access the information and download it. The principal users are other government agencies. Other countries in Latin America should emulate this example. Third, finance pilot experiments and support training for staff in the insurance industry. Agricultural insurance requires specialization and since it is an underdeveloped market segment, there are few people in developing countries who dominate all the intricacies. The pilot experiments should strive to develop products that are low-cost to administer, actuarially fair, easy to understand, and attractive to clients. Client participation in the design should be high. Fourth, monitor and evaluate the pilots rigorous and make necessary changes. Fourth, scale-up the experiences that are documented to be successful. Fifth, educate farmers and policy makers about the limits and benefits of insurance. Sixth, invest in and maintain the infrastructure and recurrent activities necessary to support information flows, i.e. weather stations, household surveys, marketing information (volume, price, grade transacted in different places), agricultural censuses, broadband internet infrastructure, aerial photo surveys, obtaining satellite images documenting land use and monitoring in real time of weather systems, improved internet connectivity and affordability, and construction of relational geographic databases. The systems are in Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala and all grew of international cooperation projects to improve land use planning and title registration. Honduras is fully operational and open to the public. El Salvador and Guatemala should be on–line and fully functional within a few months. Bad Practices to Avoid Mandatory Insurance: Governments interested in promoting agricultural insurance policies should shy away from making agricultural insurance mandatory to access credit or guarantee loan programs. The insurance product, accordingly, converts into being “bank insurance” and do not force lenders and insurance companies to adequately measure and evaluate risks. Invariably, the private insurance companies demand backing from government to participate in such schemes or only publicly owned insurance companies would participate. At the end of the day, the government is using a roundabout scheme to guarantee a loan. The challenge is to reduce asymmetric information problems, reduce transaction costs, and increase profitability at the farm level. Premiums Need to Adjust Frequently as New Information Becomes Available: Government run insurance programs tend to be reluctant to adjust premiums from year to year based on loss ratios and new available information out of political sensitivity. Policyholders tend to complain vocally about high premiums. The failure to adjust premium rates undermines program viability. Set Insurance Sale Dates Well in Advance of Harvest Time and Honor Them: Selling insurance policies after closing dates, invites opportunistic behavior. More reliable and accurate information on weather becomes available the closer one gets to planting time. Farmers will use this information to their advantage. They will not buy if the weather forecasts are good leading to low income for the insurance company or they will pay buy if the forecasts are bad, leading to heavy losses for the insurance company. Extending Insurance Coverage to All Regions and Most Crops: For political reasons, many government backed comprehensive agricultural insurance programs seek to extent “affordable” insurance to high-risk areas and to accept all clients regardless of management skills, character, and risk profile. This violates one of the Golden Rules—all risks are not insurable. Either the premiums should be set sufficiently high, active client screening engaged in, or the insurance company should withdraw. Using Third Party Claim Adjusters: The monitoring and claim inspections cannot be delegated to third parties or strategic allies. The staff of the insurance company underwriting the policy should make the physical inspection to verify and make claim adjustments. To use third parties creates the risk of collusion and fraudulent manipulation between the policyholder and the third party. CONCLUSION Agricultural insurance is a complex and difficult product to deliver in a sustainable manner. In the region, the agricultural insurance market is nascent but there are encouraging signs. More and more policymakers and farmers recognize the need for more modern risk management systems in order to stabilize incomes, prevent asset depletion, and to enhance competitiveness. Traditional risk management systems sometimes are not sufficiently robust to deal with the vagaries of weather and disease and as a result these uncontrollable events cause significant economic losses that negatively affect households, communities, and government themselves. Nonetheless, yield insurance must be kept in perspective. It should not be seen as a substitute for unprofitable farms, failures of farm management, changes in technology innovations, market access, disaster aid, or government policies that suddenly affect the rate of return. Neither should the provision of insurance be seen as a sufficient condition in order to improve agricultural competitiveness. If other necessary investments are not made in rural infrastructure, market information systems, and production support services, competitiveness will not improve. Insurance, however, can be beneficial in improving access to credit by serving as a guarantee against involuntary default. On the other hand, insurance policies should not be made a mandatory condition to access credit because invariably such a dictum undermines both the bank’s and insurance company’s capacity to evaluate creditworthiness, measure risk, and assess farmer management capacity. Some farmers may have adequate on-farm risk management strategies and will be forced to bear additional financial costs in order to access credit. Many others will have no incentives to engage in on-farm risk management activities and will increase the loss probabilities of the insurance company. Markets that evolve spontaneously and are based on solid fundamentals tend to be deeper and more efficient in the long-run, i.e. Mexico since 1990 vs. state banks in Honduras and the Dominican Republic that depend on mandatory purchase of insurance in order to access credit. Last but not least, developing countries should not convert crop insurance into an entitlement or disguised income transfer tool. Many do not have the economic wherewithal and it would be more advisable to keep insurance as a risk management tool. In developing agricultural insurance markets, the role of governments is crucial. An action agenda was laid out—adjusting legal and regulatory frameworks, if necessary; developing public information depositaries easily accessible by insurance companies and others; training staff; educating farmers, policymakers, and superintendents; conducting pilot experiments; scaling-up activities; designing catastrophic disaster relief programs that do not undermine incentives to undertake on-farm risk management activities and/or to purchase formal insurance---that could serve as a model for operations. Moreover, it was argued that in this model, all public money should be spend on creating public goods and sustaining favorable conditions and not necessarily on subsidizing the insurance premium. The principal reasons for this allocation are based on efficiency and sustainability. Several different types of insurance products were reviewed—single peril, multiple peril, parametric, and revenue--- and their respective strengths and weaknesses were noted. Regardless of the product, the guiding criteria for design and implementation of products should be based on achieving the lowest administrative cost possible, pricing for actuarial soundness, fostering transparency, and maintaining affordability. A tradeoff, however, does seem to exist between actuarially fair crop insurance schemes and the limited financial means of farmers in developing countries. Farmers prefer individual, multiple risk coverage but an actuarially fair premium would be unaffordable for most. Parametric products (indexes based on area yield averages or weather triggers) are less costly but imply basis risk and would be attractive to less risk adverse farmers. The historical record for writing multiple peril products is generally unsatisfactory and great caution should be exercised in expanding these products unless historical data exist that would permit reliable loss estimations and actuarially sound premiums are charged (UNCTAD, 1995; Hazell, 1992, Just, et. al, 1999). Greater emphasis and government support should be given immediately to developing information systems, modeling yield losses, quantifying degrees of risk aversion, determining better fits between individual losses and aggregate triggers so that less costly insurance schemes can be introduced that are attractive and of interest to low-income farmers. In the short- to medium-term, more attention should be paid to promoting better on-farm risk reducing and risk coping strategies through better extension services and the use of single peril and parametric products. Much work remains to be done to further develop agricultural insurance in Latin America and the Caribbean. Ripe areas for research and pilots include eliciting farmer risk attitudes, blending crop insurance with other financial products; using modern information technology to reduce costs; better modeling and understanding of weather phenomena and the impact of climate change; and improving reinsurance capabilities.

03.01.2007

Managing Agricultural Production Risk - Innovations in Developing Countries

Managing Agricultural Production Risk - Innovations in Developing CountriesWorld Bank - Ulrich Hess, Jerry Skees, Andrea Stoppa, Barry Barnett, John NashProgress is being made in creating risk transfer markets for weather events in developing and emerging economies. While this document introduces several sources of risk that create poverty traps for poor households and that impede the development process, the focus is on low-probability, high-consequence weather risk events as they relate to rural households. These types of risks are highly correlated and require special financing and access to global markets to pool the risk and make them more diversifiable, improving the pricing. Thus, a significant contribution of this document is the introduction of index insurance and highlighting how it can be used at the micro-, meso-, and macro-levels for risk transfer. In particular, using index insurance products, it is possible to organize systems to take advantage of global markets and transfer out of developing countries the correlated risks associated with low-probability, high-consequence events. This document presents both a conceptual backdrop for understanding how this can be done and also a progress report on several World Bank efforts to assist countries in using limited government resources to facilitate market-based agricultural risk transfer for natural disasters. While global markets that provide reinsurance for natural disasters are both large and growing, they rarely have an interest in taking such risk from developing and emerging economies. In part this is because primary insurance markets are weak in developing countries. Before agreeing to provide reinsurance, global reinsurers engage in due diligence investigations of primary insurers and the risks the primary insurers wish to transfer. Compared to traditional insurance products, index insurance has far fewer hidden information and hidden action problems. This reduces the reinsurers due diligence and underwriting costs and makes it more likely that they will be interested in accepting natural disaster risk from new insurance providers in developing countries. Nonetheless, natural disaster losses can be significant, and carefully crafted ways to finance such losses are also critical preconditions for shifting the risk into global markets. Innovation in pooling these risks globally may also facilitate the transfer of natural disaster risk from developing countries. For full version of the report please download the document (PDF, 700 kB) The World Bank Agriculture and Rural Development Department June 2005 Progress is being made in creating risk transfer markets for weather events in developing and emerging economies. While this document introduces several sources of risk that create poverty traps for poor households and that impede the development process, the focus is on low-probability, high-consequence weather risk events as they relate to rural households. These types of risks are highly correlated and require special financing and access to global markets to pool the risk and make them more diversifiable, improving the pricing. Thus, a significant contribution of this document is the introduction of index insurance and highlighting how it can be used at the micro-, meso-, and macro-levels for risk transfer. In particular, using index insurance products, it is possible to organize systems to take advantage of global markets and transfer out of developing countries the correlated risks associated with low-probability, high-consequence events. This document presents both a conceptual backdrop for understanding how this can be done and also a progress report on several World Bank efforts to assist countries in using limited government resources to facilitate market-based agricultural risk transfer for natural disasters. While global markets that provide reinsurance for natural disasters are both large and growing, they rarely have an interest in taking such risk from developing and emerging economies. In part this is because primary insurance markets are weak in developing countries. Before agreeing to provide reinsurance, global reinsurers engage in due diligence investigations of primary insurers and the risks the primary insurers wish to transfer. Compared to traditional insurance products, index insurance has far fewer hidden information and hidden action problems. This reduces the reinsurers due diligence and underwriting costs and makes it more likely that they will be interested in accepting natural disaster risk from new insurance providers in developing countries. Nonetheless, natural disaster losses can be significant, and carefully crafted ways to finance such losses are also critical preconditions for shifting the risk into global markets. Innovation in pooling these risks globally may also facilitate the transfer of natural disaster risk from developing countries. One global innovation currently being prepared by the World Bank and European Commission involves a Global Index Insurance Facility (GIIF). The GIIF will have three functions that are targeted at helping developing country insurance providers build capacity: 1) supporting the technical assistance and infrastructure that are needed to develop index insurance using quality data; 2) aggregating and pooling risk from different developing countries to allow for improved pricing and risk transfer into the global reinsurance and capital markets; and 3) co-financing certain insurance products on a bi-lateral basis from donor to developing country. Importantly, the third function will be separate from the commercial activity represented in functions 1 and 2. A global effort to facilitate these three functions could represent a major breakthrough for developing countries that are exposed to extreme natural disaster risk. Another promising realm of innovation is in the development of improved technology to both measure weather and to link weather and farming systems together to forecast crop yields. Improved and less costly systems for measuring weather events in developing countries will play a significant role in the potential success of many of the ideas presented in this document. Secure and accurate measurement will influence both the pricing of index insurance and the demand from end users. Improvements in measuring the vegetative cover with satellite images and then forecasting the value of that vegetation either in terms of crop yields or grazing value could enhance the type of index insurance products that are made available in developing countries. Additionally, more sophisticated crop models that link weather, management systems, and soil can be used to provide insurance products that protect against the dominant random variable in production — the weather. There are numerous reasons why risk transfer out of developing countries is important. Natural disasters impede the development process, push households into poverty, and drain fiscal resources of developing countries. Many of these natural disasters are directly tied to extreme weather events. Bad weather events have devastating impacts on agriculture. Of the 1.3 billion people in the world who are living on less than US$1 per day, nearly three-fourths depend on agriculture for their livelihood. In many countries around the world, agricultural development will still clear the way for overall economic development of the broader economy. There is a strong link between weather, the livelihoods of the poor, and development. Yet, there is a void in effective ex ante solutions for weather risks in developing countries. Instead, developing countries, the World Bank, and the donor community are currently heavily exposed to natural disaster risk via ex post responses such as financial bailouts, debt forgiveness, and emergency response. None of these responses are optimal. They fail to provide an effective safety net for the poor; they can be inequitable, untimely, and create a dependency that has dire consequences. If planning for, and financing of, extreme weather events occurs ex ante, access to both formal and informal lending should improve. As broader financial services become more accessible to the rural poor, newer technologies will be used and improvements in productivity and incomes should follow. Farmers around the world utilize various risk coping and risk management strategies. However, many of these strategies are inefficient. The economic development literature is full of cases to illustrate how risk-averse, poor farmers often give up potentially higher incomes to reduce their exposure to risk. Both individual households and the larger society incur costs for smoothing consumption across income shocks. In many cases, the poor must resort to paying high interest rates for loans after a major income shock. Some argue that the poor cannot afford to purchase ex ante insurance protection against extreme weather events. However, the widespread use of ex post loans suggests otherwise. The challenge remains of how to make insurance against extreme weather events both more effective and affordable. Two major challenges obstruct the development of risk transfer markets for agricultural losses caused by extreme weather events: 1) organizing ex ante financing for highly correlated losses that result in extremely large financial exposure; and, 2) high transaction costs due to asymmetric information problems such as moral hazard and adverse selection. The latter also makes it nearly impossible to provide traditional agricultural insurance for small farmers given large fixed transaction costs. This greatly increases the average cost, per monetary unit, of insurance protection for smallholder agriculture. Unfortunately, there are few successful examples to consider. Governments in developed countries have provided heavily subsidized crop insurance that is both costly and questionable in terms of net social welfare. In addition to these challenges, traditional agricultural insurance markets often generate low levels of purchase because the potential insurance purchasers’ willingness to pay for the insurance contract is less than the insurers’ willingness to accept. Researchers frequently find that economic decision makers underestimate the likelihood and/or magnitude of low-probability, high-consequence loss events. This reduces their willingness to pay for insurance that protects against these events. At the same time, because they have little empirical information about the likelihood and/or magnitude of extreme events, insurers tend to add large extra costs to premium rates for insurance products that protect against low-probability, high-consequence loss events. This divergence between what potential purchasers are willing to pay, and what insurers are willing to accept, causes agricultural insurance markets to clear at less than socially optimal quantities of risk transfer. New conceptual models are being developed to facilitate the transfer of extreme weather risk out of developing countries. This document reports on the progress of several ongoing efforts of the Commodity Risk Management Group (CRMG) at the World Bank that have been motivated by these models. All of these efforts are built on the premise that index-based insurance products can effectively address both the challenge of ex ante financing of highly correlated losses and the challenge of high transaction costs. Index insurance products pay indemnities based on an independent measure that is highly correlated with realized losses. Unlike traditional crop insurance that attempts to measure individual farm yields, index insurance makes use of variables that are largely exogenous to the individual policyholder, such as area yield, or weather events, such as temperature or rainfall. This feature greatly reduces the need for deductibles and copayments since there is very little exposure to asymmetric information problems such as moral hazard and adverse selection. Because there is no need for farm-level loss adjustment, index insurance products also have lower transaction costs than traditional agricultural insurance products. Purchasers of index insurance products are exposed to basis risk. Since index insurance indemnities are triggered not by farm-level losses but rather by the value of an independent measure (the index), it is possible for a policyholder to experience a loss and yet receive no indemnity. Conversely, it is possible for the policyholder to not experience a loss and yet, receive an indemnity. The effectiveness of index insurance as a risk management tool depends on how positively correlated farm-level losses are with the underlying index. Importantly, since farmers have incentives to continue to produce or try to save their crops and livestock, even during bad weather events, index insurance should provide for a more efficient allocation of resources. Since they are standardized and transparent, index insurance products can also function as reinsurance instruments that transfer the risk of widespread correlated agricultural production losses. To the extent that institutions can be created to aggregate and pool the low-probability, high-consequence tail risk that results from writing insurance on these events, the divergence between insurers’ willingness to accept and potential purchasers’ willingness to pay should decrease, causing the market to clear at high quantities of risk transfer. This document is written to inform a broad range of decision makers about progress that is being made in risk transfer for natural disaster risk. While the focus is on agriculture, obviously many of the same concepts can be used for other sectors that are exposed to natural disaster risk. Two basic innovations dominate the conceptual framework: 1) use of index-based insurance; and 2) layering risk to facilitate risk transfer. In many cases, individuals will self-insure against the layer of risk that is composed of high probability, low-consequence losses. Some form of government intervention may be required to achieve higher levels of risk transfer in the layer of risk that is composed of low-probability, high-consequence losses. Between these two extremes is a layer of risk that, with appropriate risk transfer and pooling structures, can be transferred using market mechanisms. Since catastrophe risks (CAT risks) are one of the impediments to market development, a framework for government action in the management of agricultural risk that includes models for government intermediation of catastrophic risk through Government Disaster Options for CAT Risk (DOC) has been developed, proposing that governments buy index-based catastrophic risk coverage in international markets and offer them at rates that are lower than global market rates to local insurers who would pass these savings on to end users in developing countries. This would mitigate large loss/infrequent risks that are usually difficult and expensive to reinsure in traditional reinsurance markets, and would ultimately allow local insurers to cover more people against the extreme risks in an ex ante fashion. Several case studies are presented to illustrate how these concepts are being applied in countries around the world. While the specifics vary based on the needs of each country, all of the cases involve the use of index insurance and/or layering of risk to facilitate risk transfer. The final chapter of this document describes potential future roles for the World Bank in the area of agricultural risk management. This document presents innovations in agricultural risk management for natural disaster risk, with the focus on defining practical roles for governments of developing countries and the World Bank in developing risk management strategies. Recent success stories demonstrate that the World Bank can play a role assisting countries with effective actions that use limited government resources to facilitate market-based agricultural risk transfer. This is important, as developing countries, the World Bank, and the donor community are currently heavily exposed to natural disaster risk without the benefit of ex ante structures to finance losses. Instead, at each big drought or other natural disaster, there is an appeal for financial support, leaving the vulnerable to the mercy of ad hoc responses from government, the international financial institutions, and donors. In most developing countries, livelihoods are not insured by international insurance/reinsurance providers, capital markets, or even government budgets. In addition, natural disasters and price risk in agriculture also impede development of both formal and informal banking. Without access to credit, risk-averse poor farmers are locked in poverty with old technology and an inefficient allocation of resources. Advances in risk transfer in developed countries are leading the way to solving many social problems. Shiller (2003) documents progress, and charts a course for far more innovation as the democratization of finance and technology spur global risk pooling. Financial and reinsurance markets in developed countries are rapidly developing index-based instruments that allow for the transfer of systemic risks and even livelihood risks. Innovations in risk transfer for natural disasters have been well documented (Doherty, 1997; Skees, 1999b). The challenge is to make these innovations relevant in developing countries and facilitate knowledge and access. Is the absence of formal risk transfer from natural disasters in developing countries inevitable? Clearly not; there are formal global markets for offsetting natural disaster risks and weather risks that are widely used in developed countries.3 This document demonstrates how these markets can be used to insure natural disaster risk in developing countries. Agricultural sectors in developing countries are much more exposed to the vagaries of weather than are those of richer countries, so this protection would be even more valuable to them. Is it a luxury to offer insurance to poor people who lack proper roads or even safe drinking water? Priorities must be set for any government. Careful consideration of the benefits and costs of different interventions is critical. Still, the poor are forced to make production decisions with the objective of minimizing risk, rather than maximizing profits, foregoing more remunerative activities that could provide an escape from poverty. An effective and timely insurance mechanism might allow people to engage in higher risk/higher return activities without putting their livelihoods at risk. Spurring development via improved financial markets is an important activity in developing countries. Are there any effective precedents for agricultural insurance mechanisms in developing countries? While these innovations are just taking hold, progress has been made with weather insurance for farmers in India, Ukraine, Nicaragua, Malawi, Ethiopia, and Mexico. Several other experiments are also documented in this work. Weather-insured farmers in India say they either have a good crop — in which case it does not matter if they do not recoup the insurance premium — or they have a monsoon failure, in which case they receive an insurance payout. This will at least cover their cash outlays and perhaps some extra money that allows them to keep children in school and preserve assets that otherwise would have to be liquidated at greatly reduced prices. These farmers will be likely to invest a little more in the right seeds and fertilizer at the right time. Quantifying this impact is difficult right now, but a large impact assessment will soon provide more information. It is clear already that when offered the choice, many farmers will pay for fully priced weather insurance in India. Even farmers who have access to the government-subsidized crop insurance product choose to buy the market-priced weather insurance product. They say they like the objective nature of the weather index; they can go and check the weather station measurements themselves. They also like the timely payout. Indeed, on this count, the new rainfall index insurance that pays on a timely basis compares favorably to the national crop insurance product that might pay after 18 months. Is this only for large commercial farmers? One true advantage of weather insurance is that it can be targeted to small farmers as no monitoring is needed to verify farm-level losses. The Indian experience demonstrates that small farmers find value in weather insurance. BASIX (a microfinance entity in Andhra Pradesh) estimates that all of the 427 farmers who bought weather insurance policies in 2003 are small and medium-sized farmers with 2-10 acres of land and an average yearly income of 15,000-30,000 Rupees, or between US$1 and US$2 per day. Currently, many of those buying weather insurance in India are repeat customers. Clearly, these farmers were not too poor to buy the product. Early survey results demonstrate that over one-half list managing risk as the number one reason for buying the insurance. Some farmers might have chosen this new insurance option over the prospect of having to turn to a high interest money lender when cash is needed after a harvest failure. Is this sustainable? Now that the pilot program in India is in its third year, other insurance companies have replicated and sold the product, and BASIX has mainstreamed the weather insurance product and automated delivery to an expected 8,000 clients for the 2005 season. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America are starting their own weather insurance projects at micro-and macro-levels. For example, weather insurance-based drought emergency responses are being piloted in Ethiopia. Furthermore, weather insurance seems to be a good business. The Indian weather insurance program has emerged without the support of government subsidies. The Commodity Risk Management Group (CRMG) of the World Bank has advised those who were ready, to try these new approaches to agricultural risk management. How can this be operationalized in the World Bank and elsewhere? Task managers and practitioners may have a desire to follow this work with potential projects — but how does one get started? This document presents ideas on how to begin with a solid framework of action. There are important public goods that governments and the World Bank could provide: for example, weather stations and risk financing for catastrophic protection. Governments in drought-prone countries, and donors and relief agencies, should also be aware of the potential for other kinds of projects using risk management markets to improve the response to weather-related shocks. This document explores how current ad hoc disaster relief mechanisms can be modified and complemented by a more systematic response to recurrent droughts. In assessing proper roles for government, one must first consider the economic benefits that can be created by risk management tools, the characteristics of risks faced by farmers in a specific area, and the challenges associated with creating and maintaining risk management tools such as insurance. In general, there is no “one-size-fits-all” policy recommendation for the role of government in agricultural risk management. We assume that most governments consider at least four criteria when considering alternatives for addressing agricultural risk management needs: 1) fiscal constraint; 2) growth; 3) market-oriented risk-transfer; and 4) the social goal to reduce poverty and vulnerability in rural areas. Chapter 2 of the document begins with an overview of risk and how decision makers currently cope with and manage risk in developing countries, and also carefully examines the impediments to developing effective risk transfer markets. High transaction costs, problems with correlated risk, and the classic problems of moral hazard and adverse selection clearly increase the cost of traditional insurance. Chapter 3 reviews in detail the experience of some developed countries. A clear message about the government cost and inefficiencies of these systems further supports the need for finding new solutions for developing countries. The stark contrast between what is possible in a developed country versus a developing country motivates a search for new solutions. Chapter 4 gives insight into alternative solutions that might be possible by introducing the concept of weather index insurance that insures against weather events that create serious agricultural losses. This chapter highlights the advantages of such systems for a developing country. Chapter 5 brings together two core innovations: 1) the use of index insurance to insure against detrimental weather events with significantly lower monitoring costs; and 2) the use of layering insurance products to segment risk in a more efficient fashion allowing for risk transfer of correlated risk. These innovations provide a rich framework for introducing new approaches for risk sharing and risk transfer in developing countries, and outline an effective role for the World Bank and other donors in this important domain of natural hazard risk management. Chapter 6 provides an overview of a number of pilot programs and case studies for countries that are ongoing. Finally Chapter 7 makes recommendations for the role of the World Bank and country governments in facilitating the development of innovation in agricultural risk management. DEVELOPED COUNTRY APPROACHES TO AGRICULTURAL RISK To better understand agricultural risk management markets and government policies to facilitate access to risk management instruments, it is worthwhile to critically analyze the experiences of some developed countries. The experiences of the United States, Canada, and Spain are described for reference purposes, but it is important to understand why these systems may not be replicable or suitable in most developing countries. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that many developed countries have more involved market support and income transfer programs that extend well beyond crop insurance. To the extent that these more complex programs are based on farm income, they also involve levels of protection for severe crop failures. The European community has extensive policies that focus on income protection. CROP INSURANCE PROGRAMS IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES This section presents overviews of agricultural risk management programs in three developed countries: the United States, Canada, and Spain. These countries have been able to implement substantial programs to reduce yield and revenue risk for agricultural producers. While these programs offer a variety of risk management products for farmers, the programs also require significant government support that is not feasible for most countries. The United States In the United States, multiple-peril yield and revenue insurance products are offered through the Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP), which is a public/private partnership between the federal government and various private-sector insurance companies.10 The program seeks to address both social welfare and economic efficiency objectives. With regard to social welfare, the private companies that sell federal crop insurance policies may not refuse to sell insurance to any eligible farmer — regardless of past loss history. At the same time, the program aims to be actuarially sound. Policies are available for over 100 commodities but in 2004 just four crops — corn, soybeans, wheat, and cotton — accounted for approximately 79 percent of the US$4 billion in total premiums. Excluding pasture, rangeland, and forage, approximately 72 percent of the national crop acreage is currently insured under the FCIP. About 73 percent of total premiums are for revenue insurance policies, while 25 percent are for yield insurance policies. Most FCIP policies trigger indemnities at the farm (or even sub-farm) level. Yield insurance offers are based on a rolling 4-10–year average yield known as the Actual Production History (APH) yield. The federal government provides farmers with a base catastrophic yield insurance policy, free of any premium costs. Farmers may then choose to purchase, at federally subsidized prices, additional insurance coverage beyond the catastrophic level. This additional coverage, often called “buy-up” coverage, may be either yield or revenue insurance. Farm-level revenue insurance offers are based on the product of the APH yield and a price index that reflects national price movements for the particular commodity. Area-yield and/or area-revenue buy-up insurance policies are offered through the FCIP for some crops and regions. The areas for these policies are defined along county boundaries. On a per acre insured basis, area-level insurance products tend to be less expensive than farm-level insurance products. Thus, in 2004, area-yield and area-revenue policies accounted for 7.4 percent of total acreage insured but less than 3 percent of total premiums. The federal government also provides a reinsurance mechanism that allows insurance companies to determine (within certain bounds) which policies they will retain and which they will cede to the government. This arrangement is referred to as the standard reinsurance agreement (SRA). The SRA is quite complex with both quota-share reinsurance and stop losses by state and insurance pool, however, in essence, it allows the private insurance companies to adversely select against the government. This is considered necessary since the companies do not establish premium rates or underwriting guidelines but are required to sell policies to all eligible farmers. There are four components of federal costs associated with the U.S. program: 1. Federal premium subsidies range from 100 percent of total premium for catastrophic (CAT) policies to 38 percent of premium for buy-up policies at the highest coverage levels. Across all FCIP products and coverage levels, the average premium subsidy in 2004 was 59 percent of total premiums. 2. The federal government reimburses administrative and operating expenses for the private insurance companies that sell and service FCIP policies. This reimbursement is approximately 22 percent of total premiums. 3. The SRA has an embedded federal subsidy with an expected value of about 14 percent of total premiums. 4. The program, by law, is allowed to be called actuarially sound at a loss ratio of 1.075. This implies an additional federal subsidy of 7.5 percent of total premiums. On average, the federal government pays approximately 70 percent of the total cost for the FCIP. Farmer paid premiums account for only about 30 percent of the total cost. While the direct-farmer subsidy varies by coverage level, the U.S. has consistently passed legislation to increase the subsidy level to farmers for crop and revenue insurance products. The rate of subsidy is one component that has influenced the growth in overall premium. Figure 3.1 clearly shows that the growth in premium subsidy is greater than the growth in farmer paid premiums. The rate of subsidy was increased in 1995 and 2001. Canada In 2003 Canada revised its agricultural risk management programs. The “Business Risk Management” element of the new Agricultural Policy Framework (APF) is composed of two main schemes: Production Insurance and Income Stabilization. The Production Insurance (PI) scheme offers producers a variety of multiple-peril production or production value loss products that are similar to many of those sold in the United States. One major distinction, however, is that the Canadian program is marketed, delivered, and serviced entirely and jointly by federal and provincial government entities, although it is the provincial authorities who are ultimately responsible for insurance provision. This allows provinces some leeway in tailoring products to fit their regions and to offer additional products. Production insurance plans are offered for over 100 different crops, and provisions have been made to include plans for livestock losses as well. Crop insurance plans are available, based on individual yields (or production value in the case of certain items, such as stone-fruits) or area-based yields. Unlike the U.S. program, Canadian producers are not allowed to separately insure different parcels, but rather must insure together all parcels of a given crop type. This means that low yields on one parcel may be offset by high yields on another parcel when determining whether or not an overall production loss has occurred. Insurance can also be purchased for loss of quality, unseeded acreage, replanting, spot loss, and emergency works. The latter coverage is a loss mitigation benefit meant to encourage producers to take actions that reduce the magnitude of crop damage caused by an insured peril. Cost sharing between the federal government and each province for the entire insurance program is to be fixed at 60:40, respectively, by 2006. However, federal subsidies as a percentage of premium costs vary from 60 percent for catastrophic loss policies to 20 percent for low deductible production coverage. Combined, federal and provincial governments cover approximately 66 percent of program costs, including administrative costs. This is roughly equivalent to the percentage of total program costs borne by the federal government in the United States program. Provincial authorities are responsible for the solvency of their insurance portfolio. In Canada, the federal government competes with private reinsurance firms by offering deficit financing agreements to provincial authorities. Beginning in 2004, the Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization (CAIS) scheme replaced and integrated former income stabilization programs. CAIS is based on the producer production margin, where a margin is “allowable farm income,” that includes proceeds from production insurance, minus “allowable (direct production) expenses.” The program generates a payment when a producer’s current year production margin falls below that producer’s reference margin, which is based on an average of the program’s previous five-year margins, less the highest and lowest. One important feature of CAIS is that producers must participate in the program with their own resources. In particular, a producer is required to open a CAIS account at a participating financial institution and deposit an amount based on the level of protection chosen (coverage levels go from 70 percent to 100 percent of the “reference margin”). Once producers file their income tax returns, the CAIS program administration uses the tax information to calculate the producer’s program year production margin. If the program year margin has declined below the reference margin, some of the funds from producers’ CAIS account will be available for withdrawal. Governments match the producers’ withdrawals in different proportions for different coverage levels. The total investment by federal and provincial governments for the “business risk management” programs is CAN$1.8 billion per year. In 2004 around CAN$600 million were provided by governments as insurance premium subsidies. Spain The Spanish agricultural insurance system is structured around an established public/private partnership. On the public side is the National Agricultural Insurance Agency (ENESA) that coordinates the system and manages resources for subsidizing insurance premiums, and the Insurance Compensation Agency (Consorcio de Compensación de Seguros) that, together with private reinsurers, provides reinsurance for the agricultural insurance market. Local governments are involved only to the extent that they are allowed to augment premium subsidies offered at the national level. On the private side, insurance contracts are sold by Agroseguro, a coinsurance pool of companies that aggregates all insurance companies active in agriculture. Farmers, insurers, and institutional representatives are all part of a general commission hosted by ENESA that functions as the managing board of the Spanish agricultural insurance system. Similar to the United States and Canada, insurance policies offered cover multiple perils in a combined program. Policies are available for crops, livestock, and aquaculture activities, with these risks being pooled across the country by Agroseguro. Unlike the United States and Canada, farmer associations are more actively involved in implementation and development of agricultural insurance. Government has reserves to cover extreme losses, and as a final resort, the government treasury is used to cover losses that may occur beyond these reserves. Total premiums for agriculture insurance policies purchased reached around US$550 million (?490 million) in 2003, of which approximately US$225 million (?200 million) have been provided by the government (Burgaz 2004). The rationale for subsidizing agricultural insurance is that it will serve as a disincentive for the government to also provide free ad hoc disaster assistance. To reinforce the point, Spanish producers are not eligible for disaster payments for perils for which insurance is offered. For non-covered perils, ad hoc disaster payments are available, but only if the producer had already purchased agricultural insurance for covered perils. WHY THE EXPERIENCE OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES IS NOT A GOOD MODEL FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES There are various reasons for developing countries to avoid adopting approaches to risk management similar to the ones adopted in developed countries. Clearly, developing countries have more limited fiscal resources than developed countries. Even more importantly, the opportunity cost of those limited fiscal resources may be significantly greater than those of a developed country. Thus, it is critical for a developing country to consider carefully how much support is appropriate and how to leverage limited government dollars to spur insurance markets. In developed countries, government risk management programs are as much about income transfers as they are about risk management. Developing countries cannot afford to facilitate similar income transfers to large segments of the population who may be engaged in farming. Nonetheless, since a larger percentage of the population in developing countries is typically involved in agricultural production or related industries, catastrophic agricultural losses will have a much greater impact on GDP than in developed countries. Policy makers should also carefully consider the structural characteristics of agriculture for different countries. In general, farms in developing countries are significantly smaller than farms in countries like the United States and Canada. For traditional crop insurance products, smaller farms typically imply higher administrative costs as a percentage of total premiums. A portion of these costs are related to marketing and servicing (loss adjustment) insurance policies. Another portion is related to the lack of farm-level data and cost effective mechanisms for controlling moral hazard. Developing countries also have far less access to global crop reinsurance markets than do developed countries. Reinsurance contracts typically involve high transaction costs related to due-diligence. Reinsurers must understand every aspect of the specific insurance products being reinsured (for example, underwriting, contract design, ratemaking, and adverse selection and moral hazard controls). Some minimum volume of business, or the prospect for strong future business, must be present to rationalize incurring these largely fixed transaction costs. The enabling environment to gain confidence in contract enforcement and the institutional regulatory environment are critical to create trust that must be present for a global reinsurer to become involved. These components are largely missing in developing countries. In fact, a prerequisite for effective and efficient insurance markets is an enabling environment. Setting rules assuring that premiums will be collected and that indemnities will be paid is not a trivial undertaking. In this respect, the alternative risk management products discussed in Chapter 5 are structured to overcome many of these problems. INNOVATION IN MANAGING PRODUCTION RISK: INDEX INSURANCE INDEX INSURANCE ALTERNATIVES Given the problems with some traditional crop insurance programs in developed countries, it has been critical to search for new solutions that would mitigate several aspects of the problems outlined above. Index insurance products offer some potential to this end (Skees et al. 1999). Index insurance products are contingent claims contracts that are less susceptible to some of the problems that plague multiple-peril farm-level crop insurance products. With index insurance products, payments are based on an independent measure that is highly correlated with farm-level yield or revenue outcomes. Unlike traditional crop insurance that attempts to measure individual farm yields or revenues, index insurance makes use of variables that are exogenous to the individual policyholder — such as area-level yield, or some objective weather event such as temperature or rainfall — but have a strong correlation to farm level losses. For most insurance products a precondition for insurability is that the loss for each exposure unit be uncorrelated (Rejda, 2001). For index insurance, a precondition is that risk be spatially correlated. When yield losses are spatially correlated, index insurance contracts can be an effective alternative to traditional farm-level crop insurance. Index products also facilitate risk transfer into financial markets where investors acquire index contracts as another investment in a diversified portfolio. In fact, index contracts may offer significant diversification benefits, since the returns should be generally uncorrelated with returns from traditional debt and equity markets. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF AN INDEX The underlying index used for an index insurance product must be correlated with yield or revenue outcomes for farms across a large geographic area. In addition, the index must satisfy a number of additional properties that affect the degree of confidence or trust that market participants have that the index is believable, reliable, and void of human manipulation; that is, that measurement risk for the index is low (Ruck 1999). The properties for a suitable index are that the random variable being measured is: 1. observable and easily measured, 2. objective, 3. transparent, 4. independently verifiable, 5. able to be reported in a timely manner (Turvey 2002; Ramamurtie 1999), and 6. stable and sustainable over time. Publicly available measures of weather variables generally satisfy these properties. For weather indexes, the units of measurement should convey meaningful information about the state of the weather variable during the contract period, and are often shaped by the needs and conventions of market participants. Indexes are frequently cumulative measures of precipitation or temperature over a period of time. In some applications, average precipitation or temperature measures are used instead of cumulative measures. New innovations in technology, including the availability of low-cost weather monitoring stations that can be placed in many locations and sophisticated satellite imagery, will expand the number of locations where weather variables can be measured, and also the types of measurable variables. Measurement redundancy and automated instrument calibration further increase the credibility of an index. The terminology used to describe features of index insurance contracts is more like that used for futures and options contracts rather than that used for other insurance contracts. For example, rather than referring to the threshold where payments begin as a trigger, index contracts typically refer to it as a strike. They also pay in increments called ticks. Consider a contract that is being written to protect against deficient cumulative rainfall during a cropping season (for example, see Figure 4.1). The writer of the contract may choose to make a fixed payment for every 1 mm of rainfall below the strike. If an individual purchases a contract where the strike is 100 mm of rain and the limit is 50 mm, the amount of payment for each tick would be a function of how much liability is purchased. There are 50 ticks between the 100 mm strike and 50 mm limit. Thus, if $50,000 of liability were purchased, the payment for each 1 mm below 100 mm would be equal to $50,000/ (100-50), or $1,000. Once the tick and the payment for each tick are known, the indemnity payments are easy to calculate. For example, if the realized rainfall is 90 mm, there are 10 ticks of payment at $1,000 each; the indemnity payment will equal $10,000. Figure 4.1 maps the payout structure for a hypothetical $50,000 rainfall contract with a strike of 100 mm and a limit of 50 mm. In developed countries, index contracts that protect against unfavorable weather events are now sufficiently well developed that some standardized contracts are traded in exchange markets. These exchange-traded contracts are used primarily by firms in the energy sector. However, the range of weather phenomena that can potentially be insured using index contracts appears to be limited only by imagination and the ability to parameterize the event. A few examples include excess or deficient precipitation during different times of the year, insufficient or damaging wind, tropical weather events such as typhoons, various measures of air temperature, measures of sea surface temperature, El Niño- Southern Oscillation (ENSO) that are tied to El Niño and La Niña, and even celestial weather events such as disruptive geomagnetic radiation from solar flare activity. Contracts are also designed for a combination of weather events, such as snow and temperature (Dischel 2001; Ruck 1999). The potential for the use of index insurance products in agriculture is significant (Skees 2001). A major challenge in designing an index insurance product is minimizing basis risk. Basis risk refers to the potential mismatch between index triggered payouts and actual losses. It occurs when an insured has a loss and does not receive an insurance payment sufficient to cover the loss (minus any deductible), or when an insured has a loss and receives a payment that exceeds the amount of loss. Since index insurance indemnities are triggered by exogenous random variables, such as area-yields or weather events, an index insurance policyholder can experience a yield or revenue loss and not receive an indemnity. The policyholder may also not experience a yield or revenue loss and yet, receive an indemnity. The effectiveness of index insurance as a risk management tool depends on how positively correlated farm-yield losses are with the underlying index. In general, the more homogeneous the area, the lower the basis risk and the more effective area-yield insurance will be as a farm-level risk management tool. Similarly, the more a given weather index actually represents weather events on the farm, the more effective the index will be as a farm-level risk management tool. RELATIVE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF INDEX INSURANCE Index insurance can sometimes offer superior risk protection compared to traditional, farm-level, multiple-peril crop insurance. Deductibles, co-payments, or other partial payments for loss are commonly used by farm-level, multiple-peril insurance providers to mitigate asymmetric information problems such as adverse selection and moral hazard. Asymmetric information problems are much lower with index insurance because 1) a producer has little more information than the insurer regarding the index value, and 2) individual producers are generally unable to influence the index value. This characteristic of index insurance means there is less need for deductibles and co-payments. Similarly, unlike traditional insurance, there is little reason to place restrictions on the amount of coverage an individual purchases. As long as the individual farmer cannot influence the realized value of the index, there is no need to restrict liability. An exception occurs when governments offer premium subsidies as a percentage of total premiums. In this case, they may want to restrict liability (and thus, premium) to limit the amount of subsidy paid to a given policyholder. As more sophisticated systems (such as satellite imagery) are developed to measure events that cause widespread losses, it is possible that indexing major events will be more straightforward and accepted by international capital markets. Under these conditions, it may become possible to offer insurance in countries that traditional reinsurers and primary providers would previously have never considered. Insurance is about trust. New risk management opportunities can develop if relevant, reliable, and trustworthy indexes can be constructed. THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN BASIS RISK AND TRANSACTION COSTS Among the most significant issues for any insurance product is the question of how much monitoring and administration is needed to assure that moral hazard and adverse selection are kept to a minimum. To accomplish this goal, principles of coinsurance and deductibles are used to make certain that the insured is sharing the risk and that mistakes in offering too generous a coverage will be mitigated. More information is needed to tailor insurance products and to minimize the basis risk for even an individual insurance contract. More information and more monitoring involve higher transaction costs which convert directly into higher premiums to cover the administrative costs of the insurance. Index insurance significantly reduces the transaction costs. Index insurance can also be written with lower deductibles and without the concern for introducing coinsurance. When farm yields are highly correlated with the index that is being used to provide insurance, offering higher levels of protection can result in risk-transfer superior even to individual multiple-peril crop insurance (Barnett et al., 2005). The direct trade-off between basis risk and transaction costs has implications for product designs that are sustainable and for the role of government and markets. Chapter 5 introduces the idea of layering risk. These concepts also greatly depend on understanding the trade-off between basis risk and transaction costs. At every level of risk transfer, someone must accept a certain degree of basis risk if the products are to be both sustainable and affordable. In short, extremely high transaction costs must be paid for. The extra premium or cost to society for absorbing the extra costs can easily offset the basis risk that may have to be accepted to make the risk transfer of natural hazard risk more efficient. WHERE INDEX INSURANCE IS INAPPROPRIATE Index insurance contracts will not work well for all agricultural producers. There are many places in the world where agricultural commodities are grown in microclimates. For example, much of the coffee produced in the world is grown on the sides of mountains. Fruit such as apples and cherries will also be commonly grown in areas that can have very large differences in weather patterns within a few miles. In highly spatially heterogeneous production areas, basis risk will likely be so high as to make index insurance problematic. Under these conditions, index insurance will work only if it is highly localized, and/or if it can be written so that it protects only against the most extreme loss events. Even in these cases, it may be critical to tie the index insurance to lending since loans are one form of mitigating basis risk. Over-fitting the data is another concern with index insurance. If one has a limited amount of crop-yield data, fitting the statistical relationship between the index and that limited data can become problematic. Small sample sizes and fitting regressions within the sample can lead to complex contract designs that may or may not be effective hedging mechanisms for individual farmers. Standard procedures that assume linear relationships between the index and realized farm-level losses may be inappropriate. While scientists are tempted to fit complex relationships to crop patterns, interviews with farmers may reveal more about what type of weather events are of most concern. When designing a weather index contract one may be tempted to focus on the relationship between weather events and a single crop. When it fails to rain for an extended period of time, many crops will be adversely impacted. Likewise, if it rains for an extended period of time, with significant cloud cover because of persistent rain during a critical photosynthesis period, a number of crops may also be adversely impacted. Finally, when designing index insurance contracts, significant care must be taken to assure that the insured has no better information about the likelihood and magnitude of loss than does the insurer. Forecasts of weather by farmers are many times quite accurate. Potato farmers in Peru forecast El Niño at least as well as many climate experts using celestial observations and other indicators in nature (Orlove et al., 2002). In 1988 an insurer offered drought insurance in the U.S. Midwest. As the sales closing date neared, the company noted that farmers were increasing the purchase of these contracts in a significant fashion. Rather than recognize that these farmers had already made a conditional forecast that the summer was going to be very dry, the company extended the sales closing date and sold even more rainfall insurance contracts. The company experienced very high losses and was unable to meet the full commitment of the contracts. Rainfall insurance for agriculture in the United States suffered a significant setback. The lesson learned is that if one is going to write insurance based on weather events, it is critical to be diligent in following and understanding weather forecasts and any information to make forecasts available to farmers. Farmers have a vested interest in understanding the weather and climate. Insurance providers who venture into weather index insurance must know at least as much as farmers about conditional weather forecasts. Otherwise, intertemporal adverse selection will render the index insurance product unsustainable. These issues can be addressed; typically, the sales closing date must be established in advance of any potential forecasting information that would change the probability of a loss beyond the norm. But beyond simply setting a sales closing, the insurance provider must have the discipline and systems in place to make certain that policies are not sold beyond that date. POLICY OBJECTIVES Governments that seek to spur growth and eradicate poverty almost inevitably mix economic policies that enhance efficiency and growth with social policies that address poverty and vulnerability. Governments often also pursue equity or income redistribution objectives. Thus, government policies related to agriculture and rural areas tend to pursue the following objectives: 1. Growth. Economic growth in rural areas — in particular higher agricultural yields and value-added processing, and also the development of off-farm activities — is perceived to be the best way out of poverty in the medium term. While better incentives for market players and an enabling infrastructure are key drivers, better management of agricultural production risk is also critical for growth, as it enhances access to credit and adoption of new technologies. 2. Reduce poverty and vulnerability in rural areas. Government directly intervenes in a targeted manner for social and equity reasons because free markets do not necessarily alleviate poverty for those in society who cannot participate effectively in these markets. Safety nets are one tool for such government intervention. Given limited resources in developing countries and the existence of other sectors that require government attention, these objectives are typically pursued within an environment of binding fiscal constraints. These objectives target different segments of people in rural areas and different risk profiles. Growth objectives focus on increasing profitability so that less poor farmers can continue adopting production technologies even when high-frequency, low consequence loss events occur. Poverty reduction policies target the poor and seek to increase their average income, and decrease the volatility of their income and the likelihood of a risk event wiping out hard-won asset gains. A precondition for the sustainable achievement of growth and the objectives of poverty reduction is an ex ante system for disaster risk management. Disaster risk management covers severe and very infrequent events that affect mostly the poor, because the poor are more vulnerable and tend to live in marginal and more risk-exposed areas. Major natural disasters tend to trap people in poverty due to the lack of efficient risk management at the household level.22 Government disaster risk policies often entail some form of monetary compensation for the victims. The challenge is to deliver timely and predictable aid in disaster situations. This requires ex ante planning rather than just ex post disaster responses. This also implies efforts to forestall political demands for ex post, ad hoc government disaster assistance. Indeed, a credible and reliable disaster risk management system can put farmers and countries on a higher growth path as people are more comfortable in taking calculated and protected risks. Naturally the growth and poverty-reduction objectives overlap, but that makes it even more important to clearly identify objectives, and design effective and cost-efficient ways to achieve them. Mixing the objectives can lead to sub-optimal outcomes. For example, many government-facilitated crop insurance programs attempt to simultaneously accomplish social welfare and economic efficiency objectives. CONSTRAINTS IN AGRICULTURAL RISK MANAGEMENT When making decisions about agricultural risk management programs, policy makers face a number of constraints. They must consider whether the benefits of such programs outweigh the costs, and if so, outweigh the net benefits offered by competing demands on public resources. They must construct the risk management program so as to minimize distortions in resource allocation and reduce opportunities for rent-seeking behavior. They must take into consideration the status and development of financial and insurance institutions within the country, any regulatory constraints on the operations of those institutions, and the infrastructure for enforcing contracts. Finally, it is important to consider the dichotomy that exists in many countries between smallholder farms and large farms that produce for export markets. Cost-benefit analyses of agricultural risk management projects Traditional economic analyses of projects (or other sector interventions) weigh social benefits against social costs, usually in monetary terms. In theory, this procedure should make it possible to compare the net benefits from these projects with the net benefit of a government risk management program. However, conducting such a comparison is not a trivial exercise, as the assumptions required to quantify the benefits of risk management are numerous and not always robust across different projects. Still, it is worthwhile to compare the net benefits of government risk management programs with the net benefits from other projects if only to get a sense of the orders of magnitude involved. Fiscal constraints Government expenses for agricultural insurance programs can be quite high. This is often masked in the way that actuarial performance is presented. Governments typically report loss ratios, or cost to premium ratios, as indemnities paid, divided by total premiums collected. There are two problems with this. First, because of government premium subsidies, farmers pay only a fraction of the total premium. Second, governments typically absorb most of the administrative and operating costs. When calculating loss ratios for private sector insurance products, administrative costs are included in the numerator. By simply looking at indemnity relative to premiums (and not being concerned that some significant portion of premiums are paid by the public sector) both the U.S. and Canadian crop insurance programs have, in recent years, reported loss ratios around 1.0. These loss ratios are then cited as evidence that the programs are actuarially sound. But if administrative and operating costs are added to the numerator and government premium subsidies are subtracted from the denominator so that the loss ratio is equivalent to the standard used for private sector insurance products, the crop insurance loss ratios are about 3.6 for the United States and 2.9 for Canada.23 Hazell (1992) estimates similar ratios for a number of government-based crop insurance programs. His estimates show the Philippines, Japan, and Brazil with programs where the loss ratios (as defined in the private sector) exceed 4.0. Policy makers often suggest agricultural insurance programs as an alternative to free ex post disaster assistance. In principle, insurance programs have many advantages over ex post disaster assistance. For example, it is often argued that disaster assistance programs can generate perverse incentives that increase the magnitude of losses in subsequent disaster events (Barnett 1999; Rossi et al. 1982). But, in practice, agricultural insurance programs have often evolved into another vehicle for transferring wealth from the public sector to agricultural producers. Furthermore, there is not much evidence that agricultural insurance programs have been successful in forestalling free ex post government disaster assistance. For example, in the United States, more and more costly crop insurance programs have coexisted with disaster payments for well over 20 years (Glauber 2004). Operational constraints: minimize distortions/rent-seeking opportunities Governments should only choose to invest public resources in developing agricultural insurance if the social costs of inefficiencies caused by the lack of such insurance products outweigh the social costs of government intervention. These social costs would include not only the opportunity costs of public resources required to create and maintain the agricultural insurance products but also any resource allocation distortions that result from farmers and rural decision makers responding to incentives created by the insurance products. This can include rent-seeking and regressive effects of policies that benefit mostly large commercial farmers. Contract enforcement Contract enforcement is critical to effective and sustainable risk management programs. It is very difficult to develop insurance contracts if the legal and regulatory environment does not exist for contract enforcement. Purchasers will lose trust in the program if indemnity payments are not made on a timely basis or are frequently tied up in long-lasting legal procedures.24 Likewise, insurers will lose trust in the program if they are forced to pay indemnities for losses that the contract is not intended to cover. Level of financial sector development Complex agricultural insurance programs are not likely to be sustainable unless they are accompanied by adequate amounts of insurance capital and expertise. In developing countries, insurance sectors are often underdeveloped and concentrated in very few lines of business such as automobile, property, and casualty insurance. Further, insurance companies in developing countries tend to be based in urban areas. They tend to shy away from rural areas where the insurance market is characterized by high transaction costs and small policies. New products will be required if agricultural insurance is to take root in countries with underdeveloped traditional insurance sectors. For example, insurance products that are based on an index that is recognized and accepted by international reinsurers provide opportunities to bypass in-country insurance capacity constraints. If the reinsurer accepts the data and settlement procedures for the index, the insurer’s capital is somewhat less relevant than for traditional lines of insurance because the reinsurer is not really accepting the insurer’s underwriting risk, but rather only the risk inherent in the index. Experience with reinsurance for weather index contracts reveals that reinsurers may even be willing to take 100 percent of the risk. However, for operational and regulatory reasons, international reinsurers prefer to deal with professionally-run companies to source the risk. Structure of agricultural sectors Smallholder-dominated agriculture is clearly a constraint for the large-scale roll-out of sophisticated crop insurance programs or indeed, any agricultural risk management scheme. Farmers with one hectare of land or less will never be an attractive marketing target for insurance companies. The challenge is to identify suitable aggregators of risk, such as microfinance institutions, banks or cooperatives, or even local authorities who can enroll farmers in group insurance programs. Agricultural sectors need to be segmented, and distribution channels tailor-made to specific needs and local customs. Regulatory constraints Agricultural risk transfer involves financial contracts that are regulated according to prudential principles. Insurance companies must organize the financing to pay for the worst case scenario. This constrains the type and sophistication of contracts — just as the capacity of the regulator to understand and supervise new products can be a constraint. Spatial correlation of risk Weather events that cause agricultural losses are often highly spatially correlated. In the presence of such spatial correlation, index insurance products, such as the rainfall index insurance described above, can be effective risk transfer mechanisms. However, once the risk is transferred from the farmer to a local insurance provider, spatial correlation makes it very difficult for the local insurance provider to generate much risk reduction through pooling. Unless some mechanism exists for transferring the spatially correlated loss risk out of the region or country, local insurance providers will be reluctant to offer insurance products — even if those products protect only against losses in the market insurance layer. Risk-transfer strategies There are at least three strategies for transferring risk from index insurance contracts: 1) direct transfer of contracts into reinsurance markets; 2) packaged transfer of independent contracts; and, 3) pooling of risk and subsequent transfer of the pool tail risk (Table 5.1). Under the first two strategies there is no basis risk, insofar as every single contract is reinsured against payouts that exceed a defined level. However, since no pooling occurs prior to the risk transfer, direct and packaged risk transfer strategies will likely have higher reinsurance premium rates than the transfer of pooled risks — even if the reinsurer offers portfolio-adjusted pricing. Under the third strategy of pooling risk prior to transfer, insurers could be exposed to some basis risk insofar as a pool of indexes does not perfectly reflect the payout likelihood of each individual contract, and only the excess risk of the overall pool is reinsured. However, if there are opportunities to diversify risks within the pool, this strategy could lead to lower reinsurance premiums relative to either of the other two strategies since the risk of the overall pool (rather than each individual contract) would be reinsured. The first strategy does not involve the government in transferring the risk. The other two strategies may involve government in either facilitating risk transfer (second strategy) or pooling risk and facilitating risk transfer (third strategy). Pooling of risk The third risk transfer strategy identified above involves pooling risks within the country or region. Risk pooling is based on the statistical law of large numbers which states that the more uncorrelated risks that are added to a portfolio, the lower the variance in the outcomes of the overall portfolio. For an insurer, this results in lower capital needs and therefore lower capital costs. Index-based insurance contracts can be pooled and transferred in a number of ways. For example, the reinsurance contract can be based on a basket index that is a weighted average of the indexes contained in the pool. A risk management program being considered for Malawi would have private insurers sell rainfall-based index insurance contracts for various weather stations around the country. The government would purchase reinsurance protection and sell it to the insurers. For reinsurance cover, the government could use the Malawi Maize Production Index (MMPI), a weighted average of weather station indexes with each station’s contribution weighted by the corresponding expected maize production from that location. The more highly spatially correlated the risks on the underlying indexes, the better the basket index will perform as a reinsurance mechanism (that is, the lower the reinsurance basis risk). But, of course, the more highly spatially correlated the risks on the underlying indexes, the less advantage there is to pooling within the country as opposed to simply transferring the underlying weather station indexes to the reinsurance market using either of the first two strategies identified above. A pool of index insurance risks can also be transferred using traditional stop loss reinsurance. In this case, in exchange for a reinsurance premium, the reinsurer would simply cover all losses in excess of a predefined percentage (for example, 110 percent) of the total premium dollars in the pool. With this type of reinsurance (and unlike reinsurance based on a basket index), the pool would not be exposed to basis risk. However, the transactions costs for the reinsurer will be much higher since the reinsurer will need to conduct due diligence on not only the underlying indexes but also the underwriting of the pool. All other things equal, higher transactions costs will cause reinsurers to charge higher reinsurance premiums. Despite this, if spatial diversification opportunities are sufficiently high, pooling may reduce risk exposure to such an extent that reinsurance premium costs are reduced. This concept can be extended to the pooling of multi-country risks within a region. Weather-risk can be retained and managed internally if the areas under management are significantly diverse in their weather risk characteristics. This immediately suggests that the weather sensitivity of neighboring countries must be taken into account when considering a country’s weather-risk profile and its need for outside reinsurance. Consider the example of the region of the Southern African Development Community (SADC; Figure 5.3). Analysis shows that on average, two countries in the region suffer a drought each year. However, the distribution of drought events in SADC is extremely long-tailed, with the possibility of widespread drought events that could potentially devastate the region. A SADC pool of rainfall-based index insurance contracts could be constructed with each member country being charged an actuarially fair assessment of the risk transferred to the pool. Suppose the financial impact to the pool of four SADC countries experiencing simultaneous droughts is about US$80 million. The pool may wish to transfer the risk of losses beyond US$80 million to the international reinsurance market. This could be done in layers with, for example, one layer of US$80-350 million being transferred using reinsurance mechanisms. Losses in excess of US$350 million, as might occur with simultaneous droughts in 10 SADC countries, occur with a frequency of about one percent. Instruments such as catastrophe (CAT) bonds might be used to transfer this extreme layer. CAT bonds allow the transference of very large exposures into financial markets and often have tenures of up to three years. More efficient means of transferring risk implies that costs could be greatly reduced for the member countries by transferring risk as part of a regional strategy rather than by transferring the risk one country at a time. For example, the SADC pooling approach above would reduce insurance costs by 22 percent for one of the countries, Malawi, due to risk-pooling effects (Hess and Syroka, 2005). However, managing a pool requires a high degree of underwriting and actuarial sophistication. Reinsurers will conduct due diligence and will be very reluctant to write traditional excess of loss reinsurance unless they are convinced that the pool is being managed appropriately. POLICY INSTRUMENTS Risk layering provides an extremely helpful conceptual framework for thinking about government intervention in risk transfer markets. In the previous discussion of the market insurance layer, reference was made to situations where government packaging or pooling of risk could potentially reduce the transaction costs associated with risk transfer and thus the premiums paid by end users. We next consider other possible government interventions. Specifically, we address government facilitation of risk transfer in the market failure layer, the role of government subsidies in risk transfer markets, and potential uses of index insurance instruments to finance government disaster relief and safety net policies. Government disaster option for CAT risk: a policy for the market failure layer Cognitive failure and ambiguity loading occur primarily with events in the extreme tail of the loss distribution — previously mentioned as the market failure layer. For this reason, and as a substitute for ad hoc disaster relief payments, governments may decide to cofinance risk transfer mechanisms for these events. For example, the government could design Disaster Option for CAT risk (DOC) index reinsurance contracts for catastrophic risks. Returning to the example in Figure 5.2, a DOC could insure against rainfall less than 500 mm with a payment per tick of say, $50. Primary insurers could then offer coverage beyond the earlier imposed limit of 500 mm and transfer the catastrophic tail risk to the government using the DOC. Even if primary insurers are selling traditional crop insurance they could use a DOC to transfer part of the catastrophic tail risk in their portfolio of crop insurance policies. DOCs could be offered for a variety of strikes and settlement weather stations, as long as the coverage is for catastrophic risk layers and can be offset in international weather risk markets. The government could even offer other DOC indexes (for example, excess rainfall or wind speed) to reinsure other lines of insurance, such as property and casualty (see Figure 5.4). The government would reinsure DOCs in international reinsurance or capital markets using any of the three risk transfer strategies described earlier. Since DOCs would address only extreme catastrophic loss events, reinsurance premium rates would likely contain an ambiguity load. Premiums could be subsidized to offset part of this ambiguity load so DOC purchasers would pay something closer to a pure premium rate. DOCs could be tailor-made to individual insurers needs, for example, DOCs could be based on individual weather stations or written as regional weighted average baskets of weather stations. Strikes should be set so that the DOC covers only infrequent events (for example, an expected frequency of 1-in-30 years or less). This is the domain of the probability distribution over which potential insurance purchasers tend to experience cognitive failure and insurance providers engage in ambiguity loading. Primary insurers and ultimately insured parties would pay a premium for this catastrophic protection, but significantly less than what the market would charge. Those who reinsure DOC contracts will insist on verifying the credibility of the underlying indexes. The premium required to transfer the risk to international markets would provide a baseline from which to base DOC premium rates. The risk-layering approach proposed here would institutionalize the social role of government in subsidizing extreme risk events at the local level. Premium rates could be subsidized to offset ambiguity loading. Furthermore, by organizing DOC contracts at the local level, isolated severe events that do not capture the attention of national policy makers could still have some structured assistance. To summarize the major advantages of offering index-based DOCs: 1. DOC contract provisions established ex ante allow for better planning than ad hoc disaster payments. 2. DOCs provide a structure that provides more spatial and temporal equity in government disaster assistance. 3. DOCs facilitate commercial insurance product development by providing a means by which catastrophic risk layers can be effectively transferred into international markets. 4. DOCs can be subsidized to address the market failure associated with ambiguity loading and cognitive failure. 5. Governments can estimate their own DOC subsidy cost exposure based on actuarial estimates of the risk inherent in the index. Reinsurance coverage adds a market check on the credibility of the index and the adequacy of DOC premium rates. 6. While DOCs may be partially subsidized, end users still pay part of the cost to transfer the risk into international markets. This reduces the potential for perverse incentives that could encourage excessive risk taking. Subsidies Governments frequently subsidize agricultural insurance products. These subsidies take a variety of forms. The government may cofinance insurance purchasing with direct premium subsidies, or may reimburse primary insurers for administrative or product development costs, or may provide reinsurance at below market premium rates. Regardless of the form, government subsidies are generally designed to increase insurance purchasing by lowering the premiums charged to agricultural insurance purchasers. Such subsidies are extremely controversial. They tend to benefit operators of larger farms more than operators of smaller farms. A wide range of stakeholders can and will engage in rent seeking once subsidies are introduced. Subsidies are costly to maintain and are subject to close scrutiny regarding the social costs versus the social benefits. Many times subsidies are provided based on the rationalization that markets for agricultural insurance are missing or incomplete without careful consideration of the core reasons why such market limitations exist. This document has carefully considered why agricultural insurance is missing or incomplete in many settings: adverse selection and moral hazard, high transaction costs, cognitive failure and ambiguity loading, and exposure to highly correlated loss events. Any government subsidies should be carefully targeted to address one of these specific sources of market failure. However, even then it may be that the costs of addressing that market failure are simply too high to justify use of limited government resources to that end. Even when subsidies are carefully targeted, the resulting rents can be captured by politically powerful elites. Government insurance subsidies may crowd out demand for private-sector risk transfer instruments. The World Bank supports the development of financial institutions that operate profitably on a commercial basis by offering products and services that meet the needs of a wide range of clients, including the poor. Thus, any World Bank efforts to facilitate the provision of risk transfer instruments should be based on careful consideration of whether subsidies or grants can be provided without distorting or inhibiting the growth of private-sector financial markets. Some types of subsidies are likely less distorting than others. Subsidies and grants for supporting financial intermediaries and financial infrastructure, such as technical assistance and data systems needed to develop effective index insurance products, are likely to be the least distorting. Beyond distortions in the markets, there are legitimate reasons for supporting infrastructure to improve market access among the rural poor. Finally, some public support for product development may be justifiable because of the free rider problem. It is costly to develop innovative insurance products. Yet it is difficult to recoup these costs in a competitive market. Any firm can simply copy the new product and compete without having to recover the product development costs. Furthermore, developing index insurance products is an area that is unfamiliar in many developing countries. Examples of subsidies for financial intermediaries and infrastructure include: • Providing technical assistance to financial intermediaries to improve systems that enhance efficiency, such as management information systems; • Developing and introducing demand-driven products on a pilot basis; • Helping develop or improve service delivery mechanisms that enable greater outreach into rural areas; • Covering a portion of the cost of establishing new branches in areas that do not have financial intermediaries that serve the poor; • Creating capacity within regulatory and supervisory bodies; • Supporting the creation of industry associations; • Developing training institutes and insurance information agencies; • Supporting data for weather stations or other data that will be used to develop effective indexes; and • Providing technical assistance to develop new products in an emerging market in developing countries. Premium Subsidies While it is common for developed countries to cofinance premiums for farmers with direct premium subsidies, these types of subsidies are particularly problematic. Generally, direct premium subsidies reflect income enhancement objectives as much or more than risk management objectives. Such subsidies are typically provided on a percentage basis. This clearly benefits higher risk areas relatively more than lower risk areas. Even attempts to subsidize to levels that represent a pure premium or expected loss basis may favor higher risk areas relatively more than lower risk areas since in a commercial market, premium rates for higher risk areas would likely contain higher catastrophic loads. Thus, any attempt to introduce premium subsidies will likely be distorting. In principle, if subsidies are targeted to the “market failure layer” as described above, market distortions should be minimal. Given the ambiguity loading and cognitive failure that occur in this layer, carefully targeted subsidies (such as cofinancing of DOCs) may even be welfare enhancing. However, for the “market insurance layer,” subsidies should, in general, be avoided. If subsidies are provided in the “market insurance layer,” they should be targeted to reducing uncertainty loads in premium rates. Commercial insurers will tend to load premium rates based on the quantity and quality of data used to generate pure premium rates. The better (worse) the data used to generate the pure premium rates, the lower (higher) the premium load. These loads could be offset with cofinancing from donors. However, here again, one would need to be very clear about the level of these subsidies and the intent. NICARAGUA: A SEVEN-YEAR INCUBATION PERIOD Country context and risk profile The contribution of agriculture to the Nicaraguan GDP has been in decline but still remains a significant economic activity. In 2003 agriculture accounted for nearly 18 percent of the US$4.1 billion GDP of Nicaragua. The major commodities produced include coffee, meat, shrimp, corn, sugar, and beans. In Nicaragua, 30 percent of the population is involved in agricultural activities; however, agriculture has experienced little, and often negative growth since the 90s and Nicaragua has remained a net food importer of cereals and grains. Agricultural production is hindered by exposure to drought and flood risks. Nicaragua is the World Bank’s first experience in recent history where the idea of rainfall insurance was seriously considered. Hazell and Skees provided the first feasibility study in the spring of 1998. Subsequently, Skees and Miranda (1998) examined the issue in more detail and made specific recommendations about rainfall insurance in the major cereal production area of northwest Nicaragua where the major risk to cereal production is insufficient or excess rainfall. In this work, they suggest that rainfall index insurance contracts could be introduced and sold to individual farmers to hedge against the risk of both drought and excess rain. Nonetheless, they also point to the large hurdles in making such an introduction in a developing country. Four key recommendations are made for progressing with a plan to introduce a rainfall index insurance pilot and deemed necessary for the development and sustainability of the insurance scheme: 1. Analytical work and development of human capital. Extensive data analysis and modeling would be necessary to design and price the insurance contracts. It would be equally important to train Nicaraguans in these methods to develop the capacity within the country for future work. 2. Pilot development for demonstration, education, and evaluation. The first year of the pilot should start small and be targeted primarily at learning and demonstration. Education, marketing, and sales would be primary goals. Only three stations should be used in the first year: 1) Leon; 2) San Antonio; and 3) Chinandega. This market is contiguous and would cover no more area than 800 square kilometers. To obtain the most effective risk management, only those within 10 kilometers of the stations should purchase the rainfall contracts. 3. Infrastructure development and pilot expansion. During year one of the pilot, investments in additional, secure weather stations should be made to increase the density of stations within the original 800 square kilometer market area. By year two, the sales and exposure should increase to about US$10 million. 4. In-country project management and support. It is essential to have a key person in Nicaragua who can manage and support the pilot project. This person should know all aspects of the project and be active in every dimension of the project. One key goal of the individual will be to monitor the activity and give international reinsurers the comfort to participate in this activity. Beyond the pilot test area, this person should be willing to investigate other possibilities for new regions that may stand on their own with private support. Fostering similar activity in other regions will help entice the international reinsurance community. This person should also facilitate an active education program. Beyond the educational effort, there should be funds for advertising and promotion. Some progress was underway in discussions within both the Nicaraguan public and private sectors on these concepts when Hurricane Mitch arrived with its devastation in October of 1998. After this event, the focus on World Bank efforts to provide technical assistance in Nicaragua shifted to developing an aggregate weather index that would provide disaster financing to the government of Nicaragua during severe events. The work developed to the point of a specific set of weather stations that were indexed into a single aggregate index for protecting against catastrophic risk. The index was even priced in the global reinsurance markets. Once the contract was priced, the government rejected the idea on the grounds that they did not need to purchase insurance because they could depend on the global community for assistance when major catastrophes occurred. At this point, no further activity on index insurance was pursued in Nicaragua. Nevertheless, a number of significant lessons learned from the Nicaraguan experience: • It takes time to develop innovation. The literature on innovation emphasizes that it takes time to gain acceptance of new ideas. Innovation can take a full generation before it is widely accepted. The Nicaraguan experience fits perfectly with this theory. While the original idea was presented seven years ago, new products that fit with the ideas presented are just being introduced. It is reasonable to think that part of the reason that Nicaragua is only now introducing these ideas is because other countries have ventured into this domain. • There is an inherent moral hazard in expecting that countries will purchase catastrophic protection. The excellent work completed after Hurricane Mitch to develop a mechanism for the government of Nicaragua to indemnify catastrophic losses from extreme weather events was met with a cool reception. The government was likely correct in their evaluation that they did not need this type of protection since the global community has been very responsive with free aidafter major catastrophes. • Linking index insurance to banking in Nicaragua is an excellent addition to work that is ongoing around the globe. Early indications are that the banks in Nicaragua have agreed to reduce interest rates for production loans when their farmers purchase the new weather index insurance products. Nicaragua may be the first country where there is an explicit tie between interest rates and the amount of index insurance purchased. This is an important development in Nicaragua that should be evaluated to be more fully understood. Proposed agricultural risk management structure In November of 2004, CRMG responded to interest expressed by INISER for developing a local weather index insurance market for agriculture. CRMG provided technical assistance to analyze potential markets for a pilot project in 2005 and decided to concentrate on developing a pilot project for the groundnut sector to secure lending to the sector. Banks have expressed their interest to internalize some part of the risk reduction by lowering the interest rate, while also providing financing for the farmers to pay the premium as an incentive for a proactive financial risk management approach. Armed with prototype contracts INISER/CRMG has launched consultations with end users, financial intermediaries, and the insurance regulator. Final contracts have been designed and priced by reinsurers, but still require approval from the regulator. The government of Nicaragua had adopted a “wait-and-see" strategy, based on several previous failures to launch either traditional or weather index insurance for agriculture. It was not until the most recent proposal was being developed and the government could clearly see that there was interest and participation from the international financial markets, that the government opened the door for serious policy dialogue on the issue. In particular, the government has offered to support INISER in the implementation phase with economic resources as well as guidance to upscale the current pilot project. This has open the door to work with several productive sectors, including small farmers, in a comprehensive context of economic development where insurance becomes a useful tool to facilitate investments in the sector. MOROCCO EXPERIENCE Country context and risk profile In Morocco 47 percent of the total population and most of the poor live in rural areas. Agriculture plays a crucial role for rural livelihoods. On average, agriculture accounts for about 17 percent of the GDP, but this percentage fluctuates, mainly due to climatic—especially rainfall—variations. Moroccan agriculture is characterized by a dichotomy between the traditional and commercial sectors. The traditional sector consists of small farms in rain fed areas involved predominantly in cereal, legume, and livestock production. The commercial sector operates mainly in irrigated areas. Farm surveys indicate that about 70 percent of farms are small in size (under 5 hectares) and account for 23 percent of total land under cultivation. Farms less than 20 hectares (ha) in size represent 96 percent of the number of farms in operation. The average size of a farm in Morocco is 5.7 ha. Almost 90 percent of Moroccan agriculture is non-irrigated, and since most of the crops rely on adequate rainfall, this has translated to wide variations in yields and production. For example, the production of cereals fell from 9.5 million tons in 1994 to 1.6 million tons in 1995 due to drought. Current response In 1995 the Moroccan government activated the Programme Secheresse (Drought Program), a state sponsored insurance program managed by the local mutual agricultural insurance company (MAMDA) that addressed the drought problem through the implementation of a yield insurance scheme. The program, revised in 1999, is structured on the coverage of three revenue levels of 1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 Moroccan Dirhams (MAD) per hectare (ha). Payments are triggered by a ministerial declaration certifying the occurrence of drought. For the first revenue threshold, the payout is based on an area-yield base mechanism, while for the 2,000 and the 3,000 MAD/ha level, specific farm-yield assessments are required. The program proved to be popular but also affected by typical yield insurance problems such as high costs for supporting insurance premiums and severe management problems related to individual farm-yield assessment (Hess et al. 2003). Proposed agricultural risk management structure Given the limitations of the Drought Program, the Moroccan government agreed to participate in a World Bank research project aimed at exploring the feasibility of weather-based insurance as an alternative to traditional yield insurance. The investigations led the team project to conclude that a drought insurance program based on rainfall indexes could have potentially significant benefits over the current scheme, minimizing moral hazard and adverse selection risk and promoting a more rapid, streamlined pay-out process, in addition to increasing the potential interest of international reinsurers and capital markets in investing in the program. Based on analysis of rainfall and cereal-yield data across the country, the study determined that an index-based rainfall insurance product could be feasible in Morocco. Following the feasibility study, an international team sponsored by the IFC and the Italian Technical Assistance Trust Fund assisted MAMDA in structuring the insurance coverage to be launched as a pilot program in some cereal growing regions. Products The structure of the product proposed for implementation was that of a rainfall index insurance contract that would indemnify cereal producers when the rainfall index in a determined area would fall below a specified threshold. The indexes, developed by local agronomists together with farmers’ representatives, added important insights on the rainfall-yield relationship and were not just cumulative measures of rainfall but included specific weights for different plant growth phases and a “capping” procedure in order to take into account the fact that water in excess of storage capacity is lost and does not contribute to plant growth. This process allowed the indexes developed to reach correlation values of over 90 percent (Stoppa and Hess 2003) and to be greatly appreciated by potential end users. Constraints Despite the wide consensus gained by the proposed rainfall index contracts among government officials, insurers and producers, the implementation of the foreseen pilot programs in Morocco did not take place. The main reason for the failure of the implementation process was the fact that rainfall precipitation in the selected areas showed a downward trend. Consequently, the reinsurance company involved in the deal made the cost of the insurance prohibitive for producers. The experience developed with the feasibility study and the implementation project for Morocco generated expertise that led to the realization of other WB-facilitated deals (for example, India) and of other independent programs (for example, Colombia). INDIA: PRIVATE SECTOR-LED ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURAL RISK MARKET DEVELOPMENT Country context and risk profile In 1991 a household survey addressing rural access to finance in India revealed that barely one-sixth of rural households had loans from formal rural finance institutions and that only 35-37 percent of the actual credit needs of the rural poor was being met through these formal channels (Hess 2003). A survey based on the Economic Census of 1998, (Hess 2003) shows that Indian formal financial intermediaries reportedly met only 2.5 percent of the credit needs of the unorganized sector through commercial lending programs. Current response Farmers respond to the lack of formal financial services by turning to moneylenders; reducing inputs in farming; overcapitalizing and internalizing risk; and/or by over-diversifying their activities which leads to sub-optimal asset allocation. Smallholders cannot risk investing in fixed capital or concentrating on the most profitable activities and crops, because they cannot leverage the start-up capital and they face catastrophic risks, such as drought, that could wipe out their livelihoods at any point in time. The challenge for banks is to innovate a low-cost way of reaching farmers and helping them better manage risk. Proposed agricultural risk management structure An initial study explored the feasibility of weather insurance for Indian farmers to determine if it would be possible to extend the reach of financial services to the rural sector by reducing the exposure to weather risk (Hess 2003). The study identified several potential project partners. In response to this study, CRMG, in collaboration with the Hyderabad-based microfinance institution, BASIX, and Mumbai-based insurance company, ICICI Lombard, a subsidiary of ICICI Bank, initiated a project to launch a small weather insurance pilot program for groundnut and castor farmers in the Andhra Pradesh district of Mahahbubnagar, the first weather insurance initiative ever to be launched in India. The insurance contracts, protecting farmers from drought during the groundnut growing season, were designed by ICICI Lombard with technical support from CRMG and in consultation with BASIX. The products were marketed and sold by Krishna Bhima Samruddhi Local Area Bank (KBS LAB)34 extension officers to the four villages through workshops and meetings with the BASIX borrowers. In total, 230 farmers bought the insurance for khariff (monsoon season, June-September) 2003: 154 groundnut farmers and 76 castor farmers; most fell into the small farmer category, with less than 2.5 acres of landholding. The entire portfolio of weather insurance contracts sold by BASIX was insured by ICICI Lombard, with reinsurance from one of the leading international reinsurance companies. ICICI Lombard was also involved in another project in khariff 2003 in Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh, where 1,500 soya farmers bought protection against excessive rainfall. ICICI Lombard filed all the necessary forms and terms of insurance with the Indian insurance regulator, registering their products before the programs were launched. A second pilot program was launched in khariff 2004 and introduced significant changes to the 2003 design following farmer feedback from the pilot program, with technical assistance from CRMG. The program was extended to four new weather station locations, in two additional districts in Andhra Pradesh: Khammam and Anantapur. The weather insurance contracts were offered to both BASIX borrowers and nonborrowers and marketed and sold through KBS LAB in the Khammam and Mahahbubnagar districts and Bhartiya Samruddhi Finance Ltd. (BSFL)35 in the Anantapur district through village meetings, farmer workshops, and feedback sessions in the month leading up to the groundnut and castor growing season. New contracts were also offered for cotton farmers in the Khammam district and an excess rainfall product for harvest was offered to all castor and groundnut farmers. In total, over 400 farmers bought insurance through BASIX in 2004, and a further 320 groundnut farmers, members of a the Velugu self-help group organization in the Anantapur district, bought insurance directly from ICICI Lombard. Several farmers were repeat customers from the 2003 pilot. In contrast to 2003, ICICI Lombard did not seek reinsurance for the BASIX farmer/weather insurance portfolio in 2004. In 2004, a number of other transactions also took place within the Indian private sector in response to the 2003 pilot program initiated by CRMG. In 2004, BASIX themselves bought a crop lending portfolio insurance policy based on weather indexes. For the first time, BASIX used this protection to cover their own risk and passed neither the cost nor the benefits to their farmers. The protection allowed BASIX to keep lending to drought-prone areas by mitigating default risk through the insurance policy claims in extreme drought years. BASIX bought a policy to cover three business locations, which was insured by ICICI Lombard, with structuring support from CRMG, and then reinsured into the international weather market. During 2004, not only did BASIX expand their weather insurance program, a number of other institutions, including the originator ICICI Lombard, began expanding the market for weather insurance in India. IFFCOTokio, a joint venture insurance company, launched weather insurance contracts similar to the 2003 contracts in 2004, selling over 3000 policies to farmers throughout India. In conjunction with ICICI Lombard, the Government of Rajasthan launched a weather insurance program for orange farmers, insuring 783 orange farmers from insufficient rainfall in khariff 2004, and 1036 coriander farmers in rabi (October-March season) 2004. The National Agricultural Insurance Company (NAIC), responsible for the government-sponsored area-yield indexed crop insurance scheme, also launched a pilot weather insurance scheme for 20 districts throughout the country in 2004 reaching nearly 13,000 farmers — the scheme was even mentioned in the government of the Indian budget for the financial year 2004-2005. Therefore it is estimated that nearly 20,000 farmers bought weather insurance throughout India in 2004. In 2005, BASIX/ICICI Lombard further improved the weather insurance product and automated underwriting and claims settlements. Thus, BASIX will sell area-specific weather insurance products in all of its 50 branches in 7 Indian states, targeting 10,000 farmers. In addition, ICICI Lombard is scaling up its agricultural weather insurance sales and is expanding into other sectors, while NAIC and IFCCO Tokio are stepping up their efforts to sell weather insurance products and developing better products for farmers. An important element of the new pilot programs will be monitoring. Ultimately it will be important to learn not only if farmers are buying these products, but how it is changing their behavior and the lending behavior of local financial institutions. Box 6.1 describes the monitoring that is beginning for the India weather insurance products. UKRAINE EXPERIENCE Country context and risk profile Rural financial institutions in Ukraine increasingly use future harvests as collateral since farm equipment is generally antiquated and of limited value. These lenders also tend to require harvest insurance to hedge against crop losses.36 The major banks active in agricultural lending, such as Aval (with a total of 4600 loans and 30 percent market share), do not lend on the basis of uninsured collateral, so to obtain credit, a farmer must have a proper insurance policy written by a preapproved insurer. To provide for the lending insurance needs of farmers, most banks set up their own insurance companies. Most farmers do not yet understand the particular nature of weather index insurance, but are familiar with weather risk and would like to have protection against natural, multiple perils. Crop risk is diverse throughout Ukraine. Crop-yield data for five major crops (maize, sunflowers, sugar beets, wheat, and barley) in all 25 oblasts in the 1970-2001 period show there is a substantial geographic spread of the agricultural values concentrated in central and southern Ukraine. The correlation of crop yields between eastern Ukraine and the southern region near Odessa is nearly zero, facilitating risk pooling and in-country retention of a large share of natural risks. Current response In this market, the types of insurance policies currently offered are input cost insurance, generally linked to agricultural credit collateral requirements and limited to very low insured sums, and harvest insurance, covering hail, storm, excessive precipitation, frost, and fire risk. Drought is offered by only a few companies, but in general is not covered. Two crop insurance pools were founded in 2003 as part of attempts to provide more secure crop insurance to Ukrainian farmers. Five and sixteen insurance companies, respectively, agreed to pool their agricultural risks to improve their risk-bearing capacity and to obtain access to international reinsurance markets. Nevertheless, crop insurance policy sales were very limited (around 80 for both pools). Market participants cited the following reasons for the low uptake: inability to pay for the policy, unclear loss adjustment and underwriting procedures, mistrust of insurance companies, and insufficient information available to farmers. Moreover, by providing ad hoc disaster assistance to farmers in 2003 and 2004, the government of Ukraine (GoU) lowered incentives for farmers to pay for commercial insurance premiums. According to recent market information, by the end of 2004, the biggest agricultural insurance pool shrunk to six companies. Policy objectives The GoU has experimented with compulsory crop insurance and is now establishing a crop insurance subsidization scheme. The regulator has approved weather index insurance as an insurance product and a few weather insurance policies were sold to farmers in the first pilot sales season of 2005. A feasibility study by CRMG presents a risk management framework and considers several options for government intervention in the sector. An investment phase would consist of the acquisition and installation of automated weather stations, including the analysis of the density of the network required for the weather exposure of Ukraine and the design of an adequate maintenance program to ensure the quality of observations across time. In addition, the GoU could consider a Backstop Facility for Weather Risk Insurance Retention. Ukrainian insurance companies would need international reinsurance for insuring against systemic risks. A risk pool “facility” in Ukraine would allow for the underwriting of agricultural reinsurance based on pre-established guidelines to retain as much risk inside the country as possible. This pool would then reinsure itself through a GoU fund. Extreme or catastrophic risk would be reinsured on the international reinsurance market based on transparent and competitive premium ratemaking principles; that is, once the pool and the GoU fund are depleted, international reinsurers would pay the remaining claims. Through the aggregation and layering of risk, reinsurers would be interested in reinsuring risk in Ukraine and forced to price the risk competitively. Individual insurance companies sometimes face insurmountable difficulties even accessing international reinsurance markets, let alone obtaining competitive prices. The combination of introducing a transparent index insurance product and an efficient and well-regulated risk pool can overcome this market failure. Risk layers representing relatively frequent (but mild) adverse events would be insured by the GoU risk fund. Intermediate risk layers (for example, 1-in-20–year events to 1-in-100– year events) could be transferred to the GoU Backstop Facility. The catastrophic risk layer (the 1-in-100– year event) could be transferred to international reinsurance markets. ETHIOPIA: ETHIOPIAN INSURANCE CORPORATION AND DONOR-LED EX ANTE DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT Country context and risk profile Ethiopia is one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world, ranking 169th of 175 countries in the Human Development Index. More than 85 percent of the population make their living in the agricultural sector which accounts for 39 percent of Ethiopia’s GDP (2002/2003) and 78 percent of foreign earnings. In Ethiopia, agriculture is predominantly rain fed and more than 95 percent of its output comes from subsistence and smallholder farmers. The staple diet for the majority of Ethiopians is coarse grains including maize, teff (a cereal grain), and sorghum. Production of coarse grains is valued at around US$380 million and cereals at US$585 million. At the household level, adverse weather patterns, primarily lack of rain, are detrimental to yields and outputs and result in significant income losses and negative impacts on the livelihoods of farmers. Ethiopia faces highly variable rainfall and suffers from both national and regional droughts that can have extreme impacts on farmers who utilize traditional agricultural practices, using little irrigation, and rely on the country’s 35 million head of livestock. This rainfall variability, in addition to limiting the ability and motivation of farmers to invest in agricultural technology and yield-increasing assets, reduces overall production, which can decrease both consumption and income of households. At the national level, average grain production in the country is 8.9 million metric tons (MT) and is prone to recurrent drought. The Ethiopian ministry of agriculture has indicated that the level of production is too low to feed the whole population even in good rainfall years. Current response With 10 percent of the population of 72 million requiring food aid assistance each year, food insecurity is a chronic issue. Emergency responses have been frequent if not constant, accounting for an annual average of 870,000 MT of food aid between 1994 and 2003. In 2003, a record 13 million Ethiopians required emergency assistance as a result of drought and the corresponding failed harvest in 2002. These emergency responses have saved millions of lives in the short term, but destitution has worsened, people’s assets have eroded, and vulnerability has increased. The uninsured loss of income and assets caused by natural disasters, primarily droughts, in developing countries such as Ethiopia, threatens the lives and livelihoods of vulnerable populations. Insurance is a critical requirement for development as uninsured losses lock entire populations in vicious cycles of deepening destitution. It is estimated that in sub-Saharan Africa, approximately 120 million people are at risk to natural disasters and for these populations, humanitarian aid provides the only insurance that protects their lives and livelihoods. But humanitarian aid is often too unreliable, unpredictable, and often times too untimely to provide an effective insurance function. To partly address this issue, in 2003 the government of Ethiopia (GoE), donors, United Nations agencies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), launched the New Coalition for Food Security, whose goal is to achieve food security for the population in Ethiopia who have been categorized as “chronically foodinsecure” and significantly improve food security for the additional 10 million people who are vulnerable in the next five years. To achieve these goals, the organizations are working through the government to introduce a productive safety net for 5 to 6 million people starting in January 2005. The safety net is not an emergency activity but an attempt to change the vulnerability and risk profile of the chronically food insecure. From January 2005, responses to chronic and emergency food shortages will be addressed by different channels: the former, essentially a development activity, will be addressed through the productive safety net program coordinated by the Food Security Coordination Bureau and the latter, a response mechanism to unpredictable humanitarian needs, will be tackled through the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC). Accordingly, those households that are not covered by the safety net program, but are still considered in need of government relief assistance, will fall under the emergency program through early warning and annual needs assessments. Proposed agricultural risk management structures In order to address the current situation in Ethiopia, two agricultural risk management structures are currently being considered, one at the farmer, micro-level and the other at the government, macro-level. Micro-Level —Weather Insurance: The state-owned Ethiopia Insurance Corporation (EIC) plans to launch a small pilot weather insurance program for wheat farmers in southern Ethiopia in the wereda (district) of Assassa, Arsi Zone. The EIC has previously experimented with agricultural insurance for farmers but with little success. They are keen to explore new potential products to address the risks of larger, commercial farmers in the country. The pilot program is due to start in June 2005 and the EIC is receiving technical support from CRMG for the pilot. Part of the work includes the demand assessment and participatory design of the contracts with farmers in Assassa. Macro-level — Ex Ante Funding of Emergency Relief Operations: The World Bank and the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) are investigating the feasibility of index-based weather insurance as a reliable, timely, and cost-effective way of funding emergency operations in Ethiopia. Specifically, the aim is to address the more extreme emergency situations, for example, as mechanisms to cope and mobilize small or localized emergency operations already established within the system, with the availability of the GoE strategic grain and cash reserve. Hence the aim is to target vulnerable populations who are not food insecure and are not included in the country’s new safety net program but are “at risk” to income and asset losses and consumption shocks resulting from the more severe natural disasters. It is estimated that at least a further 35 percent of the population, above those estimated as chronically food insecure and covered by the safety net, is at risk from hunger in the event of an extreme drought such as in 1984. For example a traditional food aid response to a catastrophic drought in today’s prices would be estimated to cost about US$1.6 billion, for all beneficiaries, chronic and nonchronic. Instead of the traditional funding approaches that rely on protracted appeals to international donors following a drought, the insurance approach focuses on transferring this risk to the reinsurance and capital markets. Such a mechanism will ensure predictable and timely availability of funds for the DPPC to launch emergency relief operations and appropriate interventions in the event of a well-defined rainfall deficit at harvest time. Some of the benefits of this type of insurance-based emergency funding include objective payouts, timely delivery, and funding in cash. In the case of Ethiopia, the insurance approach would allow intervention four months earlier than the traditional appeals-based system. Policy objectives Both proposed agricultural risk management structures are in line with the GoE current poverty reduction strategy, which focuses on 1) agricultural-led, rural-based growth, recognizing the importance of improving the environment for exports, private-sector growth, and rural finance; and linked to this, 2) food security. Clearly the micro-level weather insurance initiatives are complementary to the government’s primary focus on agricultural development. The poverty reduction strategy is characterized by strong country ownership and focuses on a broad-based participatory process. In particular the GoE favors a gradual shift from food assistance, assistance in-kind, towards financial assistance that could be destined for the purchase of food from the domestic market . The New Coalition for Food Security is a testament to the government’s ambitious poverty reduction strategy: the main features of the safety net are multi-annual funding, transition towards cash-based programming, scaled-up public/community works, linkages with broader food-security programs, harmonized budgeting, and monitoring and evaluation. The Food Security Coordination Bureau has been created, under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, to coordinate all food-security programming, including the safety net. Targeting the nonchronically hungry but food-insecure or vulnerable populations, an index-based weather insurance approach for Ethiopia that aims to provide contingency cash funding for responses to severe and catastrophic drought is clearly in line with the government’s strategy and complementary to the safety net initiative. If the World Bank-WFP feasibility study indicates this is an appropriate approach for Ethiopia and the WFP, the aim is to pilot the concept and design an insurance contract for the WFP, transferring the risk to the international reinsurance markets for the 2006 growing season. In effect, in the pilot stage of the initiative, the WFP will be the counterparty to any commercial transaction with the international reinsurance markets and it is expected that donors will pay for the premium associated with this risk transfer. However, the ultimate aim of the initiative ideally would be for the GoE to take responsibility for this risk management program as part of their overall and long-term poverty reduction strategy. Constraints There are two major constraints that in the short term can limit the proposed risk management frameworks: 1. The first constraint comprises the weather-observing network and the weather data in Ethiopia. The National Meteorological Services Agency (NMSA) is responsible for a network of over 500 weather stations and rain gauges throughout Ethiopia. However, not all of the weather stations have the reporting capabilities or the historical data of the quality sufficient to transfer risk to the international markets or even to perform an actuarial analysis of the weather risks involved. Furthermore, given the large size and challenging topography of the country, the spatial distribution of the network is inadequate to protect the entire country from weather risk. These issues will hamper both micro- and macro-level efforts. On the micro-level, initially, only farmers who live near good weather stations will benefit from the availability of weather insurance. Furthermore, the EIC may find it difficult to secure reinsurance for this risk until the quality and security of the NMSA network improves. On the macro-level scale, the weather protection can only be designed using weather stations that adhere to the strict quality requirements of the international weather market. This will naturally limit the scope of the project in the first years. 2. The second constraint, more relevant for the macro-level weather-risk transfer, comprises fiscal constraints; namely, the ability of the government of Ethiopia to eventually take over the ex ante funding of the emergency relief operations program and take responsibility for the premium payments necessary to have this funding mechanism in place. Products and risk transfer structure Both micro- and macro-level proposals are focused on index-based weather risk management solutions. Micro-level: At the micro-level, the EIC will market and sell weather insurance contracts to kebeles (small groups of farmers) and/or farming cooperatives to protect their farmer members from the financial costs associated with crop failure as a result of adverse weather. The products will be similar in concept to the products offered to farmers in India, but it will be sold at the group rather than individual level in line with farmer preferences identified during discussions and focus groups in Assassa. The EIC will then seek international reinsurance for their portfolio of weather risk. Macro-level: At the macro-level, lack of rainfall is the dominant, immediate cause of emergency relief operations in Ethiopia. It is therefore an appropriate proxy for representing economic loss due to drought, and also a simple, objective basis for index insurance. The appropriate index must be based on a weighted average, or “basket,” of as many stations as possible to capture the macro-level nature of the risk the GoE faces. The government may be able to cope with small, localized droughts by transporting food supplies from other regions of the country and by sourcing government budget reserves. Retaining such risks will most probably be a more cost-effective solution than seeking insurance, and Ethiopia should be able to take advantage of any natural diversification of the country to reduce its insurance costs. However, in situations where drought affects several regions, is national, or when there is a severe regional drought, this reallocation of resources may not be manageable for the government, and it would be appropriate to utilize the basket-based insurance product to fund the expected emergency relief operations in a predictable and timely manner if such an event occurs. The basket approach also reduces the risk of reliance on one weather station and also the associated issues of moral hazard and basis risk. On this note, including more stations in the basket not only gives better national coverage and hence representation of the index, but also increases the placement potential of the structure in the international reinsurance markets. In the pilot stage of the program, the WFP will be the counterparty to any commercial transaction with the international reinsurance markets and it is expected that donors will pay for the premium associated with this risk transfer. However, in the event of an extreme and catastrophic drought, any payment triggered by the insurance would be made available to the GoE DPPC. This would allow the provision of resources early to the GoE and thus the beneficiaries to ensure appropriate consumption smoothing and to avoid distressed sale of assets, which is vital if the intervention is to play an effective and protective role. With the availability of cash, the intervention can also be used to fund activities, other than food aid, that are already established in other parts of the country such as: cash-transfers, food-for-work, or cash-for-work schemes. Ultimately the long-term objective would be for the GoE to go directly to the market and take responsibility of this program, rather than through the intermediary WFP. PERU: GOVERNMENT-LED SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO AGRICULTURAL RISK MANAGEMENT Country context and risk profile Peru is currently negotiating a Free Trade Agreement with the United States. One of the most vulnerable sectors to the opening of the economy is the agriculture sector because of its lack of competitiveness. In this context, the Ministry of Agriculture (MA) is preparing a multidimensional strategy that involves extension services to farmers and the engineering of innovative financial schemes, with the participation of the private sector to facilitate access to better technology and new markets. Due to farmers’ lack of bankable collateral, the MA intends to facilitate the emergence of a sustainable private agriculture insurance market Current response There have been two major efforts in the last decade to introduce agriculture insurance in Peru with disastrous results. The lack of technical knowledge and exposure to catastrophic events like El Niño generated big losses in the industry. From the consumers’ perspective, the previous schemes were not transparent and the lack of education translated into dissatisfaction about the scope and use of this financial instrument. Currently, crop insurance or similar instruments are not available to farmers. Proposed agricultural risk management structure The government of Peru (GoP) created a special commission in 2003 to draft a strategic plan for the implementation of an agriculture insurance scheme in Peru. The treasury ministry, agriculture department, insurance regulator, private and development bank representatives, farm unions, and insurance representatives participated in the discussions and recommendations for the strategic work plan. A specific body designed for that purpose is the Technical Committee for the Development of Agriculture Insurance (TCDAI), which was created by ministerial resolution in September, 2004, and is housed in the agriculture ministry. The TCDAI is currently working on several technical studies related to the design and implementation of agriculture insurance in Peru. Policy objectives The main objectives of the GoP are to 1) maintain prudent fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies, essential to attract investment and promote continued growth; and 2) complement growth with direct interventions to address inequality and poverty, focusing on excluded groups: indigenous people; Afro-Peruvians; and at-risk groups — youth and single mothers (Peru, 2004-6). Constraints In addition to fiscal constraints, Peru’s agricultural sector is divided between powerful export-oriented, high-value agricultural producers concentrated in 12 valleys along the coast, and the sierra- (highlands), and selva-based (jungle) smallholder agricultural producers. Products The technical committee, assisted by CRMG, proposes the following work plan: Design of prototype index contracts: The feasibility of these types of contracts is tested for several crops located in the three main areas of Peru (coastal, sierra, and selva). The contract design requires weather data from the Peruvian weather service (SENAMHI). This is a priority for the work plan. Demand assessment: This activity will aim at gauging the demand for weather insurance by type of producer and will include participatory design sessions that will address questions such as what types of contracts to develop and for what periods. This activity will include the training of potential end users (farmers) regarding index insurance basics (for example, types of indemnities, how are they calculated, how the contracts are settled, how the premiums are calculated). Delivery model design: Based on a mapping of rural financial intermediation in Peru, this activity will evaluate segmented delivery models that would be used for real distribution channels to reach farmers with small- and medium-sized farms with viable production potential. Prototype contracts by institution and client segment will be used to work with potential intermediaries for contract designs. Regulatory review: The purpose is to develop a strategic work plan with the insurance regulator to prepare the necessary technical documentation for the index insurance product to be approved under the guidelines of property insurance. The TCDAI has defined the following crops and areas of interest for the feasibility study: 1. Rice — San Martín 2. Mango — Piura 3. Yellow maize — Lima 4. Potato — Huanuco 5. Coffee — Cuzco 6. Cotton (Tangis) — Ica 7. Cotton (Pima) — Piura 8. Asparagus — Lima Risk-transfer structure The GoP seeks to enhance risk-taking capacity in the country generally by facilitating special risk transfer arrangements with insurance companies in Peru — particularly those that wish to launch agricultural insurance. Specifically, the GoP wishes by set up a US$50 million fund that will take agricultural risk, managed by the leading second-tier bank (COFIDE). In addition, the technical committee plans to develop index-based products for insurers that can be directly transferred into international risk markets. MONGOLIA: WORLD BANK CONTINGENT CREDIT FOR LIVESTOCK MORTALITY INDEX INSURANCE Country context and risk profile The economy of the Mongolian countryside is herder-based. Agriculture contributes nearly one-third of the national GDP and herding accounts for over 80 percent of agriculture. Animals provide sustenance, income, and wealth, protecting nearly half the residents of Mongolia. Shocks to the well-being of animals have devastating implications for the rural poor and for the overall Mongolian economy. Major shocks are common as Mongolia is a harsh climate and animals are herded with limited shelter. From 2000-2002, 11 million animals perished due to harsh winters (dzuds). The government of Mongolia has struggled with the obvious question of how to address this problem. The Mongolian government requested specific assistance in coping with extreme livestock losses. Given the nature of highly correlated death rates for animals in Mongolia, an index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) product was proposed and in May 2005, the World Bank approved a loan to Mongolia to finance the Index-Based Livestock Insurance Project. This project will support a three-season pilot program in three states in Mongolia and includes a contingent debt facility to serve as a mechanism for protecting against extreme losses during the pilot. The major objective of the pilot program is to determine the viability of IBLI in Mongolia, including testing herders’ willingness to pay for an IBLI product. The index would pay indemnities based on adult mortality rates by species and by soum (province). By law, Mongolia performs a census of animals each year. Elaborate systems are in place to assure the quality of the data. The proposed pilot involves three distinct layers of risk: 1) self-retention by the herder; 2) a base insurance product (BIP) for mortality rates in a certain range; and 3) a disaster response product (DRP) for livestock losses beyond the layer covered by the insurer. An index-based insurance program was recommended because of significant concerns about moral hazard, adverse selection, and extreme monitoring costs associated with any individual livestock insurance program in the vast open spaces of Mongolia. Weather index insurance was considered; however, it was determined that the weather events contributing to livestock deaths were too complex to develop this alternative. The project will support continued research to strengthen the mortality index by incorporating other indexes, for example the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI), as a means of establishing a more secure index for paying losses. While it is believed that the index-insurance product can be effectively underwritten, significant financial exposure for a nascent insurance market that has extremely limited access to global risk-shifting markets remains among the largest challenges. Given concerns about financing extreme losses, the pilot design involves a syndicate pooling arrangement for companies. Pooling risk among the insurance companies offers some opportunity to reduce the exposure for any individual insurer. In the short term, the government of Mongolia will offer a 105 percent stop loss on the pooled risk of the insurance companies. Herder premiums go directly into a prepaid indemnity pool. Insurers must replace the reinsurance cost and the exposure above 100 percent for the prepaid indemnity pool. In the syndicated pooling arrangement, participants share underwriting gains and losses based upon the share of herder premium they bring into the pool. Each insurer also pays reinsurance costs that are consistent with the book of business they bring into the pool. This gives the reinsurance pool the benefits of the pooling arrangement and provides the opportunity to build reserves for the overall activity. The reinsurance pool pays for the first layer of losses beyond the 105 percent stop loss. Once the reinsurance pool is exhausted, the government of Mongolia can call upon the contingent debt to pay for any remaining losses. A major advantage of having a prepaid indemnity pool is that all other lines of the insurance business are protected from the extreme losses that can occur from writing an agricultural risk policy that is highly correlated. In addition, the long-term vision is for the syndicate to be well positioned to find risk-sharing partners in the global community quickly, as the pooling arrangement is both risky and profitable. Reinsurers might be willing to provide capital and enter quota-share arrangements on that risk. To the extent that the risks within the pool are standardized, using the same measures and procedures, one can also envision this mechanism serving as a means to securitize the risk. Finally, the design also offers the opportunity to transition the system to the market once it is learned whether herders find the BIP an acceptable product and demonstrate a willingness to pay. The first challenge to the risk transfer structure is the uncertainty of the livestock mortality index based on an annual government census of all animals in the country. Several systems are in place to monitor potential problems during the pilot, for example the movement of animals across soum borders. From the perspective of the reinsurer, even the government could have the incentive to tamper with the data if this data determines the level of reinsurance claims. The project seeks to establish systems to verify losses using third-party audits. A second challenge to this structure is the sustainability of the proposed pooling mechanism that determines reinsurance premiums for each participating insurer using advanced modeling procedures. Human capital within the country must be developed to perform these duties. Pooling mechanisms generally tend to fail because of collective action problems and high transaction cost. The challenge in Mongolia will be to move the pooling mechanism to a private-sector entity by the completion of the pilot; otherwise the system will likely be unsustainable if left to the government to maintain. POTENTIAL ROLES FOR GOVERNMENTS AND THE WORLD BANK Agricultural producers and other rural residents are often exposed to a variety of biological, geological, and climatic factors that can negatively affect household income and/or wealth. In addition, agricultural producers are often faced with tremendous variability in output and/or input prices. Given this environment, risk-averse individuals will often make investment decisions that reduce risk exposure but also reduce the potential for income gains and wealth accumulation. Thus, risk contributes to the “poverty trap” experienced by rural people in many developing countries. For a variety of reasons (discussed in Chapter 2), markets for transferring these risks are typically either very limited or nonexistent. This “market failure” has stimulated a number of policy responses. Many developed countries have highly subsidized, farm-level agricultural insurance programs. Critics argue that, in addition to being very expensive, these programs stimulate rent-seeking activity, are highly inefficient, and may actually increase risk exposure by encouraging agricultural production in high-risk environments (Chapter 3). Regardless, given fiscal constraints in most developing countries, highly subsidized, farm-level agricultural insurance programs are not a realistic policy option. Index-based insurance products have been proposed as an alternative risk-transfer mechanism for rural areas in developing countries. While not a panacea for all risk problems, index-based insurance products may prove to be valuable instruments for transferring the financial impacts of low-frequency, high-consequence systemic risks out of rural areas (Chapter 4). However, for a variety of reasons, government intervention may be required to generate socially optimal quantities of risk transfer. Governments need to carefully consider the extent and nature of any intervention in markets for index-based insurance products (Chapter 5). These efforts can be facilitated by World Bank policy advice, lending instruments, and monitoring and evaluation systems (see World Bank, 2004, 2005b). This chapter sets out policy and operational implications for governments and subsequently for the World Bank operational agenda. GOVERNMENT ROLES Risks in rural areas need to be managed at the macro-, meso-, and micro-levels. Governments need to 1) Understand the country’s rural risk profile; 2) Quantify the impact of this risk on the economy and revenues; 3) Design a rural risk management framework; and 4) Implement risk reduction and risk transfer. Identify the risk profile for private and public assets and business flows A natural risk assessment identifies the types of risks that affect major private and public assets and economic activities in rural areas.40 This assessment distinguishes between micro-level risk and macrolevel risk and considers both geographical and seasonal variations. Identification of risks at the microlevel is typically based on household surveys and also specific risk surveys. The objective is to understand the types of risks that affect households and the nature of those risks. At the macro-level the assessment would consider the aggregate economic effect of household risk with a particular focus on government budget exposure. Quantify risk impacts at all levels Once the major risks have been identified, governments need to quantify the potential impact of those risks. What is the magnitude of potential physical and indirect losses for different types of assets and economic activities? As represented in Figure 7.1, a variety of indirect business flow losses often compound the direct physical losses caused by natural hazards. Design a rural risk management framework Government intervention in risk transfer markets needs to be based on a careful analysis of market shortcomings and a clear statement of how government involvement will address those shortcomings (Chapter 5). A well-designed rural risk management framework clearly delineates public and private roles in the ex ante world of risk reduction and risk financing and also the ex post world of emergency response. This framework takes country-specific objectives and constraints into account instead of replicating developed country historical models (Chapter 3). The objective is to learn from these historical examples and then apply that understanding to country-specific efforts that incorporate new and innovative risk transfer instruments (Chapter 4). Private decision makers need to know where and how government would intervene at different risk levels in order to plan accordingly. Agricultural enterprises, for example, might intensify production if a credible and reliable insurance cover is in place. Implement a risk management strategy To be successful, a well-conceived risk management strategy must be supported by a credible government commitment that is sufficiently funded over the long term. While appropriate government roles will vary to reflect country-specific circumstances, one strategy might be government intermediation of index-based risk management products that are available in international capital and reinsurance markets and also the creation of infrastructure to support the development and implementation of new private risk management products. WORLD BANK ROLES The World Bank can engage in a number of activities that, in coordination with governments, may lead to increased risk-transfer opportunities for agricultural producers and other rural residents in developing countries. In general, these activities include educational efforts, incorporating risk management into holistic rural development strategies, investment lending operations designed to encourage the development of risk transfer markets, ex ante coordination of donor responses to natural disasters, and monitoring and evaluation of the performance of index insurance instruments. Continue to build global knowledge of this new approach to agricultural risk management The World Bank is uniquely placed to reach governments and decision makers on all continents. The World Bank, in general, and ARD, in particular, can facilitate technology transfer across continents. This economic and sector work of ARD will be disseminated outside the World Bank: in FY-06, CRMG is planning Global Distance Learning events that will have a component on agricultural risk management concepts and also two workshops in two different regions, possibly in connection with weather insurance pilot project launches; and inside the World Bank, mainly through “brown-bag” lunches and a workshop. Risk management strategies should be explicitly incorporated into rural development strategy formulation and development policy lending programs While the World Bank and the IMF have a long history of assisting governments in dismantling unsustainable mechanisms for managing price risk, often this is done in the absence of alternative risk management tools or a clear risk management agenda for deregulated markets. This gap has contributed to a breakdown in marketing arrangements and credit channels so that these efforts have sometimes not produced the projected results (Kherallah et al. 2002). The importance of addressing issues of collateral policies and institutional development as an integral part of reform is now widely understood, but in many circumstances, this is not a quick or easy task. While the index-based risk management tools discussed here are not a cure-all, they can help credit institutions, producer organizations, and (in some cases) producers directly, to manage production risk, and by doing so they can help reconnect farmers to output and credit markets. In assisting policy makers in the design of reform programs, the World Bank should routinely consider how to facilitate the development of risk management instruments in the country, and should be prepared to support this process through policy advice, and in some cases, lending operations. Often, this may require reforms of collateral, macroeconomic, or regulatory policies. For example, risk management instruments using international markets cannot operate properly while exchange controls are in place. Often local regulations affecting insurance or financial markets will also need to be revised. Because government or World Bank involvement in any risk management program may require trade-offs with other means of enhancing rural development and reducing vulnerability (for example, irrigation, infrastructure, etc.), the program should be embedded in an overall rural development strategy so these trade-offs can be carefully weighed. This will also allow for linkages with other rural development objectives (for example, rural finance).The overall rural development strategy should take a holistic approach to risk management, recognizing that diversification of income sources (remittances, off-farm employment) is often an important means of reducing rural vulnerability. In addition to formal risk management markets, the strategy should consider what reforms are needed to encourage income diversification and allow farmers full choices in a functioning market place. This may include, for example, market liberalization and privatization, investments in transportation, communication, and market infrastructure, legal rights that guarantee market access (especially for women and ethnic minorities), provision of market information, and measures to better integrate rural and nonrural labor markets (see Siegel 2005; Lanjouw and Feder 2001; Lloyd-Ellis 1999; and Mead and Liedholm 1998). Attention should also be dedicated to safety nets designed to minimize the need to liquidate productive assets in times of emergency that can be scaled up quickly and efficiently (see Jorgensen and Van Domelen 1999; Jutting 1999; and Morduch 1999). Investment lending operations can be used to encourage risk management At the macro-level, a number of World Bank instruments (and those of other donors) exist or are being explored to cushion the fiscal and balance of payments adjustments required when countries are faced with shocks from natural disasters or international price movements of major commodity exports or imports. These include automatic mechanisms to adjust debt service — or even augment financing — in response to exogenous shocks. (For a full discussion, see World Bank, 2004, 2005b.) At the meso-level, risk management tools can be used to improve the functioning of government social safety net programs, either at the central or more decentralized levels. For example, index-based insurance instruments could be used to provide ex ante contingent funding that would allow safety net programs to expand when they are most needed, without the delays and uncertainties caused by reliance on the budgeting process or on external aid. Likewise, use of index-based insurance by individual farmers, associations, processors, or rural finance institutions would reduce their degree of uncertainty and facilitate primary producers’ access to credit and input markets. Although the primary World Bank tool now being used to support the development of risk management markets is AAA, investment lending projects may also be useful in some cases. Examples can be found in World Bank-facilitated price risk management efforts. In Turkey, for example, a Commodity Market Development Learning and Innovation Loan (LIL) had the objective of first supporting the development of physical commodity markets, which in the long term could evolve into a domestic platform for trading futures contracts. The project financed the upgrading of testing laboratories, warehouse facilities, and regional market infrastructure, and also technical assistance to enhance and harmonize grades and standards for some commodities, upgrade the warehouse receipts system, and improve the operations of the commodity market regulatory authority. While there is still no domestic futures trading, there has been progress toward the more limited objectives of establishing better linkages between producers and buyers and encouraging forward contracting for spot delivery, which is another means of reducing price risk. In addition, the project has facilitated more efficient price discovery: the prices for cotton and wheat determined on two exchanges which participated in the project are now used as the official record of domestic market prices for those two commodities. Monitoring and evaluation of transactions The work on index insurance in developing countries is still in an early stage and its development impact is not yet proven. A number of assumptions about the value of these instruments, their utility at the farm level, and their development impacts, need to be evaluated. CRMG has launched a first baseline study with DECRG (Research Department of the World Bank). Generally utility at the farm level can be gauged by the level of take-up of unsubsidized and unbundled products and particularly the level of repeat buying. Panel studies will reveal the actual impact of these products. Indicators are level of inputs used and diversification of farm activities, particularly the share of cash crops in the overall portfolio. Another important linkage will be to gauge if index insurance products improve access to credit or improve the terms of credit for small farmers in developing countries. Both the Indian and the Mongolian pilot project have very explicit monitoring and evaluation components that will attempt to gauge these activities. As with any innovation, index insurance products for agricultural production risk will go through some significant changes in the next few years. It is likely that we will learn that they work under some circumstances and not under others. Mistakes will be made. Learning from those mistakes will take careful evaluation and adjustments. At this stage, the key value added from index insurance products appears to be the opportunity for structured ex ante financing of catastrophic risk that is tied to highly correlated losses resulting from weather risk in agriculture. Such risk cannot be pooled at the local level and the special structures introduced in this ESW give hope that they can be shifted into global markets.

02.12.2006

Recent Agricultural Policy Reforms in North America, ERS, USDA, April 2005

Recent Agricultural Policy Reforms in North America, ERS, USDA, April 2005Steven Zahniser, Ed Young, and John Wainio, ERS, USDAThe United States, Mexico, and Canada have each made significant changes to their agricultural policies over the past several years. In the area of income supports, each country has instituted a countercyclical program that provides additional assistance to producers during downturns in commodity prices, and each continues to decouple key support programs from production decisions. In other areas, the reforms of the three countries have different points of emphasis. The United States has expanded spending on conservation activities, especially on lands in production; it has made important changes to peanut and tobacco programs; and it has implemented a new program that assists producers who are adversely affected by competition with imports. Mexico’s new efforts to strengthen the competitiveness of its agricultural sector include energy discounts for producers, and a revamped approach to agricultural finance. And Canada’s comprehensive evaluation of its farm programs is leading to new efforts concerning the environment, food safety and food quality, science, and the renewal of the agricultural sector. Please download the full version of the report (PDF, 300 kB) Over the past several years, the three largest agricultural producers of the northern half of the Western Hemisphere—the United States, Mexico, and Canada—have revised their agricultural policies (table 1). In the United States, the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (2002 Farm Act) was signed into law, providing the legal framework for U.S. farm programs through 2007 crops. In Mexico, the government responded to heightened concerns about the 2002 Farm Act, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the general state of Mexican agriculture by issuing two outlines of intended policy actions, one in 2002 and another in 2003. And in Canada, the government is engaged in a comprehensive effort to reshape its agricultural policy within the context of the Agricultural Policy Framework (APF). Mexico’s agricultural policy changes reflect a continuing effort to implement agricultural supports similar to those found in the developed economies, while still addressing the needs and wants of smaller producers who are less commercially oriented. Meanwhile, Canada’s new income stabilization and disaster protection program for producers—the Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization (CAIS) program—has emerged as the centerpiece of that country’s agricultural reform efforts, with complementary initiatives being planned for the environment, science and innovation, food safety and quality, and the renewal of the agricultural sector. During the 3 years immediately prior to these reforms (1999-2001), the United States, Mexico, and Canada provided different levels of government support to their agricultural producers. When such support is measured by the Producer Support Estimate (PSE), as calculated by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United States is estimated to have given the highest level of support (23 percent of the value of national agricultural production), followed by Mexico (21 percent) and then Canada (18 percent). The United States and Canada provide a much larger portion of their agricultural support in the form of budgetary payments to producers than does Mexico. During 1999-2001, such payments accounted for 64 percent of the U.S. PSE and 54 percent of the Canadian PSE, compared with just 34 percent for Mexico. Relative to the value of national agricultural production, budgetary expenditures on farm payments during 1999-2001 equaled 15 percent in the United States, 10 percent in Canada, and 7 percent in Mexico. With the implementation of new agricultural policies in the three countries, the relative difference between Mexico’s budgetary payments and those of Canada and the United States may narrow over the next several years. So far, Mexico’s new agricultural policies have been accompanied by a modest real increase in spending, while actual U.S. outlays associated with the 2002 Farm Act during its first 2 years of operation (fiscal years 2002-03) were well below some projections made prior to the legislation’s enactment. The U.S. development is linked to smaller-than-expected expenditures on certain price-sensitive commodity programs, due to relatively favorable prices for some crops. For 2003, budgetary expenditures on farm payments in Canada and the United States equaled 11 percent of the value of production, compared with 8 percent in Mexico. The three countries also differ in the administration of budgetary payments to producers. In 2003, Mexico based 77 percent of its payments on either input use or a long-term entitlement, while Canada and the United States distributed farm payments across a wider array of program formats. These patterns are likely to persist over the next several years, as the three countries have left the previous formats of their agricultural programs mostly intact. For instance, Canada is expected to continue devoting a much larger proportion of its farm payments to programs based on overall farm income than Mexico and the United States, since the CAIS program replaces an earlier subsidized savings plan for producers. In the case of Mexico, the different orientation of its agricultural programs reflects the profound structural differences that distinguish its agricultural sector from that of Canada and the United States. About 20 percent of Mexico’s economically active population (EAP) is engaged in agriculture, compared with just 2 percent in both Canada and the United States (table 2). But the ratio of agricultural gross domestic product to agricultural EAP is roughly $3,000 per person in Mexico, compared with $49,000 in Canada and $40,000 in the United States. Although Mexico's GDP figures may understate the size of the Mexican agricultural sector due to subsistence production and informal activities that are not tallied in official statistics, the productivity gap is nonetheless real, and Mexico's farm programs include initiatives oriented toward rural development and the amelioration of rural poverty. Despite these many differences, the agricultural reforms of all three countries share one striking similarity. Each country has created a countercyclical program that provides additional assistance to producers during a downturn in commodity prices. The United States has institutionalized the emergency assistance given to producers in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Canada has done the same by incorporating disaster assistance within the CAIS, and Mexico has formulated the Subprogram of Direct Supports to Target Income, which resembles the U.S. marketing loan program. These modifications continue a trend in which the three countries implement some income supports that are similar in their broadest features. In the mid-1990s, the three countries moved “toward policies that provide farmers with lower levels of support while simultaneously “decoupling” this support from production decisions” (Link and Zahniser, 1999: p. 18). The recent reforms do not fully reverse the earlier ones, as key supports in each country continue to be decoupled. Even with respect to the U.S. countercyclical program, payments are tied to historical production, and payment levels depend on commodity prices.

01.12.2006

Agricultural Reforms and the Use of Market Mechanisms for Risk Management

The support and subsidies provided to European farmers through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been the main reason for the limited participation of producers in risk management activities and, in particular, the use of derivative markets as a means for controlling price or yield risk. Over recent years, however, agricultural price support in the EU has been reduced and further reforms are ongoing; this is in part, a result of the necessity to change the policies of the internal market due to: the increasing cost to the taxpayers and consumers in supporting the agricultural sector, the cost of supporting the accession of the ten new member states, as well as pressures from WTO to liberalise and open the agricultural markets, particularly following the August 2004 WTO Agreement. Although the level of market price support is still very considerable, there has been a shift in support to the agricultural sector from trade distorting measures to decoupled direct payment to farmers and payments connected to rural development strategies. This implies that, where intervention prices previously offered a security net at a relatively high level below which prices would not fall, farmers’ revenue is now becoming more volatile and linked to the world prices. Preliminary investigation and statistical analysis of wheat prices suggests that, overall, the volatility of farm gate prices in EU member states has increased significantly, as a result of cuts in intervention prices and a reduction of other price support measures, following both the 1992 MacSharry and the AGENDA 2000 reforms. The ongoing reforms will result in further cuts in market price support measures which, combined with the commitment under WTO to improve market access, should increase the volatility of agricultural prices even further. Given this, the best way forward for farmers to cope with high price volatility and market uncertainty is to use market based instruments (derivatives and insurance products) in order to reduce income variability associated with price risk, provided that such instruments can be readily accessed and are economically affordable and properly understood. This report considers and outlines the opportunities and challenges related to the effective use of market based risk management products, particularly derivatives, in the European agricultural sector. Currently, the extent of use of the risk management instruments by European producers appears to vary across the EU member states and also by the type of instrument. Production and marketing contracts, particularly those with downstream participants in the supply chain, appear to be fairly common instruments adopted in a number of markets by some producers. Diversification of production and income from non-farming activities, such as rental businesses and off-farm work, are other popular risk management strategies. Insurance policies are also particularly popular in member states where insurance premia are subsidized by the government. Consistent with the trend in European agricultural policy towards reduced market intervention, in recent years, several commodity exchanges have launched new contracts on agricultural products such as milling wheat, corn, live hogs and rapeseed. As is shown in the report, derivative contracts offered by European Exchanges provide a fairly effective method for agricultural price risk management, and European producers can get the same level of risk protection as can the US farmers, using the “more established” US derivatives markets. Despite this, however, the uptake of derivative contracts by EU producers is rather limited. For instance, in the UK, it is estimated that only 11% of producers actively use derivatives for the purposes of risk management, and the level of futures trading activity is no more than equal to the level of physical production; whereas in the US, not only a higher proportion of farmers actively use derivatives, but also the volume of futures trading is, on average, 10 times higher than the level of the physical market. The main reasons for the low uptake of market-based risk management tools in the EU, identified in the report, include: Availability of Price Support through CAP Perhaps the most important reason for the limited use of market based risk management products for agricultural price risk management by farmers and producers is the security that has been provided by CAP and the inbred expectation that the consequences of price volatility will be borne by the taxpayers. In ensuring stable farm prices, the CAP has meant that producers have had little or no incentives to resort to market-based price risk management instruments. However, the ongoing reforms in CAP will result in greater variability in production prices and, hence, will make farmers more aware of the need to use risk management tools. Training and Market Information The second most important cause of the low participation in derivatives markets is lack of familiarity or understanding of risk management products due to inadequate information and training. Only a small number of European farmers and farming consultants have the knowledge, training and resources, to participate in agricultural derivatives markets and to use them for price risk management purposes. Structure of Existing Derivative Instruments The affordability of derivative instruments can sometimes be a dissuasive factor in the uptake of these products by farmers. Examples of this include the cost of buying option contracts, and the access to funds required to cover initial margins (in the case of futures contracts) and variation margins (in the case of futures and options contracts). Issues such as: quality and location mismatches between the physical production and the futures contracts; liquidity risk, due to the low trading volume in these markets; and the mixed perception of derivatives, are also reasons for the low uptake of derivatives by European producers. Regulatory Restrictions Financial regulators such as the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK and the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) in France, classify private farms (i.e. nonlimited companies) as retail investors rather than professional hedgers. This means that non-limited company farms, despite seeking to use financial instruments for hedging purposes, have to be recognised by both Futures Exchanges and their member companies in the same way as would an individual speculator. Due to regulatory requirements, the treatment of this category of financial instrument user is more complex, time consuming, and costly, and hence less attractive to all parties involved. Availability of Alternative Risk Management Tools Finally, the availability of alternative risk management methods such as, land and product diversification, crop insurance and production contracts, is another contributing factor to the low uptake of market-based price risk management instruments. Although farmers may perceive these methods to be more readily understandable and simpler to use, they may not be as efficient as other risk management techniques - such as derivative instruments and insurance policies. One of the major challenges to providers of risk management products is the diversity of the European agricultural sector due to differences in agricultural products, production levels and the structure of farm sectors across the member states. Taking these parameters into consideration, along with the reasons for the low uptake of derivatives by producers, as well as experiences from other less “protected” agricultural markets (most notably South Africa and Australia), this report proposes a number of measures to encourage and enable farmers/producers to use more efficient and effective market risk management tools to control their price, yield and income risk, i.e. Establishing an Educational and Training Programme for Agricultural Risk Management It is essential for producers to better understand the benefits of using market instruments (particularly derivatives and insurance) to manage their risk, and to be able to use such instruments confidently and effectively. The challenge is to motivate all producers to learn and eventually use these instruments in order to help them to focus on their core business activities. Training should not only be targeted at producers but also at those consultants, banks, trading houses and other organisations, to whom farmers turn for assistance in managing their risk. For instance, in the UK, Farmcare has been sponsored by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) to undertake a major risk management training and registration programme for all farming consultants (“The Risk Management Network”). It would also be beneficial to align such initiatives with the activities of other organisations actively involved in the promotion of derivative instruments in the agricultural sector, such as the Agricultural Working Group of the Futures and Options Association. Similar educational programmes have also been established by the Home-Grown Cereals Association (HGCA) in the UK, as well as in other member states, such as France and Greece. The objective of these educational programmes is to improve growers’ understanding of the basic mechanics of the grain market and the need to adopt a more strategic approach to grain marketing. These developments have been very well received by market participants and have also influenced their attitudes and perceptions towards the use of risk management tools. Delegate responses have shown that attending workshops has greatly improved their understanding and willingness to use risk management techniques including options and forward selling, based on the futures markets. This further illustrates how effective and properly implemented training schemes can affect farmer’s goals and attitudes towards risk management. Therefore, more comprehensive training programmes, co-ordinated by the appropriate authorities at European level, would greatly increase the awareness of risk in agricultural business and enhance the uptake of risk management instruments and techniques across the industry. Channelling Market Based Risk Management Products through Farmer focused Organisations Any new scheme for the education and promotion of market mechanisms for agricultural risk management should invest and build relationships with farmer-focused organisations such as Co-operatives, Farmer Controlled Businesses and Merchants. These organisations are ideal vehicles for training farmers, advising on and taking collective action in risk management activities on behalf of their members; and training schemes should enhance their ability to efficiently distribute information to the critical mass. They can also play an important role in creating economies of scale for farmers, by reducing the cost of using market risk management instruments. For instance, the World Bank Project on Commodity Risk Management presents an interesting case of how agricultural risk management projects can be tailored to meet the needs of small-scale producers. A similar approach could also be applied to promote and implement risk management projects for farmers in the EU. Development and Marketing of Flexible Derivative Instruments The diversity of the agriculture industry and business in the EU in terms of, number of products, quality differentials, regional disparities, and production cycles, indicates that more flexible risk management instruments are needed. Therefore, the success of new market-based risk management schemes and products greatly depends on their flexibility in terms of fulfilling the needs of users, simplicity in terms of trading and regulation, liquidity, efficiency and cost effectiveness. The use of flexible and tailor made Over-The-Counter products, which can be used along with exchange traded products seem to be the best way to address the need for product diversity in the agricultural sector. Such instruments can be designed to manage not only price risk but also crop yield risk, as well as weather risk, across a wide range of applications in the agricultural sector. Proactive Involvement of Exchanges, Banks and Financial Institutions The role of exchanges, banks and financial institutions working with the agricultural sector is of utmost importance because they finance farming and agricultural ventures. Experience from other agricultural economies (South Africa, Australia and the US) indicates that such institutions can have a vital role in providing appropriate infrastructure, training, and instruments, for market-based risk trading. Agricultural Policy Management The Commission and Member States need to be sensitive to the impact that the CAP, and in particular, market management activities under the CAP have on the liquidity of existing derivative markets and the development of new ones. The experience in South Africa was that during the transitional period where the Maize Board and the nascent SAFEX Agricultural Markets Division coexisted, the development of SAFEX AMD and its liquidity were threatened by the ongoing attempts by the Maize Board to continue managing the market, and in particular maize exports Overall it seems that there are opportunities for farmers and producers in different member states to make wider and more effective use of derivatives, and other risk management instruments, to stabilise their income, and that these instruments are capable of providing a viable and effective form of income protection for agricultural farmers – as they do in other sectors of the economy. It is also interesting to note that the concept of risk management is not new to the European Agricultural sector given that, prior to the post-war government policy of subsidising agricultural production, producers traditionally relied on forward dealings as a means of managing price risk, often in the form of rudimentary “to arrive” contracts. There are however, a number of issues that need to be investigated further, prior to the development of an effective action plan for making the use of market-based risk management instruments more attractive to EU producers, particularly: 1. a detailed review and assessment of the different risks which EU farmers face and of the extent to which farmers, in different regions and engaged in farming different crops, etc. are likely to use risk management products. This is an important step as very little is known about the individual goals and attitudes of farmers towards risk in different regions and member states. Understanding the producers’ needs across the different member states can also assist in appropriately channelling risk management products to the end users more efficiently; 2. the cost and effectiveness of alternative risk management tools in reducing risks associated with farming activities needs to be assessed and measured against the cost and effectiveness of the use of central subsidy under the CAP, in order to identify the economic impact of transition; 3. the need for financial service suppliers, i.e. exchanges, banks and brokers to engage more closely with the farming community. Understanding producers’ needs across the different member states will help to ensure the development of appropriate derivative and insurance products; 4. further investigation on the issue of how CAP reforms are going to affect all EU farmers and producers and, most importantly, how risk management tools can alleviate the problem of higher volatility of prices in different sectors, and across agricultural products, since this study is necessarily concentrated only on arable crops, most notably wheat, as it is the single most important agricultural produce of the EU and receives the largest share of subsidies under CAP. Amir Alizadeh PhD and Nikos Nomikos PhD, Centre for Shipping, Trade & Finance, Cass Business School

01.12.2006

The impact of crop insurance subsidies on land allocation and production in Spain

The impact of crop insurance subsidies on land allocation and production in SpainAlberto Garrido, Associate Professor, María Bielza, Research Assistant, and José M. Sumpsi, Professor, of the Departamento de Economía y Ciencias Sociales Agrarias, of the Universidad Politecnica de Madrid, SpainThe main policy conclusion of this study is that yield insurance subsidies do not seem to have a large effect on cereal production. Nonetheless, the results presented could be improved through the use of a greater number of observations and perhaps partitioning the sample by some other criteria. Secondly, more sophisticated econometric techniques could possibly answer additional policy-relevant questions than were investigated here. Nevertheless, the lack of data for those farmers who refuse to buy insurance is a serious limitation for which there is no easy solution. Spanish cereal growers generally contract agricultural insurance policies. Two insurance alternatives were available up to 1999-2000; the first covered crop destruction caused by fire, hailstorm and other extreme events. The second, called yield insurance, covered yield losses due to unfavourable crop conditions, such as drought or excessive heat, in addition to losses covered by the first scheme. As of the 1999-2000 season, growers can contract a new yield policy that expands the coverage offered by the first yield policy, with the difference that the premia are calculated on an individual basis. This study, which will cover only the first two insurance schemes, seeks to evaluate the impact of crop insurance policies on decisions made by Spanish cereal farmers. Specifically, it will aim to establish whether farmers respond to insurance subsidies by either augmenting yields (changing non-land inputs use) or by changing crop patterns, or both. It also aims to provide an evaluation of farmers’ relative risk aversion coefficients. Data was obtained from the Spanish National Agency of Agricultural Insurance (ENESA). Nine seasons, beginning with 1991-92, and a cross-section of 19 377 individual farmers serve as the reference base. The results, however, are potentially distorted by some data limitations, the most serious one being that the database includes observed cereal acreage only when an insurance policy was contracted. Missing value was thus replaced by the acreage for the most recent season for which ENESA has records. Despite the limitations, the data set offered several empirical possibilities. First, relative risk aversion coefficients were evaluated using basic theoretical results and comparing the willingness of agents to pay for insurance to the actual premium paid. Using a simple mathematical procedure based on a random selection of farmers it was possible to demonstrate that their risk preferences confirm the assumption of Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion and Constant Relative Risk Aversion, with CRRA coefficients (rr) ranging between of 0 and 4 (although 70% were between 0 and 1). Alternative econometric models were also estimated, with specifications aimed at explaining changes in insurance strategies, yields, and cereal supply. Results show that once farmers have begun to contract insurance policies, they continue to contract the same policies over time. The incentives influencing farmers’ decisions to buy insurance, however, differ from those that seem to guide their decisions about switching from low- to high-coverage policies. It was also found that individuals subject to large production risks tended to insure more than those operating in less risky conditions. The results of the yields equations, interpreted jointly with those obtained from the supply equations, show that farmers tend to obtain lower yields when they contract insurance, but may increase cereal acreage. The effect of the expected cereals and other crop prices, as well as the expected price variance and direct per hectare payments, confirm a priori economic theories. In other words price effects on yields and supply are larger than the effects of the remaining variables. It is thus clear that policies affecting cereal prices do act as important incentives influencing farmers’ decisions. The cereal supply equations show that insurance subsidies tend to increase cereal supply. However, subsidies for yield insurance have less impact on production than do subsidies for insurance against fire and hailstorm. In elasticity terms, the effects on production of subsidies to both types of insurance policies are smaller than the effects of price or other direct support policies. Absolute and relative effects of price support, area payments and insurance subsidies have been evaluated using the corresponding supply elasticities estimated from the production models. The benchmark for the estimation of the relative effects of the different instruments is a 1% increase in market prices. The same absolute increase in support is then applied in the form of an increase in area payments or an increase in the insurance subsidy. The results show that price effects and insurance subsidies are somewhat similar, but that the effects of area payments are much greater. However, it should be noted that the amount of additional subsidy that would have to be given on insurance (in order for the increase to be equivalent to the increase in market price support) is 54% for increase yield insurance. In the case of fire and hailstorm insurance the extra subsidy to be distributed is so large that the farmer would actually purchase the insurance for free, and even receive a financial bonus for doing so. The main policy conclusion of this study is that yield insurance subsidies do not seem to have a large effect on cereal production. Nonetheless, the results presented could be improved through the use of a greater number of observations and perhaps partitioning the sample by some other criteria. Secondly, more sophisticated econometric techniques could possibly answer additional policy-relevant questions than were investigated here. Nevertheless, the lack of data for those farmers who refuse to buy insurance is a serious limitation for which there is no easy solution.

12.08.2006

Analytical report "Development of Agricultural Insurance and Reorganization of Insurance premiums Subsidy Program in Ukraine" (June 2006)

Roman Shynkarenko Analytical report "Development of Agricultural Insurance and Reorganization of Insurance premiums Subsidy Program in Ukraine" was prepared by Roman Shynkarenko for Agricultural Policy, Legal and Regulatory Reform Project (USAID) in May-June 2006. The report provides review of regulatory documents in the area of agribusiness insurance; defines legislative obstacles for creation of new insurance products; and proposed the concept for agricultural insurance system development in Ukraine. This report was prepared by short-term consultant according to the terms of reference to provide analysis of the agricultural insurance system in Ukraine reflecting the impact of the government subsidies. The document provided the ideas for further agricultural insurance development in Ukraine and possible strategies for government participation. The consultant analyzed international experience in development of the insurance system for agribusiness sector focusing on regulatory and operational aspects. The report proposed the possible changes/development activities required for establishing an effective risk mitigation system in agribusiness. The structure of the analytical report: A. Overview of the agricultural insurance system in Ukraine; B. Current legislation regulating agricultural insurance; C. Functions of the government agencies and other relevant institutions; D. Problem issues at the agricultural insurance segment: i.    Agricultural insurance products currently offered at the market; ii.   Methodological issues and problems; iii.  Statistics; iv.  Farmers access' to insurance services; v.  Use of insurance instruments by finance institutions and agribusiness partners; E. International experience and practices; F. Possible strategies and instruments for agricultural insurance development in Ukraine; G. Activities, legislation and resources required; H. Expected outcomes of the modified/new agricultural insurance system; I. Suggested further activities Annexes: Annex 1. Example of Statistical Data on Agricultural Insurance in Italy Annex 2. Resources and Documents used for report Annex 3. Crop Insurance System in Spain Annex 4. Crop Insurance in the USA – General Policies and Provisions Annex 5. Building Agribusiness Risk Management System: Strategy and Stages of Development Download report (PDF) 1MB                               Please read selected sections of the report below: Abstract from section A. Overview of the agricultural insurance system in Ukraine General information According to the State Commission for Regulation of Financial Services Markets, there were 426 insurance companies in Ukraine registered by December 31, 2005. Most of these companies are small and operate either in several regions or work with selected types of insurance products. Approximately 180 companies received licenses for agricultural insurance though most of them keep licenses as an option for working with the agricultural risks in the future. Agricultural insurance system in Ukraine is underdeveloped and represents a modest segment of the general insurance system in the country. About 30 companies regularly underwrite agricultural risks and 10 companies out of TOP-50 list dominate the segment. Most of these companies operate nationwide with regional offices established in most administrative regions (oblasts). The number of insurers servicing agricultural sector remains relatively stable during the last four years. The list of dominating companies includes Oranta, ASKA, Etalon, Veksel, Credo-Classic, TAS, etc. These companies tried to develop agricultural insurance products since 2001 when the Government of Ukraine declared its interest in establishing the national agricultural risk mitigation system. It should be indicated that the overall efforts had limited success until the government introduced agricultural insurance subsidy program in late 2005. Agricultural sector profile and potential market volume for insurance Ukraine is one of the biggest world producers of sugar beet, grain and oilseeds crops. The agricultural sector accounts for approximately 15% of country’s GDP with annual production volume of 50 billion UAH or 10 billion USD. There are about 40,000 private and 16,000 commercial farms. Private households produce approximately 60% of fruits, vegetables, milk and meat per annum. Ukrainian agrarian sector supplies annually about 40 million ton of grain, 16 million ton of sugar beet, 5 million ton of oilseeds and 27 million ton of fruits and vegetables . Assuming experience of other countries where agricultural insurance is in the development stage, it is estimated that about 20% of Ukrainian producers might insure 25-30% of the annual crop production volumes. This means that the insured sum (Value at Risk) might be approximately 3 billion USD that can make Ukraine an attractive market for international reinsurance community. The potential annual premium sum might be around 250-300 million USD being equal to the current Ukrainian government support budget for agricultural sector per year. Risk management strategies and producers’ attitude to insurance Ukrainian farms and agribusiness have limited choice of risk management instruments. The major risks, as the farmers indicate, are weather, price and marketing risks and changes in government regulation and legislation. Producers try to manage weather risks by using insurance, diversification (seasonal, crop types, crop rotation and combination of crop production with animal husbandry) and seasonal finance. Most farms have no finance reserves or liquid assets which can be employed in case of getting critical losses due to unfavorable weather events. According to the farmers’ surveys , producers consider drought (34%), natural calamities (56%), low prices (39%), winterkill (22%) and pests (21%) to be the most considerable risks for their farming activities. It is necessary to indicate that the overall risk comprehension for natural calamities and low prices has a tendency for growth, meaning that producers adjust their production practices to mitigate the impact of particular risk events (drought, winterkill and hail). At the same time, the farmers tend to purchase less Multi-Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI) and more of named peril coverage (see the graph below). About 90-95% of insurance contracts in 2002-2005 were purchased by the farmers on demand of the commercial banks to be able to obtain seasonal and mid-term credits. According to Ukrainian legislation (The Law on Collateral), all pledged property (collateral) should be insured and the banks strictly follow this requirement. The farmers treat this requirement as an additional tax and tend to choose the cheapest insurance coverage to minimize their costs associated with credit provision. The situation is changing during the last two years however the overall agricultural insurance volumes grow slowly. There is lack of trust to insurance sector from the farmers’ side. The insurance companies just recently started to publicize their payouts results and this information mostly does not reach farmers. The producers suffered big crop losses in 2003 due to winterkill and severe drought in May-June but the insured farms had problems with getting payouts because of tricky contract wording and unclear terms definitions. Insurance companies deferred payouts as long as six months or refused to compensate farmers’ losses even under the threat of going to the court for disputes’ resolution. Negative experience of year 2003 is remembered by the farmers and many of them tend to treat insurance companies as unreliable partners till now. Questioning of farmers provides that most farm directors and owners lack understanding of insurance principles. Many of them consider that insurance policy should cover any crop losses as it was practiced during the old USSR times. The farmers do not read contracts thoroughly and are unfamiliar with most of insurance terms and specific provisions. There are many cases when producers ask for the cheap price of the insurance coverage neglecting the level of deductible and coverage as well as the definition of risks and description of loss adjustment procedures. Such practice results in misunderstanding of the coverage amount and leads to confusion when the risks take place. G. Activities, legislation and resources required The legislation requires minor changes to introduce an integrated risk management and insurance system. It is advised to exclude provision on the mandatory agricultural insurance from article 7 of the Law on Insurance. This provision is not active since its introduction and it would be the overall benefit if it was cancelled. It is considered that a law on agricultural insurance could be adopted. This law could identify the functions and responsibilities of the government agencies as well as setting up the basics of the Government of Ukraine’s strategies on agricultural risk management and insurance strategy. It might be necessary to adopt a special law on the risk management and insurance agency if the Government would consider this option. This agency (ARMA) or MAP should take responsibility for development of the national agricultural risk and insurance program (strategy) for the next 5 or 10 years indicating the long-term nature of this strategy. This program should be approved by the Parliament or the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine being the basic document for the agricultural insurance and risk management national system. The Parliament should consider provision on the necessary operational and subsidy budget allocations for the nearest 5 years. The annually approved allocations would put the program in tight situation and would prevent the agency from development of a sound system. Alternatively, the government might consider foundation of a special department within the Ministry of Agrarian Policy or the Regulator though the success of such initiative would greatly depend on the mandate of the department and human resource factor. It is important that either the agency or the department would be capable to employ professional staff and qualified personalities. In case the government would like to leave the insurance issues within the MAP area of responsibility, it would be vitally important for the department to be able to provide informational and educational campaign for farmers and insurance specialists. The annual programs should be developed and announced far in advance before the annual insurance marketing campaign started. The most important issue would be acceptance of the national agricultural insurance program by the Parliament and the Cabinet of Ministers. The legislators should be explained the benefits of the new risk management system and the conceptual basics required for its successful implementation. The Law on the State Support of Agricultural Sector should be redesigned and modified as most of the insurance-related provisions do not correspond to the needs of the modern agricultural insurance system. H. Expected outcomes of the modified/new agricultural insurance system The new agricultural insurance system should provide a wide range of risk management instrument to the producers as well as making Government support more structural, logical and transparent. The suggested instruments and activities should help the producers to stabilize their annual revenues from agricultural production. The new system will introduce fair and reliable strategies that the farmers and their partners (banks, input suppliers, processors, traders, etc.) can employ to improve their contract and partnership relations making agricultural production predictable and contractual obligations executable. Initially, the Government would be required to provide substantial finance support to develop a new insurance and risk management system though within some time the need in government support should go down transferring part of the catastrophic assistance functions to the private insurance sector. The new agricultural insurance system should target insurance of 20% to 50% of the farms in the country within the next 5 years. The insured volumes of production can be within 40-70% from the total production volumes. The government agencies should monitor the introduction of the new insurance system making the necessary legislative and organizational modifications when required. The new agricultural insurance system should be discusses with the private insurance companies that need to understand the concept and strategic objectives of the program from the nearest 5-10 years. The insurance and risk management measures fall in the green and yellow boxes of the WTO which are accepted by the international community and should provide easier access of the Ukrainian agricultural produce to the international markets. I. Suggested further activities The Agricultural insurance working group should discuss the possible strategies for further development of the insurance and risk management system in Ukraine. Its suggestions and decisions should be delivered and introduced to the main policy-making bodies of Ukraine including the Parliament, the Cabinet of Ministers, the Ministry of Agrarian Policy, the Regulator, the Ministry of Finance and other potentially interested institutions. The group should formulate clear the strategy papers that should be discussed with the private insurance companies, farmers, agricultural professional organizations and other interested parties. The government should make decision on how it would like to modify the existing agricultural insurance system. The present system established very high targets that usually not possible to achieve without good actuarial support and thorough informational activities. MPCI is one of the most difficult agricultural products and its introduction requires many years until the acceptable and sustainable results can be achieved. Ideally, it would be the best to establish a separate government agency that would accept full responsibility for development of insurance system and design of a wide set of agricultural insurance products. This agency might need to contract the best available professionals (domestic and international) at the initial stage to initiate the system and to design a framework for the future activities. The government should initiate a working group including the representatives from the key government institutions (MinFin, the Regulator and MAP) which should be responsible for design of the strategic plan and its adoption by the policy makers. Further, the risk management agency (or other responsible institution) will need to take a lead in development of new products and modification of the present ones. This institution should be capable to make regular and quality analysis of the system operation to be able to introduce changes if any of the products would not work properly. The institution will need to set a clear requirements list for the insurance companies that might be interested in working with agricultural risks. It will make no sense to allow any insurer to be involved as agricultural insurance is difficult and resource demanding activity. According to the current practice and international experience, it seems that there need to be from 10 to 20 insurance companies who might qualified for participating in the program. Источник - www.agroinsurance.com

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